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  Executive Summary 
 
 
 
 
1. Much debate surrounds the potential role of Intermediate Labour Markets (ILMs) in 
assisting the long-term unemployed into unsubsidised jobs. ILM activity has grown 
significantly and ILMs play a significant role in the delivery of the New Deals.  
 
2. For this report, we defined ILMs as a diverse range of initiatives that typically provide 
temporary waged employment in a genuine work environment with continuous support to 
assist the transition to work. 
 
3. The research also involved an international review of evidence on the impact of these 
programmes in other countries. Particular attention was paid both to the development of 
ILM type activity, and to newly emerging Transitional Employment Programmes (TEPs). 
These TEPs share many features with ‘StepUP’, the pilot programme that in selected 
areas in England, Scotland and Wales now provides up to a year of paid work to long-
term unemployed people who would otherwise rejoin the New Deal. 
 
4. Unlike traditional job creation programmes, TEP programmes typically target the hardest 
to place unemployed and combine short periods of paid work experience with additional 
support and job placement services aimed at getting participants into regular jobs. TEPs 
also make more extensive use of private sector job placements.  
 
5. The terms ILMs and transitional employment are very often used inter-changeably. We 
suggest the following as the basis for further discussion: 
 
1. ILMs describe local initiatives and where there is a direct social benefit from the work 
2. transitional employment is a more generic term, which covers temporary wage-based 
interventions (including national programmes) and where the transitional jobs may be in 
the private sector. 
 
 
The National Survey 
 
6. The national ILM survey was distributed to ILMs identified through Inclusion’s database 
and via Jobcentre Plus. We received 73 replies from organisations that employed over 
7,000 ILM employees. We estimate that there is a minimum of 8,700 ILM and transitional 
jobs in the UK, suggesting that almost 14,000 people were supported in 2002/3.  
 
7. Two-thirds of ILMs are based on New Deal 18-24 and/or 25+, and 80 per cent of the 
respondents receive European funding.  
 
8. New Deal represents only 25 per cent of the total turnover of ILMs. This shows that ILMs 
attract significant additional public and private sums. The Department of Work & 
Pensions is usually perceived as the main Government stakeholder, but the survey shows 
that other Government Departments and funders have a significant stake holding.  
 
9. The survey has found a range of contract lengths.  There is some evidence that longer 
contracts improve job outcome rates, although this is not clear-cut.  Further, it is not 
possible from the survey evidence to categorically say whether non-New Deal ILMs 
I  
  
recruit more employable people.  
 
10. The overall average for job outcomes, across all the ILMs surveyed was 43 per cent. 
However, this average disguises a wide range of job outcome rates. For example, the 
average for non-New Deal ILMs was 67 per cent. Comparison with job outcomes for New 
Deal 18-24 ETF and Voluntary Sector options is difficult for a number of reasons. 
However, some tentative comparisons can be made.  
 
11. Comparison of New Deal ILMs and New Deal ETF and Voluntary options gives an 
increase in job outcome rates for ILMs of between 8 to 26 percent, depending at which 
point job outcomes are measured. It is likely that the increase in job outcomes lies 
between these two extremes.  
 
12. Increased performance is most marked in the case of the non-New Deal ILMs but a direct 
comparison cannot be made because of key differences in recruitment, processes and 
recording of outcomes.  
 
13. When more valid comparisons are made then performance of the 26 week New Deal-
based ILMs only marginally improves on ETF/VS. New Deal-based ILMs that extend 
beyond 26 weeks deliver more job outcomes than New Deal ETF/VS but again direct 
comparisons cannot be made.  
 
14. The cost of ILMs varies considerably. The Marshall and MacFarlane average figure of 
£13,860 per job per year has been extensively quoted as evidence of high cost. This 
survey has found the equivalent figure to be £11,134. The ILM cost per participant is 
£8,394, and the average cost for only those ILMs offering a 26-week contract is £7,182. 
The equivalent New Deal ETF and Voluntary Sector options cost is £5,076. 
 
15. However, there is an important caveat. A proportion of the additional funds for ILMs have 
been secured to support the work output. Putting a value to the work output of ILMs is 
difficult and not part of this survey. 
  
16. The survey has confirmed a number of key characteristics about ILMs:  
 
• they are predominantly designed for, and recruit, those unemployed with the least 
employability 
• they are locally driven and ‘join-up’ different Government and EU funding streams 
• ILMs encompass a wide range of different models and work activities 
• those that are based on the New Deals improve the performance of the ETF and 
voluntary sector options and New Deal 25+ IAP 
• the cost of ILMs is not as high as previously thought 
• medium-sized ILMs with job contracts over 26 weeks appear to be the best at 
maximising job outcomes. 
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The International and Evidence Reviews  
 
17. ILMs often are associated with the subsidised employment programmes which remain 
significant in many European countries. There are examples of effective subsidised 
employment programmes, and the following factors appear causal to this success: 
 
• the work should be close to the regular labour market 
• targeting programmes at the most disadvantaged  
• job search improves job outcomes  
• combining work experience with skills training and basic skills  
• a requirement to participate reduces ‘deadweight’ 
• larger programmes are less effective. 
 
 
ILMs and TEPs in Europe 
 
18. Several Europe-wide reviews combined with British ILM evidence suggest: 
 
• Waged work experience provides a better preparation for a real job  
• The ability to ‘join up’ and integrate interventions  
• The capacity to generate additional local/regional area effects in terms of local income 
multipliers. 
 
19. The case study evidence reinforces the importance of successful implementation and 
suggests factors that underpin effective interventions: 
 
• Project staff capable of balancing the needs of the participant with the requirements of 
a realistic wage-based environment 
• Developing a range of work placements that are both appropriate for disadvantaged 
groups recruited and provide relevant employment experience  
• Training and personal development opportunities that enhance motivation and 
progression 
• Strong management and networks that link with other local economic and social 
agencies. 
 
 
Transitional Jobs in the USA 
 
20. The policy debate surrounding paid and unpaid employment experience programmes in 
the U.S. has intensified. The first significant groups of welfare recipients have exhausted 
their benefit ‘time limits’ and the next phase of welfare reform will impose federal 
requirements on States to engage more welfare recipients in work and for longer periods 
per week.  
 
21. One review of U.S. transitional employment programmes concluded that when poorly 
targeted and implemented, programmes had little effect on employment rates. Other 
findings demonstrate that targeted, well-designed, and time-limited paid work experience 
programmes can generate additional net employment and earnings, and produce 
significant outputs in low-income communities.  Factors associated with effective 
performance are: 
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• Eligibility: transitional jobs should be restricted to those not placed into unsubsidised 
jobs by the lower cost interventions provided in work-first systems. 
• Assessment: there should be effective screening procedures to identify those for 
whom a transitional job can work.  
• Work Placement Diversity: a range and bank of placements are needed to match 
participant and labour market conditions.  
• Work Preparation: many of the programmes provided pre-work placement preparation 
courses, especially for lone parents with no experience of the workplace.  
• Job Search, Retention and Job Developers: all transitional workers receive help 
searching for unsubsidised employment, but when provided through another agency 
there are problems with tracking outcomes and retention.  
• Case Managers and Networking: evaluations emphasise the importance of skilled case 
managers.  
• Implementation: successful programmes require collaboration between a range of 
organisations and this needs effective management.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
22. The survey reveals a network of organisations that have developed wage-based work 
experience programmes and play a central part in the delivery of national and EU 
employment programmes. They generate relatively high, although as yet untested, job 
outcomes and they provide work experience to disadvantaged groups. 
  
23. The international review and survey suggests common elements to successful ILMs: 
 
1. Targeting of the most disadvantaged. 
2. Targeting of geographical areas. 
3. Devised and controlled at the local level. 
4. Managing the transition from benefits to a waged employee. 
5. Support services for the individual employee. 
6. Access to training. 
7. Work that is close to conventional labour market conditions. 
8. Local partnership. 
9. Integration of national initiatives.  
10. Investment in staff capacity. 
 
24. There also appear to be certain pre-conditions for the emergence of ILMs,:  
 
1. A concentration of long-term unemployed people, and/or those with multiple barriers. 
2. Various funding streams targeted at the area or client group. 
3. Under-performing national interventions, and where local partners are committed to 
and empowered to improve performance. 
4. National rules that are sufficiently flexible to enable ‘joining-up’. 
 
25. Finally, there are three key questions for policy makers. 
 
26. First, if it is true that ILMs will emerge under certain conditions, should Government 
encourage or inhibit them? 
 
27. Second, can British ILMs and international experience with TEPs inform the development 
of existing New Deals to increase job outcome rates for the most disadvantaged? 
 
28. Third, should there be new and separate initiatives that learn from ILMs and TEPs that are 
IV 
 
 
 
 
targeted on specific groups of people and/or areas? 
 
29. The survey evidence and international experience suggests there are gains to be made in 
job outcome rates from the adoption of a stronger waged focus to interventions for the 
most disadvantaged people and areas. However, this must be done by robust targeting of 
those most disadvantaged and by national frameworks that encourage local labour market 
initiatives. 
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1.    Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 There has been much debate about the role that Intermediate Labour Markets (ILMs) 
could play in the Government’s welfare to work strategy. Some advocate that the wage-
based work experience offered through ILMs provides a tested model to facilitate an 
effective route into work for many of the disadvantaged groups furthest from the labour 
market. Others stress the unique capacity of ILMs both to improve the employability of 
the long-term unemployed and contribute to the social and physical regeneration of poor 
neighbourhoods. Critics, however, suggest that the achievements claimed for ILMs are 
over stated, arguing instead that ILM employment is expensive and could deflect the 
unemployed from looking for regular jobs.  
 
1.2 Following the election of the Labour Government in 1997 there has been a significant 
increase in ILM activities in Great Britain and the wage-based approach has been adopted 
by a wider range of organisations delivering the New Deals and other employment and 
regeneration programmes, often funded in part by the European Union.  
 
1.3 The Government is also further exploring the potential of a coherent transitional 
employment programme through its ‘StepUP’ pilots. These target the growing number of 
New Deal participants who are re-qualifying for a second or third spell in the programme. 
The pilots aim to test whether a wage-based work experience programme will be more 
effective in getting this group into regular jobs. In twenty selected localities up to 5,000 
participants are to be offered a temporary job at minimum wage for up to 50 weeks. 
 
1.4 It was in this context that the Department for Work and Pensions sought to improve its 
knowledge base of ILMs and transitional employment programmes by commissioning 
research from the University of Portsmouth and the Centre for Economic & Social 
Inclusion.  
 
1.5 This report is designed to inform the debate. It contains the results from the most 
extensive national survey of ILM activity throughout Britain. It also contains detailed 
findings from an international and systematic review of evidence on the impact and 
lessons of ILM-type projects and Transitional Employment Programmes (TEPs) in other 
countries. 
 
 
What Are ILMs and Transitional Employment Programmes? 
 
1.6 The first British ILMs were created in the 1980s just as the then Government brought to a 
close the large scale Community Programme that had provided temporary jobs for the 
long-term unemployed. The Wise Group of companies in Glasgow pioneered the 
combination of a variety of grants and contracts that enabled it to provide temporary jobs 
that paid wages to the long-term unemployed in a regular work environment (McGregor et 
al, 1997). The aim was to create an ‘Intermediate Labour Market’ that could act as a 
bridge between long-term unemployment and the mainstream labour market. The Wise 
Group provided training but placed most emphasis on the role that wage-based work 
experience played in facilitating the transition to a regular job, often for very long-term 
unemployed people who had already been recycled through mainstream employment 
programmes. Wise Group projects also delivered goods and services, such as heat 
insulation, to low income households in the most disadvantaged parts of the city. 
1 
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1.7 Throughout Britain local partnerships and organisations were inspired by the Wise Group 
and later Glasgow Works approach and by the late-1990s a number of durable ILM 
organisations had emerged from the many experimental local variants. These ranged in 
size from small scale projects involving as few as a dozen ILM workers through to larger 
projects delivered by organisations, such as Groundwork Trusts, or delivered through 
local partnership organisations in cities like Glasgow and Liverpool. 
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 A flow chart of the typical processes used by ILMs in the UK 
 New Deal participants, 
mostly joining ETF/VS  
Recruited to ILM 
Either through: 
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• direct referrals through 
Settling in period 
• getting used to work ag
• preventing early drop-o
Training 
 
• up to 1 d
• most take
Leave to a job Other ou
eg. NVQ
Post-employment support 
• some ILMs offer employee and 
employer support 
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Personal Support 
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• Mostly 3 to 4 days 
per week 
• usually of 
community benefit  
The ILM experience 
 
 tcomes 
 
Return to benefits 
or other 
destinations 
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What We Mean by Intermediate Labour Markets 
 
1.8 ILMs are now found in most high unemployment areas in Britain but, crucially, there is 
no national ILM programme. There is instead a network of diverse organisations that 
provide temporary wage-based employment, usually to the long-term unemployed, and 
mostly deliver jobs and services to disadvantaged individuals or communities. They 
typically rely on a combination of funding streams and most stress the importance of the 
contribution they make to physical and social regeneration. Their primary focus is, 
however, on improving employability through also providing training and personal 
support. ILMs may best be defined as a diverse range of local initiatives that typically 
provide temporary waged employment in a genuine work environment with continuous 
support to assist the transition to work. 
 
 
What We Mean by Transitional Employment 
 
1.9 In many other countries Governments have, since the late 1980s, continued to utilise 
temporary job creation or employment experience programmes and these have often been 
delivered by providers who shared many characteristics with British ILMs. There has, 
however, recently been a significant change in the characteristics of some of these 
‘employment experience’ programmes and many now place far more emphasis on getting 
the long-term unemployed into regular jobs. Most significantly a new generation of TEPs 
have begun to emerge, especially in the United States, and this approach is now being 
tested in the United Kingdom both through the ‘StepUP’ pilot programme in Britain and 
through ‘Worktrack’ in Northern Ireland (Worktrack is described more fully in case study 
1 at the end of this Chapter).  
 
1.10 Unlike traditional job creation programmes these TEP programmes typically target the 
hardest to place unemployed and combine short periods of paid work experience with 
additional support and job placement services aimed at getting participants into regular 
jobs. TEPs also make more extensive use of private sector job placements but unlike 
conventional employment subsidies the goal of the programme is to offer temporary, 
relevant and realistic work, rather than a contract of employment and continuing 
employment with a particular employer. 
 
 
Is This Difference Important? 
 
1.11 The terms ILMs and transitional employment are very often used inter-changeably. This is 
not surprising given that they share the same general approach and have the same core 
elements in delivery. The key distinctions, however, are important for policy-makers. We 
suggest the following as the basis for further discussion: 
 
1. ILMs describe local initiatives and where there is a direct social benefit from the 
work 
2. Transitional employment is a more generic term, which covers temporary wage-
based interventions (including national programmes) and where the transitional 
jobs may be in the private sector. 
 
1.12 The distinction is important because the value of ILMs may be their local nature – devised 
by local partners with the intention of enhancing support to the unemployed and providing 
synergy between national funding streams. If ILMs were to be generally encouraged this 
implies mechanisms would need to focus on enabling local partners to develop and 
operate local labour market initiatives. 
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1.13 Conversely, how we are using the term ‘transitional employment’ includes national 
programmes that are usually funded from one source. In this instance, different 
mechanisms will be used to stimulate the approach e.g. StepUP or Worktrack in Northern 
Ireland. However, transitional employment can also be used to describe locally devised 
initiatives, specifically where the private sector is used for job placement. 
 
1.14 In summary, whilst we accept that there is bound to be much inter-changeability in the use 
of the terms, we do suggest that the Department for Work and Pensions, and other 
Government Departments, need to be clear in their use of the terms.  
 
 
The Research and Evidence Base 
 
1.15 This report contains the findings of both a national survey of ILMs and a review of 
international evidence and best practice. 
 
1.16 The national survey of ILMs was carried out between December 2002 and February 2003. 
A detailed questionnaire, reproduced in Appendix B, was distributed through a broad 
range of ILM networks. There were 73 usable responses returned by organisations that in 
combination were delivering over 7,000 ILM jobs across the country. The detailed results 
are given in Chapter 2. 
 
1.17 The international and systematic review of evidence and ‘what works’ was carried out 
between October 2002 and May 2003 (the methodology is outlined in Appendix A). 
Broadly there were two distinct types of evidence generated through what became a multi-
layered research process. There was descriptive and case study literature on a broad range 
of what could be described as ILM projects, initiatives and providers. This literature on 
providers or small programmes sometimes contained performance information to support 
claims of effectiveness but more rigorous evaluations were scarce. The only case study 
literature that both described and evaluated the job entry performance of ILM providers 
was British and none of the reports used a control group methodology to establish net 
impacts. 
 
1.18 The other significant body of evidence comprised statistical evaluations that used varieties 
of survey and administrative data to assess the impact of national programmes that 
provided or provide temporary employment in socially useful jobs for the long-term 
unemployed. These evaluation techniques most often were used to assess the impact of 
subsidised employment and other programmes in European countries, especially in 
Northern Europe, Australia, New Zealand and North America. 
 
1.19 The methodological rigour of these micro economic studies varied but many sought to 
establish the ‘net impact’ of programmes. They typically would use multivariate analysis 
to compare and contrast the employment rates of ex-participants with those of a 
constructed control group that either did not participate or participated in another type of 
programme (such as a direct employer subsidy). The evaluations could not be compared 
with each other. They differed in design, analytic methods, samples, time periods, and 
analysed programmes implemented in very dissimilar national systems. The evidence has 
been assessed, however, to extract key lessons about the weaknesses and strengths of 
what, in Europe, is usually still referred to as ‘subsidised employment’. 
 
1.20 The USA provided the richest source of evaluation evidence, especially on TEPs. These 
relatively new programmes have been designed explicitly to exploit the advantages 
offered by a temporary wage-based experience in preparing disadvantaged job seekers for 
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regular employment. They often are targeted to those welfare recipients, frequently lone 
parents, who have not been placed in regular work by ‘work first’ job entry programmes. 
There were no experimental evaluations of these programmes but there were many 
independent assessments of both providers and state-wide systems now operative in places 
such as Washington and Georgia. Much of this literature has been published by leading 
research organisations in the USA that have done so much to create high quality 
evaluations and to stimulate effective inter-State policy transfer. This includes 
Mathematica, the Urban Institute, the MDRC (Manpower Development Research 
Corporation), and the Brookings Institute.1 
 
 
Terminology and Concepts 
 
1.21 There are complex debates about the accuracy of the methods used to establish the impact 
and cost effectiveness of labour market programmes (Smith, 2000). The descriptive 
statistics contained in many case study reports on the job entry rate of participants, for 
example, may be misleading if there is no way of measuring selection bias or the fate of 
participants without the programme. There are several dimensions of this evaluation 
problem and the terminology that is used to describe and measure them is used 
extensively throughout the report. 
 
1.22 The first issue concerns deadweight, that is, the proportion of people getting work 
through a programme who would have done so without the assistance. Another key aspect 
is whether a programme has helped create or destroy regular jobs, and whether 
programme leavers have taken jobs that would have gone to other job seekers. These 
effects are called displacement and substitution. The management and minimisation of 
displacement effects in the private and public sectors has significantly constrained the 
design of job creation programmes. High substitution, in contrast, may indicate that a 
programme is redistributing work rather than creating it, but this may be a desired 
outcome if those placed into work would not otherwise gain a foothold in the labour 
market. 
 
1.23 A variety of approaches are used to assess these different factors in order to establish the 
impact of programmes on employment outcomes. Experimental studies, or randomised 
trials where people are assigned to either a ‘treatment’ or ‘non-treatment’ group, represent 
the most accurate way of measuring deadweight (Smith, 2000, p. 5). These studies are, 
however, costly to implement, technically demanding, and in many countries outside the 
USA there are ethical or legal constraints regarding the arbitrary allocation of an 
individual to a ‘non-treatment’ group.  
 
1.24 Quasi-experimental evaluations by contrast subject relatively adequate administrative and 
survey data to a variety of statistical techniques designed to compare the experience of 
programme participants with those of a closely matched comparison group. In these 
studies the choice of relevant variables and their use within a particular methodological 
approach can also create bias and variation, making comparison across these studies still 
more difficult. Ironically, one impetus behind the emphasis now given to random 
assignment evaluations in the USA was the excessive variation in the results generated by 
different comparison-group methods that used the same data sets to assess the impact of 
                                                     
1 MDRC are planning to implement a random assignment evaluation of projects that work with the ‘Hard-
to-Employ’, two of which are likely to be transitional jobs providers. Results, however, are unlikely to be 
available for at least three years (see http://www.mdrc.org/project_20_8.htm
 
l) 
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CETA (the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act) a large element of which 
involved public sector job creation for disadvantaged groups (Maynard, 1987). 
 
1.25 In contrast to these techniques the evaluations of individual ILMs and of transitional jobs 
programmes tend to rely on management information systems and/or survey and interview 
evidence to assess impacts and effectiveness. The evaluation of the transitional 
employment programme in Washington State is the most robust and utilised data both 
from a large-scale longitudinal panel study and from Unemployment Insurance 
administrative data sets. 
 
 
Approach to the Evidence and Structure of the Report 
 
1.26 In addition to the results of our survey of British ILMs the research process generated an 
extensive and complex evidence base. The aim was to use this material to assess the 
impacts of ILM type projects and TEPs in other countries; to review international best 
practice; to discover ‘what works’; to guide the choice of comparator countries; and to use 
case studies to explore contemporary policy developments and the operational realities 
that underpinned the impact of particular projects and programmes.  
 
1.27 The first chapter of the report briefly assesses the evolution of temporary employment 
programmes - from the counter cyclical job creation programmes of the 1970s through to 
ILMs and the modern transitional employment programmes now operative in Britain and 
the USA. This identifies the distinctiveness of ILMs. 
 
1.28 The second chapter contains the results of the national survey of ILM projects and 
activities. 
 
1.29 The final chapters draw extensively on the evidence base. They assess the latest reviews 
and evaluations of the impact of what both the OECD and EU categorise as ‘subsidised 
employment’. There is an assessment of the range of intermediary organisations that make 
up ILMs, and of what seems to work in the delivery of subsidised employment 
programmes. This is followed by an assessment of evidence and experience from the 
USA, especially on the role and impact of TEPs. The aim of these chapters is not to 
provide a descriptive account of results from particular studies but to establish the 
evaluation findings most relevant to ‘what works’ and to extract lessons that might inform 
good programme design and operational practice. 
 
1.30 Finally, the report contains findings from six case studies that combine evaluation 
evidence, programme and policy developments, and project descriptions, from comparator 
countries that have already been a source of much policy exchange and transfer with 
Britain. They include assessments of: 
 
Action for Community Employment and Worktrack in Northern Ireland; • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Employment experience and Workfare programmes in Australia; 
Subsidised employment programmes in the Netherlands that are being integrated 
into an ‘employment first’ benefit system; 
Traditional subsidised employment programmes in Germany; 
Transitional Jobs Programmes in Georgia, for Young People, and in Philadelphia; 
The Washington State transitional employment programme – the largest in the 
USA; and 
Transitional Jobs providers in New York City that have targeted disadvantaged 
groups in addition to lone parents, especially the work with ex-offenders of the 
Centre for Employment Opportunities 
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Case Study 1: Northern Ireland - Action for Community Employment 
and Worktrack  
 
Action for Community Employment (ACE) was established in Northern Ireland in 1981 and was 
replaced by Worktrack in 1999. With its 18 years of operation ACE had been the longest running 
temporary job creation programme to operate in the UK and at its height employed over half of 
all people on government employment programmes in Northern Ireland. It was wound up in the 
context of the introduction of the New Deal and in the wake of evaluation findings indicating that 
it was being ineffective in getting the long-term unemployed into jobs in the context of an 
improving labour market. 
 
ACE provided 12-month temporary jobs for those who had been unemployed for at least 12 
months out of the previous 15 months. Disabled people were entitled to an 18 months job. The 
work was designed to be of benefit to the community and be additional to existing work for the 
community. Employees were paid the ‘going rate for the job’. ACE workers were expected to 
spend 20 per cent of their time on training or training related activities. 
 
The final evaluation of ACE concluded that (CPC, 1998): 
 
• based on an audit of ACE sponsors 50 per cent of ACE workers left to employment, and 52 
per cent of all ACE leavers responding to the evaluation survey said that they had been in 
employment since leaving ACE, whilst 42 per cent were in employment at the time of the 
survey 
• using a comparison group, it was found that “taking part in ACE does not appear to 
substantially improve an unemployed person’s chances of finding a job. Furthermore, ACE 
does not appear to improve participants’ earning ability or their likelihood of finding a more 
secure job.” 
• The community benefit generated by ACE was estimated to be worth between £0.35 - £0.37 
for every £1 spent on ACE. 
 
In conclusion, the evaluation stated: “Taking into account the wider community benefits, labour 
market benefits in terms of take up of training and some net job outcomes, and the social 
inclusion benefits from the programme, ACE is generating a reasonable package of benefits from 
the spend.” 
 
However, the evaluation also concluded that “an entirely new employment based scheme” should 
replace ACE. The main reasons for this were: 
 
• ACE was felt to be too ‘community centred’ and should focus more on “labour market 
outcomes and rapid progression”;  
• the number of people re-entering ACE for a second and third time, effectively making ACE 
an ‘employer of last resort’; 
• New Deal would have a significant impact on the eligible group; 
• because ACE had been operating for so long “a new image is required”; and 
• more emphasis should be given to support and training. 
 
The evaluation also identified the following elements of ‘good practice’: 
 
• a clear understanding that finding jobs in the open labour market is the main purpose; 
• working with ACE workers to help them understand how their work experience can help find 
a mainstream job; 
• focussing on progression as soon as possible; 
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• use of training to increase employability, rather than just to do the ACE job; 
• “dynamism” in the sponsor organization; 
• an approach which fits individual needs; and 
• networking, particularly with employers. 
 
Worktrack 
 
Worktrack was introduced in August 1999 and was designed to place more focus on waged work 
experience being used as a form of transitional employment. As such it is worth examining in 
some detail the design and impact of the programme, drawing on an evaluation that was 
undertaken between August 1999 and May 2001. 
 
The Design of Worktrack 
 
Worktrack was designed by the Department for Employment and Learning (DEL) to complement 
the opportunities available through the New Deals.  
 
The purpose of Worktrack is (DEL, 2003a): 
 
“To focus on the individual needs of the unemployed and progress them into sustainable paid 
employment at the earliest possible opportunity.” 
 
Individuals are eligible for Worktrack it they: 
 
• are aged over 25 and have been receiving JSA for between 26 and 65 weeks;  
• if not in receipt of JSA, they must be at least 18 and have been unemployed for at least 26 
weeks prior to starting; and  
• they must not have participated in Worktrack during the previous three years. 
 
Worktrack extends eligibility beyond JSA claimants to a far greater extent than currently exists in 
the rest of the UK. One effect of this is to greatly increase the number of women participating in 
comparison with JSA-only programmes.  
 
Worktrack offers participants: 
 
• up to 26 weeks employment paid at least the national minimum wage; 
• between 30 and 45 per cent of time should be devoted to training; 
• each person has a Training & Employment Plan; and  
• both full-time and part-time posts are available. 
 
The aims of Worktrack are to: 
 
• secure paid, sustainable employment at the earliest opportunity; 
• develop skills and competencies; 
• develop the capacity to seek, find and retain employment; and 
• to raise, with employers, the reputation of participants as potential recruits. 
 
The 26-week jobs are with a variety of employers, largely with the community and voluntary 
sectors, but with some involvement of the private sector. The jobs are supposed to be matched 
with the participants’ career aspirations. Lead Providers undertake this matching as well as 
ensuring that Training & Employment Plans are completed and that participants receive ongoing 
support and Job search training. 
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In the financial year 2001/2 a total of 1,837 people left Worktrack at a total cost of £8.45 million. 
 
Of the leavers in 2001/2 a total of 41 per cent entered employment, either on leaving or within 13 
weeks of leaving. Of these leavers, 63 per cent were still in employment 13 weeks after 
commencing work. DEL had not yet released data for 2002/3 at the time of the research. 
 
Evaluation Findings 
 
An evaluation was commissioned to examine Worktrack’s performance and how Worktrack fits 
within DEL’s future strategy for training and work experience for unemployed adults (DTZ 
Pieda, 2002). The main elements of the evaluation methodology involved surveys and focus 
groups with participants and consultation with Worktrack providers. 
 
The evaluation found that at the time of survey 40 per cent of past participants were in 
employment. This compared to 33 per cent for New Deal 18-24 ETF/VS and 19 per cent for New 
Deal 25+ Intensive Activity Period. However, ACE was securing 42 per cent job entry rates and 
the employer subsidy options under the New Deals were securing 70 per cent for New Deal 18-24 
and 60 per cent for New Deal 25+. DTZ Pieda concluded that “overall the rate of flow of 
Worktrack participants into employment is disappointing when measured against the ACE 
baseline.” 
 
In making these comparisons there are a number of important caveats that come out of the 
evaluation: 
 
1. Duration of the job: The shorter duration of Worktrack (26 weeks) in comparison with 
ACE (52 weeks) could diminish job outcomes. DTZ Pieda found that most participants 
and providers were of the view that the 26 weeks should be extended and suggested that 
“the views expressed cannot simply be dismissed such was the conviction and almost 
unanimity with which they were held.” However, the evaluators found there was no hard 
evidence either way – that 26 weeks was sufficient or that more time was needed. In the 
end the evaluation recommended that discretion should be given to DEL to extend 
contracts up to 52 weeks. Currently, DEL has decided not to implement this 
recommendation. 
2. Voluntary and mandatory: Worktrack is a voluntary programme and as such could attract 
more motivated participants. However, the survey results show that a significant per cent 
of participants were disadvantaged and very long-term unemployed. 
3. Gender: Because of the eligibility criteria Worktrack recruits significantly more women. 
In 2001/2, 75 per cent of participants were women (DTZ Pieda, 2002). The majority were 
women returners seeking employment after significant periods out of the labour market. 
4. Operation of Worktrack: DTZ Pieda found that there were some significant issues in the 
delivery of Worktrack, which if improved could increase job outcomes. For example, 
“Our research would also suggest that the Job search and other support and guidance 
provided to participants during their Worktrack placement can be improved. We .. 
suggest that it needs to be made more formal, with DEL more tightly prescribing the type 
of support that is felt to be required, perhaps including frequency of support visits, and 
monitoring delivery.” Other performance issues are dealt with below. 
 
The other key finding of interest was the extent of possible deadweight, “38 per cent of 
participants felt that, had they not taken part in Worktrack, they would have found a job 
themselves or become self-employed anyway”. Substitution was thought “unlikely to have been a 
major problem.” Similarly, displacement was not thought to be a problem because Worktrack 
placements were ‘overwhelmingly’ within community and voluntary organisations. 
 
The report concluded that despite “its (at best) only modest success in terms of transitions to 
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employment, we feel that the basic Worktrack model is appropriate and in many ways represents 
an improvement on ACE. It is largely the process side of Worktrack that has been deficient.” 
 
Delivery Issues 
 
The evaluation highlighted a number of issues in the delivery of Worktrack. DEL has since 
introduced improvements, specifically during the re-contracting for Worktrack providers for 
contracts commencing October 2003. 
 
1. Recruitment to Worktrack: The Advisory Access Programme (AAP) delivered by Lead 
Providers as the recruitment route to Worktrack was criticised for being reactive and not 
using outreach. 44 per cent of participants claimed they did not have an AAP (or failed to 
recall they had an interview). The AAP will in future be replaced by Employment 
Review Interviews or Work Focused Interviews, which will be conducted by front line 
staff in Jobcentres/Jobs & Benefits offices where an assessment of the clients work 
aspirations will be considered. Potential Worktrack participants will be referred to the 
local Worktrack Lead Provider who will only employ the person if they are able to match 
their work aspirations. 
2. Job search and training: Only 10 per cent of surveyed participants had an Individual 
Training & Employment Plan (ITEP), and 76 per cent of respondents claimed that less 
than 15 per cent of their time was spent on personal development training. On Job search 
the evaluation found that “such provision was at best patchy.” The revised programme 
requires an ITEP to be prepared for each participant and to be approved by 
Jobcentre/Jobs & Benefits office staff. 
3. Lack of training: Whilst training is required, there is not a specific requirement for 
accredited training leading to a qualification to be provided. In addition, 76 per cent of 
survey respondents claimed that less than 15 per cent of their time was spent on personal 
development, significantly less than DEL’s requirement of between 30 and 40 per cent of 
time on the programme. 
4. Matching of placements to needs: It was felt that the pool of job opportunities was too 
limited to adequately match the needs of participants. “This seems to have contributed to 
a poor match in some instances.” In future Lead Providers will only be able to employ a 
person on Worktrack if they are able to provide a placement that will accommodate the 
persons identified work aspirations.  
5. Variety in provision: The evaluators found that the Worktrack “experience” varied 
considerably from area-to-area. This variety was felt to be a weakness and led to 
inconsistency.  
6. Motivation of participants: There was some evidence of a minority of participants having 
“the perception prevalent in the ACE programme of  …. the job as an end in itself rather 
than a stepping stone to a job”.  
 
The continuing need for Worktrack 
 
The evaluation concluded that “developments .. in the economy, labour market and in the suite of 
provision available to assist the unemployed back into work combine to create a clear niche and 
rationale for the continued existence of a programme like Worktrack”. The main reasons cited 
were: 
 
 
• high levels of long-term unemployment relative to the UK; 
• growing awareness of the large numbers of economically inactive; 
• the increase in employment levels will require the attraction of the economically inactive 
into the work force; 
• the need for provision with wider eligibility other tan JSA in order to attract more 
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women; and  
• a means to tackling the increasing numbers on Incapacity Benefit. 
 
Lessons for the rest of UK 
 
In contrast with StepUP, which commenced in 2002 as a pilot in England, Scotland and Wales, 
Worktrack has now been fully operational in Northern Ireland for four years. There are some key 
design differences between Worktrack and StepUP that (from an evaluation point of view) can 
extend knowledge about the effectiveness of different models. 
 
The key differences are: 
 
• different target groups; 
• the requirement to deliver training on Worktrack; and  
• a 6 months job on Worktrack as opposed to 12 months on StepUP. 
 
However, there are core similarities: 
 
• wage-based; 
• Job search support throughout; and  
• targeted at those furthest from the labour market. 
 
In the absence of any rigorous comparison it would be unwise to use Worktrack as a benchmark 
for performance, nonetheless the job entry figures are very similar to the average job entry rates 
found in the survey of ILMs (set out in chapter 2).  
 
Perhaps of more interest are the delivery issues that arose in the first two years of operation, as 
outlined above. Generally two key points emerge: 
 
1. Balance between local discretion and programme requirements: There were clearly 
issues for how the programme design was being implemented at the local level. Whilst 
other evidence in this study would suggest maximising local discretion, the Worktrack 
evaluation suggests that local implementation was leading to a “dilution of the 
programme”.  
2. Needs driven approach: Worktrack is work-based but also incorporates a substantial 
element of personal development, training and Job search. Work and personal 
development are intended to bring together a ‘needs driven approach’ for the individual. 
The greater emphasis in the revised programme on the match between the job and the 
person recognises the importance of an effective match between the nature of the work 
and aspirations. Delivering a ‘needs driven approach’ has required both effective job 
matching and personalised plans for training and Job search, and getting both of these 
elements right seems to be critical to Worktrack.  
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2. Subsidised Employment, Intermediate Labour 
Markets and Transitional Employment 
Programmes 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
2.1 ILMs and TEPs have often mistakenly been associated with the large-scale temporary job 
creation programmes of the past. Although they share some apparent characteristics, ILMs 
and TEPs represent an evidence and practice based alternative that is focused on 
improving individual employability rather than creating temporary jobs. Nevertheless, to 
understand the evolution of ILMs and TEPs it is important to compare them with the 
temporary work and workfare programmes that continue to be used extensively in many 
OECD countries. This analysis explains both the policy context in which ILMs and TEPs 
emerged and points to the equivalents that exist in other countries. 
 
 
Temporary Job Creation Programmes 
 
2.2 Following the economic and employment ‘shocks’ of the 1970s most OECD countries 
made use of temporary job creation and employment programmes. The important 
difference with the ‘public works’ programmes that had characterised the 1930s - the era 
of the first ‘New Deal’ in the US - was that the new generation of programmes was 
usually, but not always, targeted at the long-term unemployed and younger unemployed2. 
The core aim of many of the programmes introduced in the 1970s and 1980s was 
explicitly counter-cyclical and aimed to reduce unemployment by providing meaningful 
work experience that created outputs and services that were ‘socially useful’.  
 
2.3 The challenge was to provide temporary jobs but in a way that did not undermine the 
regular labour market. In many countries similar rules emerged designed to reduce 
‘deadweight’ and minimise ‘substitution’ and ‘displacement’. The work usually had to be 
‘additional’. Often there was a mechanism for ensuring relevant employer and trade union 
approval. Those given jobs would usually be employees and would be employed at the 
minimum wage or ‘going rate’. Early evaluation evidence tended to focus on the delivery 
of the programmes, their relative costs, their impact in reducing the unemployment count, 
and their contribution to local services and communities.  
 
2.4 As employment levels recovered - at different times in each country - attention turned to 
the role that these programmes played in assisting participants to obtain regular jobs. By 
1994 the OECD ‘Jobs Study’ pointed to an increase in relevant evaluations that were now 
likely to be concerned with establishing deadweight, substitution and displacement 
effects, usually through a microeconomic assessment of programme impacts.  
                                                     
2 Public Works programmes continue to be important in some OECD countries such as Japan where they 
have been used in attempts to ‘kick start’ the economy. The projects are rarely targeted at the unemployed 
and there has been criticism that too many projects have been ‘unnecessary’, environmentally ‘harmful’ and 
‘undertaken for the benefit of bureaucrats’ (Kazutoshi, 1999, p. 18)  
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2.5 Erhel et al (1996) and Meager and Evans (1998) contain extensive reviews of these 
evaluations and their findings. Together these evaluations suggested that many temporary 
employment participants were engaged in marginal labour market activities that did little 
to prepare them for the conventional labour market. There was evidence that participants 
were ‘locked’ into their jobs and reduced active job search until their temporary 
employment ceased. Many programmes had existed simply to provide non-market work, 
others aimed to simply requalify participants for more generous unemployment benefits, 
and providers had little incentive to prepare participants for or place them in work 
(characteristics still evident in Belgian programmes: De Schampheleire and Berkel, 2001). 
 
2.6 Evidence of such effects was clearest in countries such as Sweden where there was a long 
standing ‘Relief Works’ programme combined with a strong evaluation base. The scheme 
provided six months employment in primarily public sector services but by the mid 1990s 
econometric evaluations showed that the programme did little to get people into jobs and 
there was evidence of a negative impact in that participants were ‘locked into’ temporary 
employment rather than engaging in active job search.   
 
2.7 Subsequently, these findings have been reinforced by more complex evaluations, using 
‘rich’ administrative datasets to compare and contrast the differential impacts of different 
types of labour market programmes. Sianese, for example, applied “propensity score 
multiple-treatment matching methods” to assess both inter-programme performance and 
contrast these results against the position of comparable individuals who did not 
participate in a programme (2001, p. 1). The programmes under examination comprised 
labour market training, workplace introduction, work experience placement, relief work, 
trainee replacement and employment subsidies. The outcomes assessed were employment 
rates and propensity to experience periods of unemployment insurance payments. 
 
2.8 Sianese concludes that “all the programmes initially reduce their participants’ 
employment probability in the short term” (the lock-in effect). Only job subsidies had 
long-term employment impacts. The other programmes had little long term impact and 
‘Relief Work’ was associated with lower employment rates and more time spent claiming 
benefits than if the person had been unemployed and searching for regular work – a likely 
consequence of using these programmes “as a way to re-qualify for unemployment 
benefits” (Sianese , 2001, p. 1). The conclusion was that “the more similar the programme 
is to a regular job, the higher the programme’s benefits to its participants”. 
 
2.9 Calmfors and colleagues (2001) also assessed the findings from a broad range of empirical 
studies of Sweden’s labour market programmes in the 1990s. They found that job 
subsidies generated higher employment rates but were also associated with high levels of 
displacement of regular jobs. They concluded that the large scale of the programmes 
implemented in the 1990s was counterproductive and smaller scale programmes would 
have been more effective. Another review of Swedish evidence determined that 
“subsidised employment and work placement programmes in most cases give rise to 
positive individual effects but also considerable displacement effects and, on the whole, 
negative effects on regular employment levels” (Ackum-Agell, et al, 2002, p. 24).  
 
2.10 Zetterburg adds an important qualification to these assessments of the Swedish evaluation 
evidence by pointing out that Calmfors et al (2001), in particular, ‘exaggerate’ the 
negative findings because they rely too much on evaluation results that were influenced 
by large scale programme expansion “made in a state of panic at the beginning of the 
1990s” (2001, p. 131). The data from the second half of the 1990s when policy had 
changed, employment had started to recover, and programmes were more geared towards 
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job entry “indicate more positive effects of program participation, particularly for job 
creation measures” (2001, p. 129).  
 
 
The Reform of Temporary Employment Programmes 
 
2.11 By the mid-1990s the OECD reported that many member states were ‘abolishing’ or 
‘scaling back’ public sector job creation programmes and concluded that “job creation in 
the public sector has not been successful” (1997, p. 81). This finding was reinforced by 
John Martin, in an influential and often cited OECD survey (still available on its web 
site), where he suggested that the evaluation evidence “showed fairly conclusively that 
this measure has been of little success in helping unemployed people get permanent jobs” 
(1998, p. 21). Martin noted, however, that member states continued to spend about 14 per 
cent of their budgets for active measures on subsidised employment programmes and that 
despite the evaluation evidence “the policy debate about the utility of this intervention is 
still alive” (1988, p. 21).  
 
2.12 Subsequently, Melvin Brodsky, the OECD coordinator of the U.S. Department of Labor, 
reported that a panel of experts representing 11 OECD countries had examined the 
effectiveness of measures to assist the long-term unemployed and found that now there 
was evidence to show that “the direct creation of jobs through public service employment 
programmes may be the only way to help many of the unskilled and less well educated 
long-term unemployed” (2000, p. 39). He reviewed a broad range of public service 
employment programmes in OECD countries and concluded that while the evidence 
indicated that public service employment programmes had “not been effective in reducing 
the general level of adult unemployment, they appear to help severely disadvantaged 
labour market groups stay economically active, and they can be effective as part of an 
overall strategy against social exclusion” (2000, p. 32).  
 
2.13 Although some Governments had wound up the large-scale programmes of the 1980s 
others more commonly significantly changed programme design and target groups as 
immediate unemployment crises diminished.  
2.14 There were several key features that characterised these changes. One involved more 
careful targeting of eligible groups. Another trend saw an increased emphasis being 
placed on job search incentives. This involved both positive and negative incentives. For 
example, participants were given more job search assistance and data was collected on 
provider and programme job entry performance. By contrast work incentives were 
increased by reforms aimed at reducing the ‘comfort’ factor associated with temporary 
jobs. In programmes such as the French CES (Contrats Emploi Solidarité) and the British 
Community Programme wages were restricted by limiting the number of hours that 
participants worked. In other countries, such as Germany, wage levels were set below the 
minimums available in regular jobs. In European countries this has often been combined 
with new insurance rules (as in Denmark and Finland) that preclude participants from 
requalifying for unemployment benefits.  
2.15 These reductions in the ‘comfort’ factor often have been linked to increased requirements 
for groups of long term benefit recipients to engage in employment programmes, 
frequently in the form of ‘last resort’ jobs where claimants are required to work in return 
for their benefit payments (Lodemel and Tricky, 2001). Temporary (and sometimes 
permanent) employment programmes also remain an important feature of the 
Scandinavian, Dutch and (previous) Australian ‘job guarantee’ or ‘job compact’ 
approaches, within which all long-term unemployed people have been required to 
participate in employment programmes after a specified duration of unemployment.  
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2.16 The redesign of temporary employment programmes was evident too in the 
implementation of large scale ‘workfare’ programmes which, in the USA, Australia and 
New Zealand, eclipsed conventional temporary employment or job creation programmes, 
at least until recently (see, for example, the Australian case study at the end of this 
chapter). ‘Workfare’ often is used as a general term for characterising a broad approach to 
welfare reform but originally it applied to those US programmes where mandated 
individuals were required to ‘work off’ any benefit payments received, normally in 
marginal public or community sector activities. In Australia and New Zealand this has 
taken the form of large scale ‘Work for the Dole’ programmes where many of the long-
term unemployed have been required to fulfil their ‘mutual obligation’ by undertaking 
unpaid part time work in the community. Workfare or ‘work for the dole’ evaluations 
show that the requirement can ‘shake out’ people from claiming benefits, some of whom 
will get jobs, but the overall programmes provide little or no direct employment assistance 
(see, for example, Davidson, 2002). The evaluation evidence shows that the programmes 
have little impact on participants’ subsequent employment rates and in New Zealand, for 
example, a large scale work for the dole programme was terminated when econometric 
evidence confirmed it was ‘locking’ unemployed people into longer unemployment 
durations (de Boer, 2002). 
 
2.17 Finally, in some countries there have been different responses, especially in France and 
Southern European countries, where there have been efforts to create permanent jobs and 
improve the quality and lengthen the duration of the temporary jobs available. This 
combination most recently was evident in the large-scale jobs programme – ‘Nouveaux 
Services, Emplois Jeunes’ (NSEJ) – introduced by the Jospin Government in France in 
1997 at the same time as the New Deal for Young People was introduced in Britain. 
 
 
The Emergence of Intermediate Labour Markets  
 
2.18 The British experience with temporary employment programmes has reflected many of 
the above trends. The large scale Community Programme (CP) provided mainly part time 
jobs and subsequent small-scale national temporary employment programmes paid only 
‘benefit plus expenses’. An evaluation of CP found no significant impact on 
unemployment outflows with evidence of extensive deadweight and substitution (Disney 
et al, 1992). A rigorous assessment of Employment Action, a ‘benefit plus’ temporary 
employment programme that ran between 1991 and 1993 found little difference between 
the employment rates of participants and a control group at 18, 24 and 30 months after 
leaving, although there was an increased probability of getting a job of 4 per cent three 
years after participation (Payne et al, 1996). Project Work, which was piloted just before 
Labour came into office, increased the number of people leaving the unemployment 
register but many, it seems, subsequently claimed sickness benefits (Ritchie & Legard, 
1997, p. 59). 
 
2.19 It was in this overall programme context that the concept of creating Intermediate Labour 
Markets emerged and was developed by local providers and partnerships in Britain.  
 
2.20 In contrast to the marginal economic activities that characterised conventional temporary 
employment programmes, ILMs sought to provide more realistic work experience by 
integrating their projects with local regeneration programmes and with initiatives that 
sought to stimulate job creation through an expansion of the social economy. ILM 
participants usually were paid wages and employed for up to a year. Providers suggested 
that the experience of ‘real work’ and personal support was a more effective way of 
tackling the employment barriers of the long-term unemployed. Case study evidence 
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suggested that although their costs were greater their job entry and job retention rates were 
also higher than those of mainstream programmes (Marshall and MacFarlane, 2001).  
 
2.21 In the early phase ILMs characteristically were small scale and their policy ‘visibility’ 
low. By the mid 1990s, however, a viable network existed in Britain bringing together a 
range of providers sharing some key features. They: 
 
recruited long-term unemployed people on temporary contracts; • 
• 
• 
• 
paid wages to participants for at least part of their stay; 
gave access to off the job training and personal development activities;  
provided assistance with job search and placement. 
 
2.22 Although ILMs typically relied on various forms of government funding they were unlike 
traditional temporary employment programmes as they were usually city or area specific 
and were often initiated, developed and delivered by non-governmental bodies in the 
voluntary, charitable or cooperative sectors. A key element of these initiatives was the 
combination of providing jobs for disadvantaged people with the delivery of socially and 
economically useful goods and services for low-income communities. Many also aimed to 
develop new markets in the social economy that, it was suggested, would themselves 
generate additional jobs.  
 
 
European ILMs, Transitional Jobs and Jobskills 
 
2.23 One major source of financial support for ILMs was provided by EU funding. By the mid-
1990s the European Commission was assessing the potential contribution of ILMs using 
descriptive case studies and comparative assessments. These reports catalogued many 
projects throughout Europe, often delivered by ‘integration’ and ‘insertion enterprises’ or 
cooperatives and ‘community businesses’, that appeared to share many of the 
characteristics associated with the ILM approach (see, for example, Cambridge Policy 
Consultants, 1996a; Nicaise et al, 1995; Campbell, 1999; Lloyd et al, 1999; van Berkel, 
1999). Unfortunately, while it is clear that ILM type activity is a feature of provision in 
many European countries, the different policy and legal environments in which they 
operate, and the diversity and local nature of many of the smaller scale projects that may 
be involved, make it very difficult to document the number of these initiatives, their 
activities, and the amount of participants they have. Many individual projects in different 
European countries have been described but it is only in the UK that individual 
organisations have self-consciously sought to develop ILMs (for brief descriptions of 
some projects, see IER, 1999 or Owens Moore, 2001). 
 
2.24 By contrast a more direct equivalent to ILMs emerged in the USA where a number of 
community based initiatives and Foundation funded demonstration projects continued to 
explore the potential of wage paying programmes during the early phases of welfare 
reform. These gradually became known as ‘transitional jobs’ initiatives and after 1996 
several cities and states began to implement ‘transitional employment’ programmes that 
sought to extend the job entry results that seemed to be secured by the early transitional 
jobs projects.  
 
2.25 During the first phase of post-1996 welfare reform, however, few individual States 
utilised public sector employment creation and those that did introduced conventional 
workfare programmes. The need to directly generate more work slots for welfare 
recipients has since grown in significance as the economic situation has deteriorated and 
as administrators have struggled to find work in depressed labour markets for participants 
who have significant employment barriers and/or who are approaching the end of their 
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entitlement to time limited TANF cash benefits (Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families). Much of this provision takes the form of conventional workfare but by the late 
1990s individual states and city governments started to implement more extensive 
transitional employment programmes. The aim of these TEPs has been to provide and 
utilise the incentive and job preparation effects of waged work experience. By 2003 the 
‘Transitional Jobs Network’ estimated that there were about 17,000 participants in TEPs 
operating in more than 30 cities and state-wide in Washington, Pennsylvania, Georgia and 
Minnesota (http://www.transitionaljobs.net/). These TEPs have since been joined by 
programmes developed by Wisconsin and New York City, the states previously most 
closely associated with the extensive use of ‘unpaid’ workfare. 
 
2.26 There are examples of successful TEPs in other countries, although this report is mainly 
focused on the US experience. In particular, there was a TEP that operated in Australia as 
part of the last Labor Government’s ‘Working Nation’ Job Compact. Jobskills, described 
in the Australian case study at the end of this chapter, merits attention as robust evaluation 
evidence demonstrated that this TEP generated significant employment impacts for very 
long-term unemployed people within the context of a New Deal type programme 
environment. 
 
 
British ILMs 
 
2.27 This chapter has explained the policy context within which British ILMs have developed. 
It has shown that they share characteristics with some European and US organisations. 
However, the evidence suggests that British ILMs have knowingly developed a distinctive 
approach to using wage-based work experience to improve individual employability and 
help long-term unemployed people to get jobs. The next chapter assesses the scale of their 
current activities and the extent to which they help their participants get regular jobs. 
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Case Study 2: Employment Experience Programmes in Australia 
 
Over the past twenty years the Australian Government has implemented a diverse range of job 
creation and employment experience programmes. In the recession of the 1970s the 
Commonwealth Government introduced a major job creation programme, the Regional 
Employment Development Scheme (REDS) that at its peak, in 1975/76, accounted for over 70 
per cent of programme spending. It provided up to a years employment for 32,000 people, or 
10 per cent of the unemployed, in socially useful work (CEO, 1993, p. 93). By the 1980s 
REDS had been scaled back in favour of programmes aimed at young unemployed people. The 
return of recession in 1982/83 also saw the re-introduction of a large-scale public works 
programme. By the mid-1980s the Community Employment Programme provided about 15 per 
cent of programme places and absorbed over half of all programme expenditure spent on the 
long-term unemployed. CEP was poorly targeted and open to both the short and long-term 
unemployed (CEO, 1993, p. 95). 
 
With the economic recovery of the mid-1980s the then Labor Government began to ‘activate’ 
the Australian benefit system and to target programmes on job search assistance and more 
conventional employer wage subsidies. It did, however, develop an employment experience 
programme – ‘Jobskills’ - for the ‘hardest to help’ long-term unemployed, and it retained the 
Community Development Employment Programme (CDEP) that had been introduced for 
indigenous communities in 1997. The impact and relative success of Jobskills is described 
below. CDEP, by contrast, was the original ‘Work for the Dole’ programme in which 
particular indigenous communities could opt to pool unemployment payments and instead of 
paying benefit employ residents who would receive the equivalent in wages whilst employed 
on worthwhile community projects (Champion, 2002). 
 
Jobskills 
 
Jobskills was introduced in 1991. It was targeted at high unemployment areas with participants 
aged over 21 years and claiming unemployment benefits for over a year. It offered a 
combination of work experience and off the job accredited training for up to six months. A 
quarter of the participants’ time was taken by off-the-job training, and they were expected to 
spend 15 per cent of work time in training. The aim was to give industry relevant skills; other 
transferable employment related skills; job search and presentation skills; and special supports 
to tackle other barriers, such as literacy. 
 
A network of Jobskills brokers was contracted to develop work placements. In 1994/95 
brokers, most of whom were community based organisations, were paid A$3,500 per 
participant, and there was up to A$2,000 per participant available on a matching basis with 
employers for projects that were ‘additional’ to their normal activities. Most placements were 
in public and non-profit agencies, although private sector placements were introduced towards 
the end of the programmes existence in 1997.  
 
The jobs were mostly clerical and administrative or outdoor semi skilled labouring. 
Employment Service Case Managers referred participants to Jobskills whom they considered 
as unable to be assisted through job search or wage subsidy programmes. Anecdotal evidence 
from ex-providers suggests that they were able to recruit directly and some took advantage of 
early entry rules to get assistance to those they thought might be at risk from long-term 
unemployment.  
 
 
 
Comparison group evaluations found that Jobskills increased participant self-esteem and 
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confidence and generated significant post employment outcomes. One Government evaluation 
compared the employment status of a sample of Jobskill participants with a matched 
comparison group drawn from unemployment benefits data (DEETYA, 1997). This revealed 
that three months after participation 30 per cent of Jobskill participants were in jobs against 19 
per cent of the control group, giving a crude ‘net impact’ of 11 per cent. 
 
A subsequent evaluation found that the net impact was likely to have been larger. This 
compared participants and non-participants identified in a longitudinal panel survey set up to 
help assess the impact of Working Nation, the Australian version of the New Deal. Stromback 
and Dockery (2000) controlled a wide range of variables and concluded that 43 per cent of 
Jobskills participants had obtained sustained employment compared with 18 per cent of a 
control group, giving a net impact of 25 per cent. The authors attribute some of this to 
selection bias but suggest that the impact was still significant, especially with participants who 
had been unemployed for over two years. Jobskills was in fact the most effective Working 
Nation labour market programme for this client group.  
 
Stromback and Dockery also estimated costs. Taking into account benefit savings Jobskills 
cost A$23,680 per unsubsidised job outcome with placement costs averaging A$7,105 (at 
1996/97 prices). A Government evaluation concluded that although high-cost, it is a valuable 
‘niche programme’ that could be very cost effective provided it was targeted at the right 
groups (DEETYA, 1996). 
 
Working Nation and Work for the Dole 
 
By the early 1990s unemployment had again increased and in response the Paul Keating led 
Labor Government developed its Working Nation strategy. Amongst other things the strategy 
proposed radical changes in the Commonwealth Employment Service and in programmes for 
the unemployed. The centrepiece was a ‘Job Compact’, introduced in 1994, that aimed to 
reverse a sharp rise in long-term unemployment. The Job Compact guaranteed all unemployed 
people a temporary job for around six months once they had been out of work for 18 months. 
This was designed as a circuit breaker to improve their employment prospects. The guarantee 
was a very important commitment for the Government to make. Until then, Australian 
Governments only guaranteed unemployed people access to social security payments and basic 
job matching assistance and more intensive employment assistance was rationed, and only a 
minority of long-term unemployed people benefited in any given year. 
 
The Job Compact was delivered through a new cadre of case managers employed in both the 
Commonwealth Employment Service (CES) and a network of external providers. If a long-
term unemployed person could not be placed in a job they could be placed in a range of wage 
subsidy, training and employment experience programmes. The Job Compact was tied to 
delivering a large number of places to very short timescales for individuals who had significant 
employment barriers, and the case management service was stretched as it tried to deliver 
meaningful options and meet targets (Finn, 1999). One consequence was the rapid expansion 
of a traditional short-term job creation programme, ‘New Work Opportunities’. The Compact 
was soon criticised for ‘churning’ the long-term unemployed through ‘make work’ schemes 
and it was significant that the rapidly expanded NWOs performed far less effectively than the 
longer standing Jobskills programme that was absorbed into the Job Compact. 
 
After the 1996 General Election a new ‘Coalition’ Government abandoned the Job Compact 
and halved expenditure on active labour market programmes. It also privatised the CES and 
replaced it with a ‘Job Network’. The newly privatised providers were awarded performance 
related contracts and were given flexibility in how they delivered ‘intensive employment 
assistance’ to the long-term unemployed. The nature of the contracts and the reduction in 
resources led to a marked fall in employment experience or wage subsidy programmes and by 
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2001 only 5 per cent of those assisted reported being helped in these ways (Davidson, 2002). 
Independent reviews of the performance of the Job Network pointed to its failure to engage 
with the hardest to help unemployed, and advocacy organisations have since called for the 
introduction of a ‘transitional employment programme’ for the very long-term unemployed 
(Davidson, 2002). One development has been the introduction of short-term job creation 
programmes by individual state governments, in Queensland and Victoria, but these are not 
integrated with the Job Network employment assistance system and sponsors can select from 
amongst all eligible people who have been unemployed for over six months. 
 
One of the ironies of recent Australian developments is that at the same time that the 
Commonwealth Government replaced labour market programmes for long-term unemployed 
people with ‘intensive assistance’ it introduced a new programme of the old fashioned kind in 
‘Work for the Dole’ (WftD), to which people are referred automatically regardless of their 
particular employment assistance needs. WftD is a ‘job creation’ scheme and the default 
obligation of most unemployed people who do not opt for another ‘mutual obligation’ 
programme after six months unemployment. A major weakness of WftD is that it only offers 
two days' per week of employment experience in ‘projects’ that are usually separate from 
mainstream employment. Sponsors receive little or no help with the costs incurred in providing 
supervision and personal support. The primary aim is for unemployed people to ‘give 
something back to the community’ in return for their social security payments which it is 
assumed will help improve the self esteem and work motivation of participants. As a result 
employment outcomes are poor. 
 
Official and independent research into WftD has found that many of those who have taken up 
places have appreciated some of the activities they participated in and the support they got 
(Sawer, 2001). Many participants have also expressed their concerns (Kinnear, 2000, p.7): 
 
 
• many resented the compulsion to participate and most thought the programme would be 
better if it were voluntary; 
• most participants felt that the Government was not fulfilling its end of the mutual 
obligation bargain; and 
• many felt that their WftD activities were irrelevant to the type of work that they were 
seeking. 
 
 
In terms of impact, the early evidence showed that the new mutual obligation requirement had 
a significant impact by increasing ‘exit rates’ from unemployment and reducing the inflow to 
long term unemployment for the client group “by about 25 per cent” (OECD, 2001, p. 198). A 
Government evaluation subsequently showed that 30 per cent of WftD participants were ‘off 
benefit’ three months after leaving as against only 17 per cent of a matched sample of non-
participants, giving a net impact effect of 13 per cent. For a number of methodological reasons 
the OECD indicates that these results should be treated with caution and other commentators 
point to data which suggests that 80 per cent of WftD participants were still unemployed five 
months after completion (Kinnear, 2000). 
 
The main impact of the programme is one of what the OECD calls ‘deterrence’, with three 
quarters of those referred to WftD failing to attend their first session. The Government 
suggests that many of these individuals will have moved into jobs or were already working. 
There has, however, been little research and not much is known about where these young 
people end up or about what jobs they get or how long they keep them. In the voluntary sector 
there has also been much concern about the interaction with sanctions and the plight of the 
most disadvantaged who may not only lose their benefit but may also lose contact with 
services (Davidson, 2002). 
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The growth of ‘mutual obligation’ activities has been rapid and about 300,000 people are now 
expected to participate in ‘mutual obligation’ each year. The Government have made recent 
changes both to the delivery of ‘intensive employment assistance’ and to WftD but although 
there is a more coherent linkage between both programmes WftD offers only limited help with 
employment assistance (DEWR, 2002). WftD participants now receive help with job search 
(but only in the last week of participation) and can claim training credits worth up to A$800 
(but only after an individual has participated for at least 16 weeks). Paradoxically the 
Commonwealth Government is at the same time increasing the focus on job outcomes in the 
oldest WftD type-programme, the CDEP, and in areas with ‘viable labour markets’ new 
Indigenous Employment Centres are being paid to assist some of the 35,000 CDEP workers 
into regular jobs (Champion, 2002). 
 
Australian programmes are monitored regularly and the relevant Department produces ‘net 
impact’ studies that compare the experience of participants with non-participants. The 
‘matching’ methodology has strengths and limitations and it appears to have significantly 
under estimated the impact of employment experience programmes. This was evident in ‘net 
impact’ results derived from the results of the longitudinal ‘survey of employment and 
unemployment patterns’ that was introduced to better assess the impact of the Working Nation 
strategy (but discontinued by the Coalition Government in 1996). In a major assessment of the 
outcomes of relevant employment programmes Stromback and Dockery (2000) reported that 
even though they could not eliminate all bias participation in labour market programmes was 
associated with a marked increase in the rate at which people left spells of job search and with 
longer durations in subsequent work spells (indicating that those who were placed were not 
disproportionately recruited to short term jobs). Contrary to Departmental estimates they 
reported that the best net impact results were associated with conventional wage subsidy 
programmes and with ‘Jobskills’ an early transitional employment programme (see Table 
below). 
 
Lessons from Australian experience 
 
In a comprehensive review of Australian evaluation evidence Davidson (2002) suggests that it 
is safe to conclude that well designed employment experience programmes can play a 
significant role in improving the job prospects of the hardest to place long-term unemployed, 
especially those who are unlikely to be employed even with the availability of a wage subsidy. 
On the basis of the Australian evidence he points to the following features that distinguished 
the best performing employment experience programmes from those with the poorest results: 
• substantial employment experience in work closely resembling mainstream 
employment; 
• effective targeting of the most disadvantaged job-seekers for assistance; 
• a strong emphasis on community benefit and local community support for the project; 
• effective supervision and support of the participants; 
• links with relevant vocational training where appropriate and  
• a programme infrastructure that is sustained over time so that project sponsors learn 
from experience and develop their expertise. 
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3.   Intermediate Labour Markets in Britain 
 
 
 
 
Introduction   
 
3.1 Little has been understood about the extent and nature of ILMs in Britain, despite a high 
level of interest in recent years. The only national survey to date has been that of Marshall 
& MacFarlane in 1999. Their study, for the first time, was able to set a scale to ILM 
activity and quantify some of the key features. 
 
3.2 National figures are not available for ILMs precisely because ILMs are not a national 
programme where monitoring and outcome data would normally be available. ILMs are 
developed from the local level with a mixture of different funding streams and this creates 
problems in measuring activity given that the nature and extent of management 
information varies considerably between ILMs. 
 
3.3 This survey was intended to increase the knowledge about the extent of ILMs and their 
key features, including job outcomes and other destinations of leavers. However, there are 
two important caveats that must be borne in mind when considering the data: 
 
1. all data is supplied by individual ILMs and no steps have been taken to 
independently corroborate the data provided 
2. not all respondents were able to answer every question because of variations in 
data held by local ILMs. 
 
3.4 The main aim of the survey was therefore to map the extent and scale of ILM activity in 
the UK. However, the data collected also enables a tentative analysis of the performance 
of ILMs in comparison with New Deal. The respondents to the survey include those who 
use New Deal and those who do not. For those that do use New Deal (both 18-24 and 
25+) the respondents account for 10 per cent of total New Deal provision in 2001/2. 
 
3.5 Finally, it was not the intention of this survey to establish a full value for money 
assessment of ILMs. Whilst some results help give a better understanding of the costs and 
outcomes ILMs, it was beyond the brief of this report to undertake a full assessment, 
especially given the difficulties in assessing the economic impact of ILMs work outputs at 
the local level. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
3.6 To be included in the survey a definition had to be made of an ILM. Three key criteria 
were established in the survey: 
 
1. Do you offer temporary jobs on short-term contracts to unemployed or 
economically inactive people? 
2. Do you receive state and/or private funding to support costs? 
3. Do you offer a wage at some point in the participant’s stay? 
 
3.7 In addition, organisations had to be able to tick at least one of the following features: 
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1. Do you offer access to training at some point 
2. Do you offer access to personal support and/ or job search? 
3. Is some or all of the work done of benefit to the community (i.e. not in the private 
sector)? 
 
3.8 This method appears to have successfully included all those that considered themselves 
ILMs. We are unaware of any organisation that thought itself to be operating an ILM but 
could not fulfil these criteria. The criteria also successfully excluded organisations that 
were, for example, offering conventional wage subsidies or non-waged ETF and 
Voluntary Sector options under New Deal 18-24. 
 
3.9 The overall stress in the criteria means that those included in this survey are projects that 
offer temporary jobs on a wage and with some form of additional support package to the 
individual and/or the community. No value judgements were made about the level of 
wages, the length of the job contract, or the nature of the work done by ILM employees. 
 
 
Distribution of the Survey 
 
3.10 Our aim was to have as complete a picture of activity as was possible, and so the survey 
was openly available to any organisation to complete. The survey was distributed from 19 
December 2002, with a return date of 10 February 2003, although all late returns have 
been included. It was distributed to every New Deal 18-24 and 25+ contractor through 
regional Jobcentre Plus contractor lists, and Inclusions own distribution lists which 
contained organisations that were either operating or had expressed an interest in ILMs 
over the last four years. The survey also was distributed through various email networks 
and was available to download from Inclusions website. 
 
3.11 Whilst the survey was widely distributed and we believe that a large majority of interested 
organisations would have had an opportunity to complete it, this survey does not claim to 
represent a 100 per cent coverage of ILM activity. However, we are confident that the 
response to the survey is sufficiently large to represent ILM activity and can be taken as a 
broad reflection of the activities and outcomes of ILMs in Britain. 
 
3.12 A number of linear correlations within the dataset were analysed. These either did not 
show significant correlations or were trivial (such as the correlation between average 
length of stay and the length of contract). Closer inspection of the data has shown that 
some of the distributions are bimodal rather than linear, such as the variation of unit costs 
with size where both the largest and small providers have higher unit costs than providers 
of intermediate size. Such factors lead to linear correlations producing results that are not 
significant. 
 
 
The Respondents 
 
3.13 In presenting the results of the survey we have distinguished (wherever possible and 
appropriate) between New Deal-based ILMs and non-New Deal ILMs. This thereby 
distinguishes between those ILMs that take mandatory referrals, and those that recruit 
unemployed people who have chosen to participate. This enables the survey to consider 
one of the main criticisms of ILMs: that their job outcome results are better because they 
recruit more motivated unemployed people. 
 
3.14 The survey also reflects the wide range of size, activity and diversity of models operating 
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at the local level. Therefore, we have been cautious in using average (mean) figures, given 
that averages can disguise the range and distribution of replies. Consequently we 
sometimes give median (the middle point of a range) since they usually give a better guide 
and description to ILMs diversity. 
 
3.15 A total of 73 organisations responded, with some of these being ‘consortium’ replies 
where a central organisation co-ordinates and/or funds ILMs in their area.  
 
3.16 Table 3.1 shows the country of origin of the respondents. We believe that the response 
from Scotland considerably understates ILM activity, principally because some large 
ILMs chose not to respond to the survey. We estimate that these ILMs account for around 
600 ILM jobs in 2001/2. 
 
3.17 There were no responses from Northern Ireland. Whilst we are fairly sure that ILMs have 
not developed at the local level in the same way as in other countries, we do include 
‘Worktrack’ (a programme operating only in Northern Ireland) as an ILM.  
 
 
Table 3.1 Responses by Country 
 
Country Number Percentage 
England 64 87.7% 
Scotland 3 4.1% 
Wales 6 8.2% 
   
Total 73 100% 
 
 
3.18 Table 3.2 shows the legal status of the respondents. 59 per cent of ILM providers are 
charitable or not-for-profit organisations, but there is a broad mix of providers, which 
includes some private companies operating as welfare to work providers. ILMs originated 
in the voluntary sector and so there is evidence that the ILM approach has been adopted 
recently by a wider range of providers, specifically Local Authorities. 
 
 
Table 3.2 Legal Status of ILM Providers 
 
Legal Status Number Percentage 
Charity/non-profit 38 59.4% 
Further education 2 3.1% 
Private company 7 10.9% 
Local authority 15 23.4% 
Partnership 2 3.1% 
No information 9 N/A 
   
Total 73 100%  
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3.19 The geographical distribution of respondents broadly reflects areas of higher 
unemployment and the availability of European funds. 
 
 
Figure 3.1  Geographical Distribution of Respondents 
 
 
 
Funding of ILMs and Number of ILM Jobs 
 
3.20 As explained above, many of the Tables in this report show the results for both non-New 
Deal ILMs and New Deal-based ILMs. Table 3.3 shows that for all respondents, 47 or 
64.4 per cent were based on New Deal, and 26 or 35.6 per cent were non-New Deal. 
 
 
Table 3.3 Whether Respondents Used New Deal 
 
 Number Percentage 
Non-New Deal 26 35.6% 
New Deal-based 47 64.4% 
   
Total 73 100% 
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Turnover and Size of ILMs 
 
3.21 Table 3.4 and Charts 3.1 and 3.2 set out the total ILM turnover of respondents and the 
median size of ILMs. 
 
3.22 The turnover of all ILMs has more than doubled (118 per cent) since 2000/1, with the 
non-New Deal ILMs increasing by almost 248 per cent. Twenty-two of the replies were 
not operating in 2000/1 – almost a 33 per cent increase to this year.  
 
3.23 Part of this increase is due to at least one large ILM programme commencing in 2001/2. 
The availability of EU Objective 1 funds in South Yorkshire, Liverpool and Wales also 
explains much of the increase in 2002/3. However, it is the case that the majority of 
respondents have increased their turnover annually. 
 
3.24 The median turnover of ILMs shows that the non-New Deal ILMs are considerably 
smaller than New Deal based ILMs. This is likely to be explained by: (a) larger providers 
having New Deal contracts; (b) the restricted availability of non-New Deal funding to 
support large-scale ILMs. 
 
 
Table 3.4 Turnover of ILM Providers 
 
 Non-New Deal-based New Deal-based All 
 
Median 
Thousands 
Total 
Thousands
Number of 
responses
Median 
Thousands
Total 
Thousands
Number of 
responses 
Total 
Thousands 
        
00/01 turnover £90 £3,328 12 £342 £23,254 36 £26,582 
01/02 turnover  £148 £5,854 16 £350 £33,838 43 £39,692 
02/03 turnover  £221 £11,573 20 £485 £46,397 45 £57,969 
 
 
Chart 3.1 Turnover of ILM Providers: Total 
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Chart 3.2 Turnover of ILM Providers: Median 
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3.25 The size of individual ILMs is shown in Table 3.5 and Chart 3.3. The bands in Table 3.5 
are based on the quartiles with the exception of ‘very large’ which we have decided to 
identify separately because there are three ILMs which are significantly larger than all 
other ILMs.  
 
3.26 The three ‘very large’ ILMs are ‘consortium’ replies where there is a co-ordinating 
organisation that has combined results from their local areas. As such their survey returns 
summarise the results from well over 100 different organisations participating within the 
three areas. We return to consider the importance of size when we consider job outcomes. 
 
 
Table 3.5 Size of ILM Providers 
 
 Employees 
Small  1 to 9 
Small to medium 10 to 20 
Medium 21 to 50 
Large 51 to 334 
Very large over 344 
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Chart 3.3 ILMs Ranked by Number of Employees (2002/3) 
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Breakdown of Turnover 
 
3.27 Table 3.6 describes how ILMs spend their funds. Not surprisingly 50 per cent is used for 
wages, and a further 22 per cent for providing training and personal support. A total of 72 
per cent of expenditure is devoted to the direct benefit of the ILM employee. 11 per cent 
is devoted to ‘work activity costs’, which is expenditure necessary to deliver the work 
undertaken by ILM employees, for example, tools, building materials, computers, and so 
on. 17 per cent is spent on management costs, including the salaries of managers, 
supervisors and support staff. 
 
3.28 The main difference between non-New Deal and New Deal-based ILMs is the higher 
percentage devoted to ‘support costs’. Given non-New Deal ILMs are predominantly 
smaller this may reflect the fixed costs of providing adequate training and personal 
support, and where larger ILMs can exploit economies of scale. 
 
 
Table 3.6 Breakdown of ILM Expenditure 
 
 Non-New Deal New Deal-based All providers 
 
Total cost 
£ thousands % of turnover
Total cost 
£ thousands % of turnover
Total cost 
£ thousands % of turnover
Wage cost £4,532 41.5% £22,726 51.6% £27,258 49.7% 
Support cost £3,183 29.1% £4,620 10.5% £7,803 14.2% 
Work activity cost  £1,115 10.2% £4,671 10.6% £5,787 10.5% 
Training cost £554 5.1% £4,013 9.1% £4,567 8.3% 
Management cost  £1,544 14.1% £7,931 18.0% £9,475 17.2% 
       
Total £10,928 100% £43,962 100% £54,890 100% 
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Number of ILM Jobs 
 
3.29 Table 3.7 shows the total number of jobs for which ILMs have funding in each of the 
financial years. ‘Jobs’ were defined as lasting 12 months, but as we shall see later, not all 
ILMs offer 12 months contracts and the average stay of employees is always less than the 
contract length.  
 
3.30 In 2002/3 non-New Deal ILMs declined slightly but New Deal-based ILMs increased 
significantly. 
 
 
Table 3.7 Total Number of Jobs for Which Organisations Have Funding 
 
 Non-New Deal New Deal-based Total 
2000/01 396 2,535 2,931 
2001/02 928 3,115 4,043 
2002/03 852 6,303 7,155 
 
 
3.31 Using the New Deal-based volumes we can estimate the per cent of New Deal provision 
delivered by ILMs. The above New Deal-based ILM figures include both New Deal 18-24 
and 25+, therefore we have totalled all leavers from the relevant Gateways to relevant 
provision for the financial year 2001/2. This gives: 
 
 
Leavers from Gateway 2001/2 to:  
New Deal 18-24 ETF and Voluntary Sector option 26,300 
New Deal 25+ Work Experience Placement 8,000 
  
Total 34,300 
 
 
3.32 This means that for 2001/2 around 10 per cent of this New Deal provision is delivered 
through ILMs responding to this survey. However, this percentage will have increased in 
2002/3 with the doubling of New Deal-based ILMs. 
 
3.33 For an estimated UK figure for ILM jobs we have added to the survey the additional ILM 
jobs identified in Scotland and the Worktrack provision in Northern Ireland. This gives an 
estimated minimum total of 8,700 ILM jobs in the UK, suggesting that almost 14,000 
people were supported in 2002/3. 
 
 
Funding Sources for ILMs 
 
3.34 ILMs used twenty-one different funding sources across Britain (excluding Northern 
Ireland). The majority of ILMs used at least four of the sources in Tables 3.8 and 3.9, and 
Charts 3.4 and 3.5.  
 
3.35 The New Deals contribute almost £14m, representing 31.3 per cent of expenditure of the 
New Deal-based ILMs, and 25.5 per cent of total ILM expenditure. 
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3.36 European funding clearly dominates in both groups, in terms of expenditure and in terms 
of the number of ILMs using European funding (80 per cent).  
 
 
Table 3.8 Funding Sources Used by ILMs Which Are New Deal-Based 
 
Funding source Sum Percentage Median 
 £ 000s  £ 000s 
European funds  £16,936 38.4% £194 
New Deal 18-24  £11,363 25.8% £49 
Single Regeneration Budget £4,048 9.2% £65 
New Deal 25+  £2,421 5.5% £27 
StepUP  £1,759 4.0% £658 
Regional Development Agency £1,417 3.2% £75 
Trust Funds 18-24  £1,063 2.4% £43 
Local Authority grant  £1,052 2.4% £38 
Neighbourhood Renewal Fund  £1,031 2.3% £44 
Trading income  £993 2.3% £30 
Better Neighbourhoods  £496 1.1% £496 
Scottish Enterprise  £430 1.0% £215 
Employer contributions  £293 0.7% £28 
Learning & Skills Council  £261 0.6% £32 
New Deal for Communities  £152 0.3% £76 
Communities First £142 0.3% £35 
Lottery funds  £92 0.2% £25 
Health Action Zone  £92 0.2% £46 
Education Action Zone  £51 0.1% £51 
Action Team  £21 0.0% £21 
Education & Learning Wales  £11 0.0% £11 
    
Total £44,126 100%  
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Chart 3.4 Percentage of Funding from Sources: New Deal Contractors 
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Table 3.9 Funding Sources Used by ILMs Which Are Non-New Deals 
 
Funding source Sum Per cent Median 
 £ 000s  £ 000s 
European funds  £4,921 49.4% £108 
Employment Zone  £1,983 19.9% £1,983 
Single Regeneration Budget  £1,022 10.3% £85 
Local Authority grant £653 6.6% £32 
Neighbourhood Renewal Fund  £443 4.4% £85 
Action Team  £186 1.9% £93 
New Deal for Communities  £173 1.7% £49 
Trading income  £173 1.7% £32 
Lottery funds  £135 1.4% £135 
Regional Development Agency £92 0.9% £92 
Communities First  £63 0.6% £63 
Health Action Zone  £63 0.6% £63 
Employer contributions  £49 0.5% £25 
    
Total £9,957 100%  
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Chart 3.5 Percentage Funding from Sources: Non-New Deal 
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3.37 Since the Marshall & MacFarlane survey funding sources and mechanisms have changed 
considerably. For example, TECs have been replaced by the Learning & Skills Council, 
New Deal funding formulas have changed, new Objective 1 funds, and so on.  
 
3.38 Despite these changes ILMs have, in general, continued to grow. Indeed, ILMs have 
survived a wide range of funding changes in the past decade. Their ability to do so may be 
because local organisations and local partnerships are joining-up funding at the local level 
and are readily able to adapt their ‘funding cocktail’ and priorities. However, one of the 
most common complaints from ILMs is the extent and frequency of changes in the 
bureaucracy of different funding programmes. The main problems experienced by ILMs 
identified in Marshall & MacFarlane all related to funding and bureaucracy. 
 
3.39 Critical to the continued survival of ILMs therefore will be the extent to which national 
funding sources are ‘friendly’ to ILMs. New Deal has been relatively ‘ILM-friendly’, for 
example, the ability to pay wages rather than ‘benefits plus an allowance’ in the 
Environment Task Force and Voluntary Sector options on New Deal 18-24. European 
funding also is undergoing major change in moving to the co-financing system where 
primarily Jobcentre Plus and Local Learning & Skills Councils control access to European 
funds.  
 
3.40 If local organisations and partnerships can continue to put together the ‘joined up’ funding 
packages for ILMs then national policy will need to continue to provide the flexibility 
within national funding programmes. This may be achieved both through the design of the 
programme and funding mechanisms, and through the extent of discretion it permits to 
local managers and partnerships. 
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Work Activity of ILM Employees 
 
3.41 59 per cent of all ILM jobs are in four sectors: 
 
Administrative jobs • 
• 
• 
• 
Skilled Construction & Building 
Caring Personal Service Occupations 
Customer Service. 
 
3.42 However, as Table 3.10 and Chart 3.6 shows, there are ILM jobs in all of the occupational 
classifications. This may suggest that ILMs seek to fit activity to local labour market 
conditions. If this were not the case then the results would show a much stronger skew to 
the ‘traditional’ activities of community benefit or public works programmes. The lack of 
any central control on the nature of the work or criteria for approving activity (as has 
existed in previous wage-based national programmes) may lead both to a greater diversity 
of jobs and a more appropriate fit with local labour markets. However, the justification for 
such controls should not be forgotten, namely minimising the substitution of ILM jobs for 
existing jobs in the local economy.  
 
 
Table 3.10 Jobs Done by ILM Participants: Occupational Classification 
 
 Non-New Deal New Deal-based Total 
 Number % Number % Number % 
Protective Service Occupations 62 6.0% 55 1.4% 117 2.3% 
Culture, media & sports 57 5.5% 133 3.3% 190 3.7% 
Administrative 73 7.0% 529 13.1% 602 11.9% 
Secretarial & related 4 0.4% 31 0.8% 35 0.7% 
Skilled Agricultural Trades 80 7.7% 348 8.6% 428 8.4% 
Skilled Metal & Electronic 46 4.4% 41 1.0% 87 1.7% 
Skilled Construction & Building 101 9.7% 781 19.3% 882 17.4% 
Textiles, Printing & Other Skilled 14 1.4% 1 0.0% 15 0.3% 
Caring Personal Service Occupations 57 5.5% 438 10.8% 495 9.8% 
Leisure & Other Personal Service 34 3.3% 168 4.2% 202 4.0% 
Sales Occupations 13 1.3% 122 3.0% 135 2.7% 
Customer Service 154 14.9% 337 8.3% 491 9.7% 
Process, Plant & Machine Operatives 9 0.9% 182 4.5% 191 3.8% 
Transport & Mobile Machine 33 3.2% 131 3.2% 164 3.2% 
Elementary Trades, Plant & Storage 40 3.9% 440 10.9% 480 9.5% 
Elementary Admin & Service 84 8.1% 87 2.2% 171 3.4% 
Extra Category 1 143 13.8% 190 4.7% 333 6.6% 
Extra Category 2 33 3.2% 23 0.6% 56 1.1% 
 
 
3.43 ‘Construction and Building’ still represents the largest single occupation. This probably 
reflects the fact that: 
 
many activities under the Environment Task Force will fall under this category • 
• 
• 
most Groundwork ILMs create jobs in this sector 
the over-representation of men on ILMs 
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the high numbers joining with no qualifications leading to a targeting of activities 
with high numbers of entry-level or low skilled jobs. 
• 
 
 
Chart 3.6 Jobs Done by ILM Participants: Occupational Classification 
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The ILM Offer to Unemployed People 
 
Wages 
 
3.44 ILMs are bound by minimum wage legislation and so unsurprisingly the minimum and 
median payments are in line with the £4.20 per hour minimum wage for adults. Table 3.11 
gives the minimum, median and maximum hourly rates paid by ILMs.  
 
3.45 Where the minimum payments are below £4.20 this reflects those ILMs that employ 16 
and 17 year olds to whom the minimum wage does not apply. Some organisations also use 
the ‘Development Rate’ that applies to 18-21 year olds, and for those over 22 for the first 
6 months of a job where accredited training is provided. 
 
3.46 26 ILMs have a wage scale that allows for wage increases during a person’s stay – 
facilitating progression within the ILM job. This can have two effects. One is to motivate 
people to remain within the ILM job in order to secure progression, so diminishing short-
term job search. The other effect is to demonstrate that progression is possible thereby 
leading to more motivated job search to preserve the wage gains secured on the ILM. 
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Table 3.11 Wages Paid by ILMs 
 
 Non-New Deal New Deal-based 
 Minimum Median Maximum Minimum Median Maximum 
Minimum hourly wage £2.90 £4.20 £7.75 £3.00 £4.20 £5.27 
Maximum hourly wage £4.10 £4.35 £10.40 £4.19 £4.60 £7.80 
Average hourly wage £4.10 £4.32 £8.50 £3.60 £4.25 £6.13 
 
 
Duration of Jobs and Length of Stay 
 
3.47 Table 3.12 gives the duration of the contracts offered and the actual length of stay by ILM 
employees. The conventional view of ILMs is that they offer 12-month contracts. In fact 
the survey shows there is a wide range in the length of contracts offered. This reflects 
different models of ILM structure. Some organisations put people onto a wage 
immediately, whilst others progress participants from benefit plus onto employee status 
after a period of time. This leads to the wide variation in the length of contract offered on 
a wage. 
 
3.48 The average length of stay of ILM employees indicates the extent of employees leaving, 
either as a result of dropping out for a variety of reasons or progressing to a job in the 
open labour market. 
 
3.49 It is generally assumed that a short average length of stay linked with a high job outcome 
rate indicates an ILM with a strong emphasis on aiding transition to the open labour 
market, and succeeding in moving ILM employees out of any ‘comfort zone’ because of 
the security of a temporary contract. 
 
 
Table 3.12 Contracted Weeks and Actual Stay of ILM Participants 
 
 Non-New Deal New Deal-based 
 
Contracted 
weeks 
Average 
length of stay
Per cent of 
contract 
length 
Contracted 
weeks 
Average 
length of stay 
Per cent of 
contract 
length 
Minimum 12 9 75% 10 3 30% 
Lower quartile 18.5 15 81% 26 17.5 67% 
Median 45 27 60% 39 24 62% 
Upper quartile 52 40 77% 52 34.5 66% 
Maximum 52 52 100% 52 48 92% 
       
Mean 37.8 28.17 75% 38.8 25.22 65% 
 
 
3.50 For New Deal-based ILMs operating 52 weeks (upper quartile) the average stay is 34.5 
weeks or 66 per cent of the contract length. This compares to 77 per cent of contract 
length for non-New Deal ILMs. In general, the average length of stay is longer on non-
New Deal ILMs.  
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Training 
 
3.51 The provision of training is conventionally assumed to be part of the standard ILM 
package. However, as Table 3.13 shows, whilst 89 per cent of all ILMs do provide 
training almost 20 per cent of the non-New Deal ILMs do not. This may be explained by 
local design or by the pragmatism of the type of funding and the requirements that go with 
that funding. 
 
 
Table 3.13 Whether Training Offered by ILM Providers 
 
 Non-New Deal New Deal-based All 
Training provided    
Number 21 44 65 
Percentage 80.8% 93.6% 89.0% 
 
 
3.52 Table 3.14 shows the percentage of ILMs who provide training that is accredited and how 
the training is delivered. Again the New Deal-based ILMs provide more accredited 
training. 
 
 
Table 3.14 Training Provided by ILM Providers 
 
 Non-New Deal New Deal-based 
 
Number 
providing 
training 
Percentage 
accredited 
Number 
providing 
training 
Percentage 
accredited 
Training on the job provided 21 52% 42 69% 
Training off the job provided 19 58% 43 86% 
ESOL training provided 4  7  
Basic/Life skills training provided 16 25% 37 46% 
 
 
Personal Support 
 
3.53 An integral part of ILM design is the personal support provided to address other 
employability issues whilst people are in temporary work. The assumption behind this 
model is that long-term unemployed people usually have multiple barriers to sustainable 
employment and that work experience alone is insufficient to satisfactorily increase 
employability. 
 
3.54 Job search support is critical in helping ILM employees increase their motivation to find 
continued employment beyond their ILM contract and, with the exception of one ILM, all 
offered Job search support with 94 per cent offering careers advice. 
 
3.55 The responses show that a majority of ILMs offer the range of personal support required 
to address multiple barriers. A minority of ILMs, however, do not. To offer this range of 
support ILMs clearly either must be sufficiently large to justify direct provision, or have 
good partnership arrangements with other local providers of support. 
 
3.56 Chart 3.7 sets out the per cent of ILMs that offer each of the main forms of personal 
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support offered by ILMs. 
 
 
Chart 3.7 Forms of Support - Per cent of ILMs Offering 
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Post-Employment Support for ILM Leavers Going to Jobs 
 
3.57 We also asked if ILMs provided any post-employment support to the employee and the 
employer with which the leaver has secured a job. Table 3.15 shows that the majority 
offers it to the employee but only a minority provide it to the employer. Support for 
employees varies from formal outreach to encouragement to keep in touch by phone. 
 
 
Table 3.15 Number of ILMs Providing Post-Employment Support for Employees 
 
Post-employment support for employees 
Number 51 
Percentage 70% 
  
Post-employment support for employers 
Number 31 
Percentage 42% 
 
 
Characteristics of ILM Employees 
 
3.58 This part of the survey aimed to establish a profile of the unemployed people that were 
being recruited by ILMs. As previously noted a critical difference exists between those 
New Deal-based ILMs that take referrals and the non-New Deal ILMs which will recruit 
mostly through a process of open recruitment and selection. 
 
3.59 If recruitment is by selection then, it is suggested, this will lead to recruits who are more 
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motivated and probably better qualified to undertake the work activity. In this context 
ILM managers’ recruitment decisions will be partly motivated by delivering work output 
rather than achieving only labour market outcomes. 
 
3.60 In considering the characteristics of ILM employees the expectation is that the non-New 
Deal ILMs are likely to have a higher employability (using the characteristics below as 
indicators) and the profile of New Deal-based ILM employees will broadly reflect the 
profile of New Deal participants. Therefore, where possible we have compared the survey 
results with the New Deal monitoring statistics for 2002.  
 
3.61 The results of the survey in Tables 3.16 – 3.22 give mixed results. On three characteristics 
more employable people are recruited by the non-New Deal ILMs, however two other 
characteristics could suggest the opposite. However, the New Deal-based ILMs seem to 
reflect starters to New Deal 18-24 and New Deal 25+ IAP, with the key exception of 
higher numbers of ethnic minorities. Given that New Deal-based ILMs represent the 
significant majority of ILM jobs, we have not identified any significant recruitment of 
more employable people onto ILMs. 
 
 
Age 
 
3.62 The age profile for New Deal-based ILMs shows the dominance of New Deal 18-24 with 
69 per cent of all recruits in this age bracket. The non-New Deal ILMs show a more even 
spread across the age range, and includes those ILMs that take 16-17 year olds. Some 
argue that a more even spread of ages is beneficial in better reflecting most workplaces in 
the open labour market, rather than many New Deal ILMs which can be dominated by 18 
to 24 year olds. 
 
 
Table 3.16 Age-Groups of ILM Participants 
 
 Non-New Deal New Deal-based 
 Total Percentage Responses Total Percentage Responses 
16-17 26 4.8% 18 7 0.2% 39 
18-24 199 36.6% 18 2,400 69.4% 39 
25-49 269 49.4% 19 969 28.0% 40 
50 plus 50 9.2% 18 80 2.3% 39 
 
 
Gender 
 
3.63 Non-New Deal ILMs recruit significantly more women (35 per cent) in comparison with 
New Deal-based ILMs (25 per cent). This will reflect the more open eligibility criteria 
most non-New Deal ILMs will have. 
 
3.64 New Deal-based ILMs reflect exactly the gender split on New Deal 18-24, but taking into 
account New Deal 25+ there are 5 per cent more men on both New Deals. However, given 
the dominance of New Deal 18-24 (69 per cent of New Deal-based ILMs) it is fair to 
assume that New Deal-based ILMs broadly reflect New Deal participation rates. 
 
Table 3.17 Gender of ILM Participants 
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 Non-New Deal New Deal-based 
 Total Percentage Responses Total Percentage Responses 
Male 353 64.9% 19 3,260 75.0% 39 
 Female 191 35.1% 19 1,082 24.9% 38 
 
 
Table 3.18 Gender New Deal 18-24 And 25+ Participation  
 
(all figures 
‘000s) 
Voluntary 
sector 
Environment 
Task Force 
% for ND 
18-24 
options 
ND 25+ IAP % for ND 25+ IAP Total for all % of all 
Males 7.9 11.4 74.69% 33 85.27% 53.0 80.94% 
Females 5.6 1.0 25.31% 5.7 14.73% 12.5 19.06% 
 
 
Ethnicity  
 
3.65 Non-New Deal ILMs recruit significantly fewer minority ethnic employees. Excluding 
British, Irish and other white, the non-New Deal ILMs recruit 35 per cent minority ethnic 
employees compared to 43 per cent for New Deal-based ILMs. Given the disparity in 
employment rates for most minority ethnic groups in comparison to whites, then this will 
inevitably have an impact on the job outcome rates. 
 
3.66 The significant difference, however, is between New Deal-based ILMs and New Deal 
starters to ETF and voluntary sector option and New Deal 25+ IAP. New Deal figures 
show that 14 per cent of all starts in 2002 where from black and ethnic minorities 
compared to 43 per cent for New Deal-based ILMs. A higher percentage for ILMs is to be 
expected given the concentration of ILMs in inner city areas and areas of high ethnic 
minority populations. 
 
3.67 Given that the job outcome rate from New Deal for ethnic minorities is below those for 
white people, then it would be expected that job outcome rates for New Deal-based ILMs 
would be depressed. However, if comparisons are valid then it appears that New Deal-
based ILMs not only increase New Deal job outcomes but also do so for significant 
numbers of ethnic minorities – a priority group for the Department for Work and 
Pensions. 
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Table 3.19 Participation Rates for Non-New Deal and New Deal-based ILMs in 
Relation to Ethnicity 
 
 Non-New Deal New Deal-based 
 % % 
British 43% 47% 
Irish 3% 3% 
Other white 16% 3% 
White & Black Caribbean 3% 4% 
White & Black African 3% 3% 
White & Asian 3% 3% 
Bangladeshi 3% 3% 
Other Asian 3% 4% 
Black Caribbean 3% 3% 
Black African 3% 4% 
Chinese 3% 3% 
Other mixed 3% 3% 
Indian 3% 3% 
Pakistani 3% 4% 
Other ethnic group 3% 5% 
Prefer not to say 3% 4% 
   
All Ethnic Minorities 35% 43% 
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Chart 3.8 Ethnicity of ILM Participants 
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Table 3.20 Ethnic Minority New Deal 18-24 and 25+ Participation Rates 
 
(all figures 
‘000s) 
Voluntary 
sector 
Environment 
Task Force 
% for ND 18-
24 ET/VS 
starts 
ND 25+ 
IAP 
% for ND 
25+ IAP 
Total for 
both NDs % of all 
Ethnic 
Minorities 2.8 0.9 14.3% 5.7 14.7% 9.389 14.6% 
 
 
Disability 
 
3.68 Non-New Deal ILMs had almost twice the percentage of people with a disability. This 
could diminish job outcomes for non-New Deal ILMs but it is not possible to ascertain the 
extent given that we do not count job outcome figures for those who have a disability. 
However, there was also a low response to this question indicating that not all ILMs keep 
this data as a matter of course. By way of comparison New Deal 18-24 ETF/VS has 
recorded 13.6 per cent of all starts as having a disability. Therefore, whilst the non-New 
Deal ILMs are roughly comparable, the New Deal-based ILMs appear to have half the 
national rate for New Deal 18-24 ETF/VS. 
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Table 3.21 Whether ILM Participants Have a Disability 
 
 New Deal-based 
Number Percentage Percentage 
110 10.6% 6.0% 
1037 100% 100% 
 
Work History 
3.69 This question was difficult for all ILMs to answer since most are not required to keep this 
information. This was particularly the case for non-New Deal ILMs. However, for those 
that did respond there is a stark difference in Table 3.22 with 6 per cent of recruits to non-
New Deal ILMs having had no job or only casual jobs compared to 37 per cent on New 
Deal ILMs. 
 
 
Non-New Deal 
Number  
Had a disability 242 
All ILM employees 4037 
 
 
3.70 Whilst the non-New Deal figure has to be treated with some caution the difference is 
sufficiently large to indicate that non-New Deal ILMs recruit people with some work 
experience in the open labour market. 
 
Table 3.22 Whether ILM Participants had a Paid Job Before 
 
 Non-New Deal New Deal-based 
 Number Percentage Number Percentage 
No paid job before 26 2.5% 1211 30.0% 
Casual jobs only 33 3.2% 275 6.8% 
Base 1037 100% 4037 100% 
 
 
Qualifications 
 
3.71 Again there was a low response to this question. However, there is a significant difference 
between the two groups. The non-New Deal ILMs recruit people with higher 
qualifications than New Deal-based ILMs. 75 per cent of all New Deal recruits are below 
Level 2 compared to 51 per cent on non-New Deal. Almost half (43 per cent) of all New 
Deal recruits have no qualifications at all. 
 
3.72 For comparison, nationally for all starters to date on New Deal 18-24 55 per cent had 
below NVQ level 2. Qualifications for ETF and Voluntary Sector options and New Deal 
25+ IAP starters are not available, but it can be presumed that the least qualified exit 
Gateway to an Option or IAP. Therefore, it is likely that New Deal-based ILMs broadly 
reflect New Deal. 
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 Table 3.23 Qualifications of ILM Participants 
 
 Non-New Deal ILMs New Deal-based ILMs  
 Number Percentage Number Percentage All ND 18-24 starts 
      
No qualifications 114 26% 1247 43% 31.8% 
Foundation level3     8.3% 
Level 1 qualifications4 106 24% 924 32% 14.8% 
Level 2 qualifications 111 26% 563 19% 18.9% 
Level 3 qualifications 45 10% 89 3% 4.5% 
Level 4 qualifications 57 13% 83 3% 2.5% 
Below level 2  51%  75% 55.0% 
Below level 3  76%  94% 73.9% 
 
 
Chart 3.9 Qualifications of ILM Participants 
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Outcomes 
 
Outcome Targets 
 
3.73 We asked what targets ILMs had (either set by themselves or by a funder). As can be seen 
in Table 3.24 high targets were set on average for both types of ILM. These are ambitious 
targets relative to those being achieved under New Deal. The targets reflect also an 
accepted ‘norm’ within ILMs to at least double the job outcomes for New Deal.  
 
 
                                                     
3 Foundation level qualifications are below NVQ Level 1 including basic skills qualifications. 
4 NVQ Levels are defined as: Level 1 = 4 or less GCSEs A-C; Level 2 = 5 plus GCSEs A-C; Level 3 = A 
Level or equivalent; Level 4 = Graduate or Higher Education Diploma. 
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Table 3.24 Average Targets for ILM Providers 
 
 Non-New Deal New Deal-based All 
Leavers into jobs (%) 64.6% 63.05% 63.55% 
Leavers into education (%) 11% 8.55% 9.27% 
Securing a qualification (%) 66.5% 80.97% 76.92% 
    
Median Targets for ILM providers Non-New Deal New Deal-based All 
    
Leavers into jobs (%) 61% 65% 65% 
Leavers into education (%) 6.5% 7% 7% 
Securing a qualification (%) 80% 100% 95% 
 
 
Jobs and Other Destinations of Leavers 
 
3.74 The job outcome figures in Table 3.25 and 3.26 are as given by respondents to the survey. 
No independent corroboration was undertaken, but most funding streams used by ILMs 
require monitoring of outcomes and, in some instances, performance related payments, as 
with New Deal. The definition of job outcomes and how they are expressed, however, 
varies between programmes and ILMs.  
 
3.75 For this survey we asked for the destinations of all leavers (at any stage in their contract) 
in the financial year 2001/2 and up to 31 October in 2002/3. 
 
 
Table 3.25 2001/2 Destination of Leavers 
 
  Non-New Deal % 
New Deal-
based % Total % 
Went to another job 204 66.7% 1477 39.8% 1681 41.8% 
Stayed longer than 13 wks 90 44.1% 707 47.9% 797 47.4% 
Job with same employer 25 12.3% 127 8.6% 152 9.0% 
Full time education 8 2.6% 80 2.2% 88 2.4% 
Were Dismissed 14 4.6% 281 7.6% 295 7.9% 
Resigned-Health reasons 13 4.3% 70 1.9% 83 2.2% 
Resigned-Domestic reasons 5 1.6% 23 0.6% 28 0.8% 
Dropped out - no reason 
given 6 2.0% 156 4.2% 162 4.4% 
Returned to benefits 39 12.8% 347 9.3% 386 10.4% 
Volunteering 2 0.7% 32 0.9% 34 0.9% 
Secured qualification 117 38.2% 1953 52.6% 2070 55.7% 
Destination unknown 12 3.9% 310 8.3% 322 8.7% 
Other/unclassified 3 1.0% 939 25.3% 942 25.4% 
       
Total 306  3715  4021  
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Table 3.26 2002/3 Destination of Leavers 
 
 Non-New Deal % 
New Deal-
based % Total % 
Went to another job 215 74.4% 552 36.8% 767 42.8% 
Stayed longer than 13 wks 49 22.8% 230 41.7% 279 36.9% 
Job with same employer 35 16.3% 121 21.9% 156 20.3% 
Full time education 8 2.8% 23 1.5% 31 1.7% 
Were Dismissed 23 8.0% 290 19.3% 313 17.5% 
Resigned-Health reasons 4 1.4% 14 0.9% 18 1.0% 
Resigned-Domestic reasons 4 1.4% 9 0.6% 13 0.7% 
Dropped out - no reason 
given 7 2.4% 94 6.3% 101 5.6% 
Returned to benefits 20 7.0% 310 20.6% 330 18.4% 
Volunteering 2 0.7% 25 1.7% 27 1.5% 
Secured qualification 79 27.3% 583 38.8% 662 37.0% 
Destination unknown 6 2.1% 185 12.3% 191 10.7% 
Other/unclassified 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
       
Total 289  1502  1791  
 
 
Chart 3.10 Destination of Leavers 
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3.76 The average (mean) job outcome rate for all ILMs was 43 per cent in 2002-03, a small 
increase on the previous year. However, there is a significant difference between the job 
outcomes for non-New Deal ILMs and New Deal-based ILMs, but in considering this 
result other findings of the survey need to be taken into account.  
 
3.77 What explanation might there be for non-New Deal ILMs apparently achieving higher 
results? First, it should be noted that the sample for non-New Deal ILMs is relatively 
small and could be subject to a high degree of self-selection (i.e. lower performing non-
New Deal ILMs may not have responded to the survey). Second, we found that the profile 
of recruits to non-New Deal ILMs could have relatively higher employability in 
comparison with New Deal-based ILMs – but non-New Deal ILMs still take a high 
proportion of disadvantaged people. Third, we also found that the average cost of non-
New Deal ILMs was higher – although this does not necessarily mean that more was spent 
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directly on the employees. Fourth, an untested explanation might be that non-New Deal 
ILMs were operating independently outside of a Government ‘programme’ thereby 
affording greater flexibility and responsiveness to local circumstances and individual 
needs. This may also mean that direct comparison is difficult because of the different ILM 
employee experience between the two types, for example, non-New Deal ILM employees 
tend to stay longer. 
 
3.78 Overall the survey does not yield any direct or clear explanation for why non-New Deal 
ILM performance might be higher in comparison with New Deal-based ILMs. As such we 
subsequently concentrate on comparisons between New Deal-based ILMs and New Deal 
ETF/VS performance. 
 
 
Comparison with New Deal Performance 
 
3.79 Caution needs to be exercised in considering how ILMs compare with New Deal job 
outcomes and costs. There are a number of factors that make direct comparisons not 
possible: 
 
ILMs are often a mix of participants across ages and eligible groups, dependent on 
the funding, and this study has not disaggregated job outcomes for different 
groups 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
New Deal job outcome rates are subject to under-statement because of limitations 
in monitoring and reporting systems 
There is no standard practice for how ILMs identify and record job outcomes 
There are differences in definitions of a ‘leaver’ and when job outcomes are 
recorded 
ILM costs could have been under reported in the survey 
Finally, New Deal outcomes will include the outcomes for New Deal-based ILMs. 
 
3.80 Below we summarise the extent of validity of comparisons between ILMs and New Deal 
ETF/VS. See Table 3.32 in the conclusions to this Chapter for a summary of outcome and 
costs comparisons. 
 
 
Type of ILM Comparison with New Deal 
Non-New Deal ILM Direct comparison not possible due to variations in recruits, processes 
and recording of outcomes 
New Deal-based ILMs 
26-52 week contracts 
More valid given that recruits are broadly similar. However, because of 
differences in recording outcomes only the destination of immediate 
leavers from the New Deal option should be included in the job 
outcome rate.  
New Deal-based ILM 
26 week contracts 
Stronger validity. Similar profile of recruits, same recording of 
outcomes, and similar processes. Only main difference is that a wage is 
paid. Much of this provision operates as ‘waged option’ within 
ETF/VS. 
 
 
3.81 Two different approaches can be taken to the problem of comparison. First, not attempt 
any comparison and judge ILMs by their performance and cost against their policy 
objectives. In other words, do ILMs represent good value for money for their labour 
market and social objectives? Second, attempt to minimise the problems of comparison by 
identifying where comparisons could be valid.  
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3.82 The first approach is beyond the scope of this report. However, by concentrating on the 
New Deal-based ILMs we describe below how some comparisons can be made. 
 
3.83 ‘Leavers’ are often defined differently in New Deal monitoring statistics and by ILM 
providers.5 Leavers from ILMs who return to benefit are counted as leavers at the point of 
leaving their ILM job.  
 
3.84 A leaver who returns to benefits from a New Deal option does not leave New Deal, but 
progresses to follow-through (for 13 weeks), which provides assistance with job search. 
Leavers from options are therefore not counted as leavers from New Deal.  
 
3.85 If the numbers of leavers to follow-through from New Deal options are included in 
calculating the job outcome rate (in the same way as ILMs) then this gives a job outcome 
rate of 14 per cent. However, if jobs secured during the follow-through period are 
included then the job outcome rate rises to 32 per cent for the Voluntary Sector option and 
31 per cent for the Environment Task Force6.  
 
3.86 It is unclear if survey respondents included in their returns those job outcomes secured 
after an employee has left the ILM i.e. identified by the ILM through following-up on 
people who have left and returned to benefit but subsequently got a job. However, other 
than those operating a 6-month ILM using New Deal funding ILMs generally have no 
incentive to follow-up on their leavers.7 In which case it is likely that only some ILMs 
follow up in any consistent or rigorous way after someone has left.      
 
3.87 An argument therefore can be made that there is a valid comparison between: (1) the 
survey figures for New Deal-based ILMs; and (2) the ETF and Voluntary Sector option 
job outcomes, either excluding jobs secured in the follow-through period, or including 
them. Excluding follow-through jobs would give a comparison of 14 per cent for the New 
Deal options and 39.8 per cent for New Deal-based ILMs. Including jobs from follow-
through gives a comparison of 32 per cent for the New Deal options and 39.8 per cent for 
New Deal-based ILMs. This gives an increase in job outcome rates for New Deal-based of 
ILMs of between 8 to 26 percent, depending at what point outcomes are measured. 
However, it is likely that the increase in job outcomes is lies between these two extremes. 
 
3.88 The survey also enables us to consider the performance of 26 week New Deal-based ILMs 
– these are those that are using the waged option to deliver the standard 26-week New 
Deal options. In this instance it can be assumed that these ILMs will include job outcomes 
secured within the follow through period, given that their job outcome fee is partially 
dependent on these outcomes. 
 
3.89 Table 3.31 shows the job outcome rates for these ILMs. In 2001/02 the job outcome rate 
was 33.6 per cent - only 2 percentage points above the ETF and Voluntary Sector figures. 
In 2002/03 the ILM figure increases to 47.3 per cent, but using a smaller base. This 
variation in ILM performance can be partially explained by the figures for the very large 
ILMs (see p. 53) – one of which is based on a 26 week waged ETF.  
 
                                                     
5 If a New Deal ILM employee is employed for longer than 26 weeks (the maximum funded under new 
Deal) then they are not eligible to return to follow-through if they are unsuccessful in getting a job. 
6 New Deal Monitoring Statistics to end December 2002: Department for Work and Pensions March 2003 
7 Those New Deal-based ILMs that offer 26-week contracts (i.e. waged New Deal option) can claim an 
output related payment. However, when comparing results in this case one would have to include jobs 
secured in the follow-through period in the ILMs total jobs secured. Tracking this has not been possible in 
this study. 
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3.90 In summary, it appears that taken overall ILMs do perform better than New Deal, but the 
problem of making comparisons has to be taken into account.  
 
3.91 Whilst, the better performance is most marked in the case of the non-New Deal ILMs a 
direct comparison cannot be made because of key differences in recruitment, processes 
and recording of outcomes.  
 
3.92 When more valid comparisons are made between New Deal ETF/VS and the New Deal-
based ILMs then performance of the 26 week New Deal-based ILMs only marginally 
improves on ETF/VS. However, there appears to be a significant improvement when New 
Deal-based ILMs extend beyond 26 weeks, but in this case comparisons are not as valid 
because of the different activity required of ILM employees and leavers from New Deal 
options. 
 
3.93 However, do higher job outcomes justify the additional cost of ILMs? 
 
 
Cost of ILMs 
 
3.94 Table 3.27 shows the costs for each person starting on an ILM and Table 3.28 shows the 
cost of maintaining an ILM job for one year. 
 
3.95 Most ILMs offer an extension to the New Deal duration of 6 months on an option. As we 
have seen, this is often a further 6 months to provide a contract of 12 months but this is by 
no means the general rule. P. 44 detailed the average length of stay on ILMs and showed 
that if a 12-month contract is offered the average stay is 34.5 weeks. This means that each 
52-week ILM job, and its corresponding cost, supports more than one person.  
 
3.96 The distinction is important because the Marshall & MacFarlane figure of £13,860 per 
year is widely reported as evidence of the high cost of ILMs. Marshall & MacFarlane, 
however, were clear in their report that this figure was the ‘cost per place per year’ (i.e. 
the cost of maintaining an ILM job for one year), and their figure related to a sample of 37 
ILMs.  
 
 
Table 3.27 Unit Costs for Each ILM Starter 
 
 Non-New Deal New Deal-based  
 Median Mean Median Mean Overall Mean 
      
2000/01 £2,843 £6,606 £8,558 £8,784 £8,361 
2001/02 £6,994 £8,248 £7,222 £8,443 £8,394 
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Table 3.28 Unit Costs for Each ILM Job 
 
 Non-New Deal New Deal-based  
 Median Mean Median Mean Overall Mean 
      
2000/01 £5,960 £8,800 £10,463 £9,240 £9,133 
2001/02 £9,335 £10,891 £10,833 £9,696 £10,015 
2002/03 £12,341 £12,421 £10,250 £10,638 £11,134 
 
 
3.97 This survey has found that the comparable figure to Marshall & MacFarlane is £11,134 
for last financial year. This has actually increased from £9,133 in 2000/1, the year after 
the Marshall & MacFarlane survey. The current survey is based on almost double the 
response rate of Marshall & MacFarlane (73 to 37 responses), therefore our assessment is 
that the above Tables are likely to be more representative figures. However, many will 
still argue that £11,134 is expensive relative to the gain in performance. 
 
3.98 A comparison with New Deal costs has to be with the cost for each ILM starter. This is 
because New Deal funding is based on per participant formula funding rates. The 
appropriate ILM figure is therefore £8,394 (the mean for all starters in 2001/2). This 
compares with an estimated average unit cost for ETF of £5,0768. This figure includes 
both the payments to providers and the participant’s benefits and allowance. Very often 
financial comparisons have been made between the Marshall & MacFarlane figure 
(£13,860) and only the provider element of New Deal, omitting that the Government is 
still paying benefits plus an allowance. 
 
3.99 In the survey we were able to identify those New Deal-based ILMs that offer 26-week 
contracts (i.e. the same duration as New Deal). Their average unit cost reduces to £7,182 
(Table 3.28). A fair comparison can therefore be made between the ETF average unit cost 
of £5,076 and the £7,182 ILM figure. This means that 26 week New Deal-based ILMs 
attract an additional £2,106 per starter of public (and other) funds to support costs not 
covered by New Deal, which are usually the work-related costs. 
 
3.100 The other way of looking at costs is on an annual basis. The above £5,076 figure is for 26 
weeks only, therefore over one year the total cost will be £10,152 compared to the average 
annual cost of ILMs of £11,134. The annual cost difference is therefore not especially 
significant, whilst the larger difference between the per starter figures is explained by the 
throughput. 
 
3.101 As Marshall & MacFarlane found, the cost for ILMs vary greatly. This is usually not 
because of high wages or support costs, but because of the higher work activity costs that 
are covered by non-Department for Work and Pensions funding. This points to a further 
dimension of ILMs namely the value of the work output. Some have argued that the cost 
of ILMs should be discounted to take into account the positive impact of the work output 
on the community and the local economy. For example, by helping stimulate new social 
enterprises to provide services of benefit to the community. All labour market 
programmes will have a wider economic impact (both positive and negative) but because 
many ILMs are specifically funded to deliver other outputs (e.g. environmental 
improvement, childcare, recycling, and so on) these too can be directly measured. 
 
                                                     
8 This is based on the Jobcentre Plus estimated average cost per ETF place of £3,516 plus benefits and 
allowance calculated at £60 per week for 26 weeks. 
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3.102 It was beyond the scope of this survey to measure the impact and value of the work 
output, but in a full value for money assessment of ILMs this impact should be taken into 
account. The survey did show that there is a wide range of different indicators used to 
measure impact, which is unsurprising given the range of work activity. 
 
 
Relating Size, Duration of Contract, Job Outcomes and Cost 
 
3.103 One of the main factors determining the unit cost is the length of the contract offered. This 
explains some of the relatively low unit costs found in the survey. Table 3.29 shows the 
unit costs for ILMs with different length contracts, and Table 3.30 the unit costs and job 
outcome rates for different size ILMs. 
 
 
Table 3.29 Unit Costs for ILMs in Relation to Length of Contract 
 
Length of contract Average unit cost 
Under 26 weeks £4,036 
26 weeks £7,182 
27 - 51 weeks £12,076 
52 weeks £9,186 
 
 
Table 3.30 Unit Cost and Job Outcome Rates for Different Sized ILMs 
 
Size of ILM Employees Unit Cost Job outcomes 
Small 1 to 9 £7,515 54% 
Small to Medium 10 to 20 £11,257 56% 
Medium to Large 21 to 50 £5,500 42% 
Large 51 to 334 £8,956 62% 
Very Large over 344 £9,374 32% 
 
 
3.104 The low unit cost for Medium to Large was caused by a high number of ILMs providing 
26-week contracts (or below). These were also the second least successful group. 
 
3.105 The most successful group in terms of job outcomes were the Large ILMs. Whilst this 
group has a very wide range (51-350 employees) the median size for the group was 87 
employees. The group also had a relatively low unit cost. A hypothesis to be tested further 
is whether this result can be explained by: first, a threshold for a certain number of 
employees that justifies dedicated support staff leading to better outcomes; and second, 
these ILMs can then benefit from economies of scale.  
 
3.106 The low performance of very large ILMs caused further investigation. Three City or sub-
region-wide ILMs accounted for the very large ILMs, and we sought further information 
in each of the areas. All areas offered 52-week contracts, with the exception of a part of an 
ILM in one area. 
 
3.107 In each of the areas the recording and identification of job outcomes was a significant 
issue. To solve this, each area has put into effect slightly different arrangements with 
Jobcentre Plus to rectify this problem, and to better reflect the likely job outcomes 
secured: 
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1. the first area used a mix of National Insurance checks by Jobcentre Plus, postal 
follow-up forms and telephone calls 
2. in the second area, Jobcentre Plus undertook their own check on the claimant 
status on a sample of ILM leavers 
3. the third area, has now agreed with Jobcentre Plus that each ILM leaver’s benefit 
status will be checked at 13 weeks and if they are not claiming this will be 
counted as a job outcome (but not for payment purposes). 
 
3.108 All of these arrangements are designed to more effectively measure job outcomes secured 
after leaving the ILM. The net effect is that there appears to be a significant under-
reporting of job outcomes in two of the three areas.  
 
3.109 In the first of these areas the Jobcentre Plus District conducted a study of a sample of 
leavers from the ILM to ascertain how many were claiming JSA at 13 weeks and 52 
weeks after leaving the ILM. This study found that at 13 weeks 75 per cent of ILM 
leavers were not claiming JSA, and 52 per cent were not claiming after 52 weeks. It is 
possible to broadly compare the 13-week figure with New Deal ETF and VS options. All 
leavers from follow-through (originating from ETF and VS options) going to ‘Other 
known destinations’ is 62 per cent of all starts on ETF and VS options. Consequently it 
appears that the ILM in this area improves the national average by around 13 per cent. 
 
3.110 In the second area, performance was low in 2001/02 and no survey return was given for 
2002/03. New arrangements with Jobcentre Plus were introduced in 2002/03 to track 
leavers and record job outcomes. As a result performance of the programme has improved 
to 39 per cent9 - around the average performance for ILMs found in this survey. In this 
area (as with other areas) the tracking and recording of job outcomes is a significant issue 
when measuring performance.  
 
3.111 Investigating these areas in more detail has reinforced evidence for our previous points 
that: (a) the likelihood is that many ILMs do not effectively track job outcomes after a 
person has left; and (b) there is a variation in the way that job outcomes are measured by 
ILMs.  
 
 
Relating Duration of Contract and Job Outcomes 
 
3.112 We went on to consider whether there were significant differences in job outcomes for 
New Deal-based ILMs and Non-New Deal ILMs. Table 3.31 shows, for each financial 
year, the job outcome rates for leavers by length of contract and by type of ILM. 
However, the number of places in some of the categories in Table 3.31 is too low to be 
statistically significant, therefore we are cautious about drawing some conclusions. The 
significant influence is the reduced sample size for 2002/3 – less than 50 per cent of 
2001/2. This means that the variations between the years are strongly influenced by the 
performance of individual ILMs, as opposed to general changes in performance. Whilst 
the total sample for 2002/3 is sufficient to use for comparative purposes, we do not 
believe the sample is large enough to be broken down further.  
                                                     
9 Unpublished local evaluation data 
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Table 3.31 Job Outcomes in Relation to Length of Contract and Type of ILM  
 
Job outcomes for 2001/02     
Length of contract Type of ILM Mean Median No. of places
26 weeks Non-New Deal ILM 39.3% 27.0% 56 
 New Deal-based ILM 33.6% 31.2% 1582 
 Total 33.8% 31.2% 1638 
27-51 weeks Non-New Deal ILM 62.2% 54.6% 37 
 New Deal-based ILM 60.2% 72.5% 387 
 Total 60.4% 69.2% 424 
52 weeks Non-New Deal ILM 63.7% 59.0% 102 
 New Deal-based ILM 38.5% 37.9% 1616 
 Total 40.0% 37.9% 1718 
     
Total Non-New Deal ILM 56.6% 59.0% 198 
 New Deal-based ILM 39.8% 31.2% 3715 
 Total 40.6% 31.2% 3913 
     
Job outcomes for 2002/03     
26 weeks Non-New Deal ILM 66.7% 66.7% 12 
 New Deal Based ILM 47.3% 50.0% 372 
 Total 48.0% 62.5% 384 
27-51 weeks Non-New Deal ILM 52.8% 47.9% 72 
 New Deal Based ILM 50.3% 40.0% 332 
 Total 50.7% 47.9% 404 
52 weeks Non-New Deal ILM 76.5% 100.0% 17 
 New Deal Based ILM 30.5% 25.9% 587 
 Total 31.8% 25.9% 604 
     
Total Non-New Deal ILM 60.4% 61.9% 149 
 New Deal Based ILM 40.4% 36.8% 1291 
 Total 42.5% 37.9% 1440 
 
3.113 However, some general conclusions can be drawn: 
 
despite some low sample sizes, non-New Deal ILMs always outperform New 
Deal-based ILMs 
• 
• 
• 
in 2001/02 there is a significant improvement in performance between 26-week 
contracts (34%) and 27-51 week contracts (60%), and a smaller, yet still notable 
improvement between 26-week contracts (34%) and 52-week contracts (40%). 
the 27-51 week contracts are the best performers in both years, however the 
performance of 52 week ILMs is skewed by the performance of the very large 
ILMs (see p. 59). 
 
 
Reasons for Establishing an ILM 
 
3.114 We asked the respondents to explain their reasons for establishing their ILM. Table 3.32 
shows that the overriding rationale was to assist the disadvantaged in the labour market 
and increase their employability. 
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Table 3.32 Reasons for Establishing an ILM 
 
Help disadvantaged into labour market   
Not at all 0 0% 
Not that important 0 0% 
Important 2 3% 
Very Important 65 97% 
Increase employability   
Not at all 0 0% 
Not that important 0 0% 
Important 2 3% 
Very Important 64 97% 
   
Enhance New Deal   
Not at all 13 21% 
Not that important 11 18% 
Important 18 29% 
Very Important 20 32% 
Services to benefit community  
Not at all 3 5% 
Not that important 6 9% 
Important 24 36% 
Very Important 33 50% 
Social enterprises   
Not at all 9 14% 
Not that important 19 29% 
Important 21 32% 
Very Important 16 25% 
   
Needs of private sector employers  
Not at all 9 14% 
Not that important 17 26% 
Important 28 43% 
Very Important 11 17% 
Needs of public sector employers  
Not at all 7 11% 
Not that important 23 36% 
Important 24 38% 
Very Important 10 16% 
Needs of voluntary & community sector employers 
Not at all 5 8% 
Not that important 18 28% 
Important 27 42% 
Very Important 15 23% 
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Conclusions and Summary of Key Findings 
 
Size and Funding of ILMs 
 
3.115 The survey shows that the turnover of ILMs has increased by almost 120 per cent since 
2000, and the number of ILM jobs has increased to just over 7,000. In total, there is an 
estimated minimum total of 8,700 ILM jobs in the UK. 
 
3.116 The duration of ILM jobs are mostly between 26 weeks and 52 weeks, and the average 
length of stay varies from 65 per cent to 75 per cent of the contract length, suggesting that 
around 12,000 people passed through ILMs in 2002/3. 
 
3.117 This growth has mostly come from local partners and local organisations identifying ILMs 
as a tool to improve job outcomes and achieve regeneration and social objectives. At the 
national level there have been no specific actions by Government to stimulate the growth 
of ILMs, but neither has it sought to restrict their development. Possible reasons for the 
increased growth could include: 
 
an increased desire by local partners to ‘join-up’ funding streams to achieve 
multiple objectives 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
an objective to improve on the performance of New Deal 
more intensive targeting of provision in regeneration areas 
the need for labour market initiatives which better meet the needs of those 
unemployed individuals with very low employability 
the stimulated development of social enterprises. 
 
3.118 It is important to remember, however, that the motivation and ability to start and maintain 
an ILM is due entirely to local conditions and local capacity. At the same time the 
availability of European funding and the flexibility of New Deal have enabled this 
increase. ILMs could represent a new style of labour market intervention, which is 
enabled by national funding frameworks, but not designed as a national programme.  
 
3.119 The majority of ILMs are based on New Deal 18-24 and 25+, and all of the larger ILMs 
are based on New Deal. A large majority of ILMs are under 100 jobs, but there are a few 
very large area-based ILMs where there is a central organisation which co-ordinates, 
enables, or directly funds local ILMs within the wider area. Any change to New Deal 
structure or funding could therefore have a significant impact on the ability of local areas 
to devise and operate ILMs. 
 
3.120 New Deal, however, only represents 25 per cent of the total financial turnover of ILMs. 
This shows that ILMs have attracted significant sums, from primarily public sources, to 
add value to local labour market initiatives. The Department for Work and Pensions is 
usually perceived to be the main Government stakeholder in ILMs however, the survey 
shows that other Government Departments and funders have a significant stake holding in 
ILMs. 
 
3.121 The largest single funding source is European funds. There is a currently a significant 
shift underway in how these funds are distributed and administered. This survey did not 
cover the period of the introduction of co-financing in some regions. As with New Deal 
funding, changes to European funding could significantly impact on the ability of local 
partners to operate ILMs. 
 
What ILMs Offer 
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3.122 The conventional view is that ILMs offer 12-month contracts to employees, but the survey 
has found a wide range of contract lengths. The different lengths of contracts do appear to 
have an impact on job outcomes, with improved performance over 26 weeks. The shorter 
contracts reflect different models of ILM design, for example, moving participants off 
‘benefits plus allowance’ for a short period, but which nonetheless represents the key 
transition from ‘welfare benefits to waged work’. 
 
3.123 All ILMs offered a package of personal support but the nature of this support varied – 
presumably reflecting the needs of recruits as well as available funding. Eighty-nine per 
cent of ILMs offered training, and almost all New Deal-based ILMs offered training. With 
the exception of one ILM, all offered Job search support which reflects the importance 
that ILMs place on labour market outcomes – 100 per cent of respondents said that ILMs 
were to increase employability and help the most disadvantaged secure work. In addition, 
some 70 per cent claim to offer post-employment support to ex-ILM employees.  
 
 
Who ILMs Recruit 
 
3.124 A criticism of ILMs has been that they may recruit those who are more motivated because 
participation is voluntary for some ILMs. To examine this we considered the results for 
non-New Deal ILMs (where recruitment will be voluntary) and New Deal-based ILMs 
(where participation will be primarily mandatory). For three characteristics the survey 
found that non-New Deal ILMs were recruiting people with apparent higher 
employability: 
 
1. Ethnicity – New Deal- based ILMs had 11 per cent more employees from 
minority ethnic groups 
2. Work history – 37 per cent of recruits to New Deal-based ILMs had not been 
employed before or only had casual jobs, compared to 6 per cent for non-New 
Deal ILMs 
3. Qualifications – New Deal-based ILM employees had lower qualifications. 
Seventy-five per cent had below Level 2, compared to 57 per cent for non-New 
Deal ILMs. 
 
3.125 However, for other characteristics the non-New Deal ILMs were recruiting significantly 
more people who might (in many circumstances) be expected to depress job outcomes: 
 
1. Age – 49% of recruits to non-New Deal ILMs were in the 25-49 age group, 
compared to only 28% in New Deal-based ILMs 
2. Disability – 11% of recruits to non-New Deal ILMs had a disability, compared to 
6% on New Deal-based ILMs. 
 
3.126 Therefore the overall picture gives mixed results and it is not possible, from this evidence, 
to categorically say whether non-New Deal ILMs recruit more employable people. 
 
3.127 However, it is clear from the survey that the New Deal-based ILMs reflect starters to New 
Deal 18-24 and New Deal 25+ IAP, with the key exception of ethnic minorities where 
New Deal-based ILMs recruit significantly more black and ethnic minority people.  
 
3.128 Given that New Deal-based ILMs represent the significant majority of ILM jobs, we have 
not identified any significant recruitment of more employable people onto ILMs. 
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Job Outcomes 
 
3.129 The overall average for job outcomes across all the ILMs surveyed was 43 per cent. This 
average, however, disguises a wide range of job outcome rates. For example, the average 
for non-New Deal ILMs was 67 per cent, and this may partially reflect the relatively 
higher employability of some recruits. 
 
3.130 Given that many ILMs are based on New Deal and specifically enhance the Environment 
Task Force and the Voluntary Sector option, one can cautiously compare the job outcome 
rates of these options and the New Deal-based ILMs. See Table 3.33. 
 
3.131 It appears that taken overall ILMs do perform better than New Deal, but the problem of 
making comparisons has to be taken into account.  
 
3.132 Whilst, the better performance is most marked in the case of the non-New Deal ILMs a 
direct comparison cannot be made because of key differences in recruitment, processes 
and recording of outcomes.  
 
3.133 When more valid comparisons are made between New Deal ETF/VS and the New Deal-
based ILMs then performance of the 26 week New Deal-based ILMs only marginally 
improves on ETF/VS. However, there appears to be a significant improvement when New 
Deal-based ILMs extend beyond 26 weeks. 
 
 
Cost of ILMs 
 
3.134 The cost of ILMs has been contentious, with many suggesting that they are expensive and 
do not represent value for money. The actual cost of ILMs varies considerably according 
to the local design and especially the length of contract. As such average cost figures can 
be misleading and should be treated with caution. 
 
3.135 The Marshall & MacFarlane average figure of £13,860 per job per year has been 
extensively cited as evidence of high cost. This survey has found the equivalent figure is 
now £11,134. However, in attempting to make valid comparisons with other programmes, 
the costs should be expressed as per participant costs. In which case, the overall ILM cost 
per participant is £8,394, and the average cost for only those ILMs offering 26-week 
contracts is £7,182, and for those offering 26-52 week contracts the average cost is 
£12,076. 
 
3.136 If one is to compare this to New Deal ETF and Voluntary Sector options costs one has to 
take both the Option formula funding rates paid to providers and the costs of paying 
benefits plus an allowance. If this is done then the cost of New Deal is £5,076 for a young 
person or £10,152 for 52 weeks of ETF/VS provision. 
 
3.137 It would therefore appear that for an additional cost of between £2,000 to £3,400 per 
participant (dependent on length of contract) the job outcome rate of New Deal could be 
significantly increased. 
 
 
3.138 However, there is an important caveat. A proportion of the additional funds for ILMs have 
been secured to support the work output. Putting a value to the work output of ILMs is 
difficult and not part of this survey, but there are sufficient examples to demonstrate that 
ILMs contribute to the regeneration of areas and significantly benefit communities. 
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Table 3.33 Summary of Comparable Figures for ILMs and New Deal ETF/VS, 
2001/2 
 
 New Deal-based 
ILMs 26-52 weeks 
ETF/VS New Deal-based 
ILMs 26 weeks 
ETF/VS 
Cost per 
participant 
£12,076 £10,152 £7,182 £5,076 
Job outcomes 43% 14% 34% 31 and 32% 
 
 
Implications for Future Policy from the Survey 
 
3.139 The survey has confirmed a number of key characteristics about ILMs that local and 
national policy makers need to take into account. These are: 
 
they are predominantly designed for, and recruit, those unemployed with the least 
employability 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
they are locally driven and ‘join-up’ different Government and EU funding 
streams 
they are concentrated in areas of high unemployment 
ILMs encompass a wide range of different models and work activities 
the majority of ILMs incorporate a waged job, training, and personal support 
most undertake work which is of benefit to the community, and aim to assist in 
neighbourhood regeneration and the stimulation of new social enterprises 
those that are based on the New Deals improve the performance of the ETF and 
voluntary sector options and New Deal 25+ IAP 
the cost of ILMs is not as high as previously thought 
the Department for Work and Pensions is a significant but not the only 
stakeholder in ILMs  
medium-sized ILMs with job contracts over 26 weeks appear to be the best at 
maximising job outcomes 
there are significant capacity and administrative issues in operating a successful 
ILM. 
 
3.140 A key policy question is the extent to which the Government wishes to encourage local 
partners to devise interventions intended to improve the outcomes of national programmes 
and meet the needs of local strategic plans? We return this question and other policy 
implications in Chapter 6.  
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4. What Works? Lessons from Subsidised   
Employment Programmes and Intermediate  
Labour Markets  
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
4.1 The following chapter extracts some key lessons about the impact and performance of 
European subsidised employment programmes and of mainly British Intermediate Labour 
Markets. It draws on many of the reports, case studies and evaluations that were generated 
through the methodology outlined in Appendix B. It also draws on the more detailed 
reviews of relevant programme developments and performance in a number of European 
countries. Case study reports on both the Netherlands and Germany can be found at the 
end of this chapter. The emphasis in this chapter is less on detailed summaries of 
particular evaluations and results and more on what the evaluation evidence says about 
what works and how this can be translated into effective practice.  
 
 
Subsidised Employment Programmes in Europe 
 
4.2 European countries continue to make extensive use of subsidised employment 
programmes (OECD, 2002, Table H; EC, 2002). There are major variations in programme 
design and objectives and in the way the programmes are embedded in national benefit 
systems and local labour markets. While many national programmes now emphasise the 
progression of individual participants there continues to be a tension between job creation 
and job placement objectives, and between proximity to the regular labour market and the 
creation of more or less permanent ‘employer of last resort’ jobs for those who will not 
otherwise get a job.  
 
4.3 Cumulatively, there are mixed messages from the evaluations of the large-scale temporary 
employment programmes introduced in the 1970s and 1980s. The evidence on 
programmes as diverse as the ABM in Germany, the TUC in France, the Community 
Programme in Britain, and the Job Offer in Denmark, suggests that although they helped 
reduce headline unemployment participation they had little impact on the subsequent 
employment possibilities or earnings of participants. Evaluations also showed significant 
substitution and displacement effects both of private sector and of other public sector 
employment.  
 
4.4 In contrast, Meager and Evans (1998) point to some isolated studies from countries such 
as Ireland, Austria and the Netherlands that indicate significant employment impacts 
associated with at least some of these programmes. Researchers also frequently note that 
these programmes have other positive impacts, especially on individual participants. One 
cross-European review, for example, pointed to evidence to show that at their best “they 
provide participants with economic independence, income improvement, social contacts, 
status and respect, useful activities, self-confidence and a more positive outlook” (van 
Berkel, 2000, p. 7). 
61 
ILMs and Transitional Employment in Britain and Internationally  
 
4.5 More recent evaluations of large-scale temporary job programmes confirm that without a 
focus on job transitions they have negative or weak impacts on subsequent employment 
rates (Bergemann et al, 2000; Cockx and Ridder, 2001). This was confirmed in a technical 
analysis carried out by a panel of experts for the European Commission (EC, 2002). The 
experts assessed the evidence submitted by each member state on the impact 
of subsidised employment. There were seven evaluations that used ‘quasi experimental’ 
methods but these did not take into account other impacts, such as job substitution and 
displacement. They were also of variable quality. The experts warned about the 
complexity of the factors involved but concluded that in general subsidised employment 
programmes showed “mixed results” and there was a “significant” risk of deadweight and 
substitution, especially in large scale programmes. They determined that, in general, 
“subsidised employment in the private sector was more effective than job creation in the 
public sector” although they acknowledged that displacement of regular employment 
reduces this impact. 
 
4.6 European private sector subsidy programmes usually have been aimed at placing the 
individual unemployed person in a long-term job with an employer who receives the 
subsidy. One new development has been the use of temporary subsidised employment in 
the ‘for profit’ sector, a characteristic of both ILMs and transitional employment 
programmes and found in countries like the Netherlands and Switzerland. The Swiss case 
is of interest because it uses temporary subsidised employment placements in both sectors. 
An evaluation by Gerfin, Lechner and Steiger used econometric matching methods and 
found that the private sector subsidies were more effective as routes into regular work. 
There were no positive impacts for the short-term unemployed, but both variants of the 
programme may have had positive impacts for the long-term unemployed and those at risk 
of long-term unemployment. Private sector placements were about 10 per cent more 
effective for subsequent employment rates. The researchers concluded that this was 
because the placements had been in ‘normal firms’ that were subject to market pressure 
(Gerfin, Lechner and Steiger, 2002, p. 32).10 
 
                                                     
10 A similar targeted Wage Subsidy programme was introduced in Canada in 1996. It pays a maximum of 
60 per cent of the wage to for profit and not for profit employers for a maximum of 78 weeks, but duration 
is usually 26 weeks. The goal of the programme is to offer relevant work experience, not continuing 
employment with the same employer. See http://www.hrdc.gc.ca/hrib/sdd-dds/odi/content/TWS.shtml 
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Table 4.1 Impacts of Subsidised Employment in Europe: European Employment 
Strategy Evaluations 
 
Country Evaluation Method Assessment 
Belgium Descriptive Limited evidence of positive impact on job opportunities 
Denmark Descriptive Successful measure. On the job training in private sector. The 
effect is expressed in terms of a reduction in the unemployment 
benefit period, which is estimated to be 2 months per year in 
the private sector and 3 weeks in the public sector measure. 
Germany (a) integration quota 
(b) multivariate 
regression 
(c) Ex ante 
simulation 
(a) around 80 per cent of participants in private sector 
subsidised jobs, and 60 per cent in non-market sector, no 
longer unemployed 6 months after measure 
(b) no significant effect on unemployment 
(c) limited expected impact of subsidised social security 
contributions 
France Quasi experiment 
(adjustment for 
selection bias not 
mentioned).  
Measures, e.g. subsidised contracts, that are closest to ordinary 
employment have the greatest success rates. Over 60 per cent 
of young people having completed a “contrat de qualification” 
were employed two years later. 
Greece Survey with control 
groups, econometric 
model, literature 
Negative, mainly because of deadweight 
Italy Literature review Positive for work experience schemes (esp. for young women 
and the higher educated) 
Ireland Survey of 
unemployment 
registers 
Mixed results: negative for the Community Employment 
scheme. 
Netherlands Quasi experiment 
adjusted for selection 
bias, and review of 
literature 
Negative effect on probability of finding an unsubsidised job; 
high costs. Possible explanations: Stigma effect, lack of 
incentive for organisers of measure to place participants in a 
regular job. Worst for job creation in public sector, slightly 
better for subsidised private sector jobs. ‘Sheltered jobs’ 
disregarded. 
Austria Quasi experiment Significant positive effect on prime age workers, but with 
strong displacement effects and high cost. 
Finland Quasi experiment Private sector measures more effective than public sector 
measures. Deadweight costs in subsidised employment in the 
state sector high. 
Sweden Literature survey 
(mostly quasi 
experimental adjusted 
for bias) 
Improved participants’ employment prospects, but with 
substantial displacement effects. Better results, the closer the 
subsidised jobs are to the regular labour market. 
Source: Impact Evaluation of the European Employment Strategy: Technical Analysis, supporting COM 
(2002) 416 final of 17.7.2002 (“taking stock of five years of the EES”), p. 117. Accessed via 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_strategy/impact_en.htm 
 
 
Lessons from the Evaluation of Subsidised Employment 
Programmes in Europe 
 
4.7 Private sector employment subsidies may have higher net impacts than subsidised 
employment in the public and voluntary sectors but this does not mean that the 
performance of subsidised employment programmes cannot be improved through better 
programme design. In this context the findings from the evaluations reviewed indicate that 
the factors linked with relative success include: 
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1. Targeting the programme at the most disadvantaged and the longer-term 
unemployed. Those programmes which have less restrictive eligibility criteria 
and/or which recruit the short term unemployed experience high levels of 
‘deadweight’ (they assist those who were likely to obtain jobs without the 
intervention) and by providing a ‘rest’ from normal job search they are associated 
with longer durations of unemployment than would otherwise be the case. 
 
2. The closer the work experience is to employment in the regular labour market, in 
terms of job content and conditions of work, the more effective the scheme is 
likely to be in terms of subsequent job placement rates. One of the characteristics 
of effective temporary employment programmes in the public and voluntary 
sectors is when they provide a direct link with, as well as act as an introduction to, 
real jobs. 
 
3. Providers should promote job placement and participants should engage in job 
search. Specialist job placement staff need knowledge of local labour market 
opportunities. It is unsurprising that no employment effect is found when there is 
no effort put into providing job search assistance to the unemployed. 
 
4. The combination of work experience with skills training and/or numeracy and 
literacy training appears to improve programme effectiveness. 
 
5. The relationship with the benefit system is important especially in those systems 
with a sharp division between unemployment insurance (UI) benefits and social 
assistance systems. The introduction of more restrictive UI eligibility rules in 
some countries has reduced the ‘recycling’ effect associated with programmes that 
in the past principally aimed to requalify participants for UI.  
 
6. A requirement to participate reduces deadweight, generates a compliance effect 
and ensures that providers engage with the less motivated and the hardest to help. 
It can, however, stigmatise the programme both in the eyes of participants and of 
employers. 
 
7. The scale of the programme is significant. The evidence shows that the larger and 
more extensive the programme then the less able it appears to be in offering 
transferable market-relevant work experience to participants, whilst avoiding 
displacement.  
 
 
ILMs and Other ‘Integration Enterprises’: Evaluation Lessons 
 
4.8 In the countries surveyed it was evident that most relied on a complex network of 
intermediate providers to deliver many of their programmes. These networks are 
composed of a layered range of public and private agencies that reflect the administrative 
and governance arrangements in each country. Independent non-profit providers are 
common in many countries and several Governments now make extensive use of ‘for 
profit’ organisations for delivering employment programmes (for example, the 
Netherlands).  
 
4.9 The legal status and scale of operation of these organisations varies, as does their 
relationship with their local communities, but by the 1990s surveys of international best 
practice started to identify the emergence of a distinctive approach being pioneered 
through a wide range of what were described as ‘intermediate labour market initiatives’. 
The reviews indicated that these generally small scale interventions were targeted at the 
64 
 
 
 
 
What Works? Lessons from Subsidised Employment Programmes and Intermediate Labour Markets 
 
 
most disadvantaged groups and communities and might offer a more effective way of 
delivering temporary employment programmes for the long-term unemployed (Cambridge 
Policy Consultants, 1996a; EC, 1998). 
 
4.10 The new types of providers could be found amongst the broad array of typically non-
profit organisations that were identified in different ways in different countries. There 
were ‘insertion’ and ‘integration’ companies, community businesses and cooperatives, 
and the self conscious ILMs that were being developed in GB following the lead of the 
Wise group. What united these disparate organisations was not only their relative small 
scale and focus on the hardest to help but also the ways in which they aimed to provide 
more market realistic waged work experience alongside the delivery of socially useful 
goods and services.  
 
4.11 Although they often operated within the ‘social economy’ what distinguished British and 
other ILMs from market focused social economy firms was that their primary purpose was 
improving employability and moving people into regular jobs as soon as possible. This is 
a significantly different mission to that of the many other kinds of social economy 
organisations that ‘reserve’ a proportion of longer term more stable jobs in their 
organisations for those who are experiencing labour market disadvantage, but whose 
prime focus is on the service or product market in which they operate (Borzaga, 1998). 
 
4.12 Unfortunately, while there are many descriptive and case study accounts of these ILM-
type providers that indicate high job entry rates and effectiveness there have been no 
rigorous experimental or quasi-experimental net impact evaluation studies. In part this is 
because of scale and cost. In part it is because ILMs work best by integrating and 
sequencing a range of programme elements – a process of implementation that because of 
its complexity has rarely been evaluated through traditional methodologies (Campbell, 
2001). 
 
4.13 Another problem is that it is difficult to extract general conclusions about the impact and 
effectiveness of ILMs because the concept has now been associated with a broad and 
diverse range of initiatives many of which are small scale with characteristics that are 
locality and country specific. The diversity and ‘bottom up’ nature of so many of these 
ILM initiatives and providers means that it has been difficult to document how many such 
initiatives there are, still less to obtain reliable data on the characteristics of their 
participants and their progression into jobs.  
 
4.14 The available literature on Britain has improved recently and the information from our 
survey extends the information base initially developed through case studies and the 
surveys carried out by Marshall and Mac Farlane (2000) and Lloyd (2001). There also is a 
broader literature on categories of organisations amongst which ILM initiatives are to be 
found, such as the review of social economy and ‘third system’ initiatives undertaken by 
Spear et al (2001) and Lloyd et al (1999); or the assessment of ‘employment enterprises’ 
in Germany (Boller, 1996); or that of ‘work integration social cooperatives’ in Italy 
(Borzaga, 1998, p. 20). There also are many individual anecdotal descriptions of 
organisations, such as Atlantis in Berlin, ‘Vitamine W’ in Belgium, or of some of the 
individual cooperatives that play an important role in reintegrating the unemployed in 
Italy, Spain and Portugal.   
 
4.15 The European Commission has started to develop a more systematic approach to these 
intermediaries and has supplemented its direct financial support for many of these 
initiatives with reviews of impacts and best practice. This information has, however, 
primarily relied on findings from interviews supplemented by more or less detailed case 
studies and when relevant project based monitoring data about employment outcomes and 
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client characteristics (see, for example, Ecotec, 1994; Cambridge Policy Consultants, 
1996a; Martinos, 1996; EC, 1998; Campbell, 1999; Lloyd et al, 1999; van Berkel and 
Moller, 2002).  
 
4.16 In a variety of European contexts ILM type initiatives appear to have secured relatively 
high employment rates for long-term unemployed participants, but these descriptions 
rarely contrast the results with that of a control group. In one mid-1990s overview, for 
example, Meager and Evans (1998) cited research into participants in the French 
‘insertion enterprises’ – of which there were then about 560 – that found that in the early 
1990s 43 per cent of participants went on to regular employment, with a further 15 per 
cent entering further training. They also cited a 1996 Belgian evaluation that found that of 
those leaving the ‘enterprises de formation par le travail’ 33 per cent entered jobs and 9 
per cent entered training. A more recent review provides some information on job 
placement rates for ILM type providers. Envie, for example, which employs 1,800 people 
in some 25 recycling and repair workshops throughout France, reported a job entry rate of 
40 per cent. ‘Vitamine W’, which employs about 1,000 people in local renovation and 
service projects, reported a job entry rate of 57 per cent. Another project, ‘Sinus’, in 
Bavaria, reported a placement rate of 70 per cent amongst the German-speaking migrants 
that it employs for up to a year in its projects that recycle electronic waste and used 
furniture, amongst other activities (Owens Moore, 2001, Appendix).  
 
4.17 The most systematic data available on ILM job entry rates has, however, been that 
collected from British providers (prior to the results of our national survey reported in 
Chapter 2). McGregor et al (1997) and Cambridge Policy Consultants (1996b, 1998, 
2000) reported high and sustained job outcomes that were secured by the Wise Group and 
Glasgow Works in Scotland. In the first national survey of ILM programmes in GB 
Marshall and MacFarlane subsequently concluded that “properly targeted and managed 
ILMs can be shown to achieve up to twice the job entry rate (at 60 per cent plus) and, 
more significantly, much longer lasting and better quality outcomes (longer retention, 
higher income levels) than many alternatives available” (2001, p. 8).  
 
4.18 The only specifically Government funded experiment with ILMs in Britain was the 
‘Neighbourhood Match’ option that was offered with other forms of assistance in the 
small-scale voluntary ‘prototype’ Employment Zones. The formal evaluation found that 
the ILM option was the most successful with 49 per cent job outcomes for a group who 
were a long distance from the labour market (Tu and Noble, 2000). There is also evidence 
that ILMs have been able to generate relatively high results even when they are part of 
mandatory programmes. The evidence from Manchester, which has the largest ILM 
operating within the mandatory New Deal framework, suggested that in 2000 40 per cent 
of those unemployed young people who participated in the ILM had entered employment 
‘doubling’ “the chances of young people getting into a job, in comparison with other high 
unemployment inner city areas” (ERP, 2001, p. 12).  
 
4.19 It should be emphasised that none of these studies used a control group albeit McGregor 
et al (1997) and Cambridge Policy Consultants (see above) made broad comparisons with 
the local results of national programmes, such as Training for Work’, that served a similar 
client group.  
 
 
Other Benefits and Value Added 
 
4.20 Assessments of ILM type initiatives stress that they have other positive impacts in 
addition to getting people back into regular jobs. In particular, they help mitigate social 
exclusion and the personal economic and social costs of long term unemployment, and 
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they produce services and goods that have additional value. If concentrated in poor 
neighbourhoods these new service and income streams can, it is argued, stimulate local 
multipliers. Wage-based programmes also save benefit expenditure and, as employees, 
participants often pay tax and social security contributions (albeit they are also eligible for 
in work support such as tax credits).  
 
4.21 In some sectors estimates have been made of the value of the output generated by ILMs, 
such as that of the heat insulation projects operated by Heatwise (part of the Wise Group) 
that have assisted thousands of low income households with consequential savings in 
energy bills and reductions in power demand (ACE, 2000). There have, however, been 
few attempts to measure or quantify the actual outputs of ILM or other public sector job 
creation programmes other than to get the views and estimates of providers, supervisors 
and some of the users of services. In the USA by contrast quantitative methods have been 
used to establish the value of the output generated by public sector jobs programmes with 
a review of evidence concluding that in a ‘well-run’ programme such outputs cover 
“perhaps 75 per cent of the pay of workers plus programme provided supervision and 
benefits” (Ellwood and Welty, 2000).  
 
4.22 The point is that an assessment of the ‘net’ costs of ILMs should include robust estimates 
for the value of the output created as well as estimates for the costs saved and taxes 
generated.  
 
 
ILM Evaluation Lessons 
 
4.23 Despite methodological limitations much of the evidence base that we collected indicated 
that effectively delivered ILM initiatives have the following advantages: 
 
1. The waged work experience provides not only a better preparation for a real job 
but avoids the stigma that has been attached to ‘schemes’ by many of the long-
term unemployed and by employers.  
 
2. ILMs ‘join up’ and integrate interventions that are often delivered separately by 
mainstream Government programmes and are able to tackle employment barriers 
in a more holistic fashion. 
 
3. As ILMs are often local projects embedded in their communities they generate 
other positive externalities in terms of local income multipliers (from programme 
expenditure and the wages of participants), the provision of local services and the 
improvement of the ‘quality of life’ and physical environment in what are often 
deprived and run down communities. 
 
4.24 The case studies and evaluations that were reviewed suggest a number of factors that are 
associated with successful ILMs: 
 
1. Recruitment that is targeted at the long-term unemployed and the hardest to help. 
 
2. Project objectives that are clearly defined and give ILM employees a meaningful 
and purposeful task to perform. Marshall and MacFarlane (2001) point out that 
this requires clarity about the client group involved as this will help to determine 
the type of work to be offered and the support structure needed. Other research 
stresses the importance of having an appropriate range and choice of relevant 
work activity, albeit care must be taken to minimise any displacement impact on 
regular jobs, especially in the public sector. 
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3. The payment of a wage to increase recruitment, retention and motivation, and 
give the participant the legal rights and obligations inherent to being an employee. 
 
4. The application of conventional work disciplines, from the actual process of job 
application and interview through to the day-to-day employment experience. This 
wage-based experience is thought to overcome the weaknesses and ‘stigma’ 
associated with ‘make work’ schemes. 
 
5. Training and personal development. In addition to task specific training British 
ILMs in particular often aim to remotivate and re-engage participants with 
‘learning’ by enabling participants to access an element of training and/or 
personal development that is not directly linked to the job itself. 
 
6. Length of Participation. ILMs should be focused on getting participants into 
jobs but there is a balance to be struck about the point at which ILM clients will 
be ready to move back into a regular job. British practice suggests that it can take 
up to a year before significant gains are made in employability and some 
providers suggest that this might prove longer for some clients. The challenge is 
to balance any ‘lock in’ effect against the potential for longer-term employability 
gains. The ILM must clearly have a responsibility for job search and placement 
and there should be clarity about when job search should be introduced and 
intensified. 
 
7. Counselling and Job Search Assistance. Participants should undergo periodic 
progress reviews and counselling, especially if they are employed on temporary 
placements with outside employers. Reviews should tackle barriers but also focus 
on preparation for job search. Participants should also be given help in identifying 
and applying for jobs, especially when they come towards the end of their paid 
work experience. 
 
8. Participation should be voluntary. This is a particular concern in those 
countries where programmes have been used as ‘work tests’ and have been 
stigmatised in the eyes of employers and the unemployed. This was one of the 
reasons why many early British ILMs would not take funding from mandatory 
work programmes. This concern is less relevant in countries, such as France, 
where programmes for the under 25s, for example, are voluntary but they are the 
only way in which to access an income. There are contrasting views about how 
ILMs should interact with the most discouraged and alienated of the unemployed 
and with mandatory work programmes. The survey results in Chapter 2 confirm 
that ILMs can adapt and deliver mandatory New Deal programmes but this 
involvement is associated with lower job entry rates (see also ERP, 2000).  
 
9. A strong partnership. Marshall and MacFarlane’s 2001 review of ILMs stressed 
the importance of managing diverse income flows and of embedding 
organisations in local networks. These are challenges that are shared by ILM type 
initiatives in many other countries, especially where they also claim and manage 
funding from the European Social Fund. Pragmatically Marshall and MacFarlane 
advocate the creation of a strong local partnership of statutory and voluntary 
agencies with a lead body prepared to help put a funding package together, take 
the financial risks involved during the development phase, and manage cash flow 
deficits and other problems that can arise when combining disparate funding 
sources. 
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10. Implementation. Unlike most evaluations Marshall and MacFarlane’s review of 
British practice stresses the importance of implementation and organisational 
efficiency. They highlight the significance of recruiting and developing high 
quality managers and supervisors who can help translate the above advantages 
into day to day practice and who are aware that “they employ temporary staff and 
that they are not running a scheme” (2001). These staff also must be able to 
negotiate and manage the balance between the employment needs of the 
individual worker and the output and productive tasks required by workplace 
sponsors.  
 
4.25 The key policy development question about ILM initiatives has been scale. The limited 
evidence that exists suggests that overall they have offered a useful, albeit modest 
contribution to tackling long-term unemployment, especially in high unemployment areas. 
If a significant expansion takes place it could be that deadweight and displacement might 
increase. This could be greater than that found with the major temporary work 
programmes assessed previously precisely because of the desire to produce services and 
goods in a realistic labour market environment. There is also the possibility that expansion 
might lead to more bureaucracy and standardisation, stifling the positive characteristics 
that wage-based locally developed programmes have enjoyed.  
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Case Study 3: Subsidised Employment Programmes in the Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands has been an important comparator for the British Government because it has 
rapidly developed an employment first welfare system for all unemployed people and working 
age social assistance recipients. The Dutch Government, however, has made far more extensive 
use of subsidised employment programmes and these were expanded in the 1990s. By 2001 
subsidised jobs accounted for a large part of the budget allocated to ‘active measures’ and their 
cost was estimated at approximately1.2 billion Euros as against the 450 million spent that year on 
general reintegration services (DVA, 2002). Participants on the various subsidised employment 
programmes are paid between 120 and 130 per cent of the minimum wage. 
 
Since the early 1990s Dutch municipalities have been required to create jobs either for young 
unemployed people who were covered by a ‘job guarantee’, or older unemployed people who had 
been out of work for over three years. Municipalities, especially in the major cities, created 
specific publicly funded companies to establish ‘labour pools’ (‘Bahnenpool’) that carried out a 
range of tasks, in the public and private sectors. The jobs were effectively permanent for the older 
long-term unemployed, and few of these participants made a transition to regular work and, 
because of cash limits, there were waiting lists for any labour pool jobs that did become available. 
 
The Dutch approach to subsidised employment was reorganised and expanded in the mid 1990s, 
creating a three-tiered system. Two of the subsidised employment programmes were rooted in the 
1998 Jobseekers Integration Act or Wet Inschakeling Werkzoekenden (WIW). The other 
programme – ‘ID-bannen’ - was a permanent job creation programme that emerged amongst the 
‘Melkert’ package of measures introduced in 1995/96 by the then Labour Minister. The three 
types of subsidised employment were aimed at client groups who, when they first claim benefit 
are now classified into different ‘phases’. Phase 1 applies to those unemployed people who can 
obtain employment without intervention. Phases 2 and 3 include those with employment barriers 
who are eligible for help with reintegration services. After a year of unemployment this includes 
WIW subsidised jobs. Phase 4 applies to those furthest from the labour market who after a year of 
unemployment become eligible for an ‘ID’ job.  
 
The subsidised employment programmes include (Zijl et al, 2002, p.44 and Table 6.5): 
 
• WIW work experience places, where a regular employer receives a cash subsidy from 
the municipality to hire an unemployed person for a minimum of six and a maximum of 
twelve months. In 2000 there were about 5,300 full time equivalent places and about 53 
per cent of participants entered a regular job  
• WIW jobs, where an unemployed person is hired by a municipality and works in a 
public, non-profit or private sector placement. The employer pays a fee to the 
municipality. The contract is for two years initially and afterwards can be changed into a 
permanent contract. In 2000 there were about 34,900 full time equivalent places and 
about 19 per cent of participants entered a regular job.  
• ID-jobs, where a long-term unemployed person is recruited to a subsidised job in the 
public or non-profit sector, paid for by the municipality. The first wave of ‘Melkert’ jobs 
offered permanent employment contracts and this was reflected in outflow data for 2000 
that reported that about 6 per cent of participants entered a regular job at a time when 
there were some 43,000 full time equivalent places. Experience suggested that between 
20 and 30 per cent of ‘Melkert’ participants were capable of working in the regular 
labour market. 
In 1999 an additional 20,000 ‘ID’ jobs were introduced to supplement the original ‘Melkert’ jobs. 
These were designed differently, however, so as to mitigate the ‘lock in’ effect, reduce costs and 
stimulate providers to assist more people to make a transition into regular jobs. From 1999 new 
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recruits could enter only ‘starter ID jobs’ and could move on only to a more permanent ‘flow ID 
job’ after they had been in a ‘starter’ job for at least five years. Subsequently the funding for ID 
jobs has been reduced, with a 15 per cent cut being imposed in 2003. The programme was widely 
perceived as being at risk as so little emphasis was placed on using the subsidised work 
experience to create routes into regular employment.  
 
The various subsidised job programmes are delivered through a network of specialised 
employment companies many of which were created in the 1990s by municipalities obliged to 
create ‘labour pools’. Most are private companies, with independent management groups, but 
they are largely dependent on contracts with the municipalities that were instrumental in their 
creation. 
 
The way that the individual companies operate largely reflects the funding streams that they 
utilise. Those funded through the 1988 Jobseekers Employment Act (WIW) work with those 
closest to the labour market (classified as phase 2 or 3), with the intention of a gradual transition 
to regular employment. Those funded through the ‘ID-bannen’ programme work with ‘phase 4’ 
clients who have little prospect of regular jobs and, until recently, a transition into a regular job 
was of secondary importance. There also is a separately funded network of sheltered workshops 
employing an additional 90,000 people on disability benefits. 
 
The crucial difference between the subsidised job companies is their orientation to the labour 
market. In Amsterdam, for example, NV Werk was created in 1995 with the specific objective of 
creating 10,000 ‘Melkert’ jobs in four years (http://www.nvwerk.nl). In 2002 the company 
employed about 6,900 unemployed people of whom 70 per cent had been unemployed for over 
three years and over half of whom were from minority ethnic backgrounds. Participants are 
employed by NV Werk but located with a diverse range of project sponsors who deliver services 
of social value in the non-profit sector. They included security and safety teams, teachers aides 
and a wide range of projects in child care, social services, youth services, health services, sports 
and so on. NV Werk assigns each participant a case manager who helps with barrier reduction, 
such as arranging childcare, and job placement and retention. The company does not, however, 
provide significant assistance with helping participants move into regular jobs. Its priority has 
been firmly one of job creation and service delivery. NV Werk sees little potential for placing its 
clients into regular jobs of similar worth. 
 
The Amsterdam municipality created another independent company to deliver WIW programmes 
and this operates in a very different way. ‘Maatwerk Amsterdam’ 
(http://www.maatwerk.amsterdam.nl) sees its primary role as using subsidised work experience to 
improve individual human capital and help participants to get regular jobs. Most of its 
participants are young unemployed people, many of whom are from minority ethnic backgrounds. 
The company operates a diverse range of projects, some with the private sector, which each 
provide real workplace disciplines, more or less support with both basic and hard skills, and the 
support of workplace supervisors and an individual case manager. Participants are reviewed 
regularly and rotated through six month placements with gradually increased work 
responsibilities and expectations. Those coming to the end of their time in the programme are 
supported by a ‘job coach’. Maatwerk now also uses the end of each six-month placement to 
reassess and identify those who could be placed in regular jobs, a process that has been reinforced 
by output related funding payments geared to job entry. Maatwerk also provides ‘after care’ 
support for ex-participants for up to a year, a service again reinforced by a bonus payment they 
receive for job retention. They claim to place up to 60 per cent of their participants into regular 
jobs. 
 
By 2002 it was estimated that about 80,000 people were employed in subsidised jobs (DVA, 
2002, p. 7). Subsidised employment programmes also had become subject to much political 
criticism. The different programmes were complex for participants and employers, and the largest 
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of them was expensive with few of its participants moving into regular jobs. In 2004, however, 
there is likely to be radical change. Proposed legislation, if passed, will completely devolve 
financial responsibility for both social assistance and reintegration measures to the Municipalities. 
The Municipalities will be given far greater freedom to develop reintegration programmes to fit 
local circumstances and there will be financial incentives to encourage them to try to move 
people into regular employment. Municipalities will not be allowed to provide services directly 
but they will have complete freedom to design the type of subsidised employment, if any, that 
they want to offer.  
 
Early plans in major cities such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam suggested that any new system was 
likely to prioritise entry into regular employment and there was likely to be more extensive use of 
the WIW model with a run down of ‘ID’ jobs. There was provision, however, in both cities for 
existing contracts with ‘Melkert’ workers to be honoured but future work programmes for the 
‘hardest to help’ are likely to be unpaid offering participants “3 to 9 months in unpaid work, 
while receiving intensive guidance and training” to increase the outflow to regular work (DVA, 
2002, p. 8). 
 
 
Case Study 4: Subsidised Employment Programmes in Germany 
 
Job creation programmes continue to play a major role in Germany although they are less 
widespread than they were in the 1990s when the Government used them extensively to address 
mass unemployment in the East. There are two distinct elements – federally funded programmes 
aimed at those who qualify for unemployment insurance or assistance, and municipal 
programmes, aimed at social assistance recipients.  
 
The main federal programme continues to be ABM (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmassnahmen or 
‘Measures of (direct) job creation’) This has been supplemented since 1993 by ‘SAM’ 
(Strukturanpassungsmassnahmen or ‘Structural Assistance Measures’).  
 
Between 1952 and 1968 participants worked for benefit, with no employment contract. Between 
1968 and 1997 participants were employed on contracts and received full pay levels determined 
by the relevant collective bargaining agreement. Since 1987 providers have been funded only on 
the basis that temporary workers receive no more than 80 per cent of the average rate of pay. 
Over most of the period eligibility has been restricted to the long-term unemployed, but now it 
has been extended to those ‘at risk’ of long-term unemployment (determined by the Federal 
Employment Service). At the peak there were over 450,000 people employed on ABM and SAM 
but by 2001 this had fallen to about 220,000, and is likely to fall further with the programme’s 
emphasis now being placed on direct integration into the formal labour market.  
 
The large-scale programmes of the mid-1990s may have largely disappeared but there remain 
direct linkages between regional development and temporary job creation, especially in the East. 
Public authorities who commission regional infrastructure projects with the private sector can 
have up to a third of their costs subsidised by the Employment Service if the private contractor 
undertakes to hire a specified number of unemployed people selected by the ES (Knuth and 
Krone, 2002). 
The ABM contracting model involves non-profit organisations or public authorities applying to 
the Federal Employment Service (FES) to deliver a project that is ‘additional’ and does not 
substitute for or displace other employment. These rules limit the transferability of the 
employment experience and produce some anomalies. Evans notes, for example, that while an 
ABM project is allowed to fix the roof of a church it cannot fix the roof of a public building 
(2001, p. 49). The FES grants any ABM award for a fixed period, usually for a year, and submits 
unemployed people for recruitment. Providers can select from this pool and employ the 
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individual for up to a year. The FES grant usually covers wage costs, with operating costs being 
met by state Governments and others. This gives rise to significant local variations. Evans, for 
example, reports that in Hamburg ABM participants have at least 20 per cent of their time 
allocated to training and each work placement provider must agree and incorporate an element of 
training (2001, p. 48). 
 
ABM has only recently been assessed as a tool for directly getting people into jobs and the FES 
still retains responsibility for job placement at the end of the programme. One consequence was 
that until the late 1990s the programmes were largely assessed on the basis of how well they 
delivered temporary jobs and their related outputs, rather than on how well they did in getting 
people directly into jobs. This has changed since 1998 and the objectives of ABM programmes 
are now defined as: 
 
1. skills formation or stabilisation through subsidised employment; 
2. improve prospects for re-employment;  
3. prepare or complement structural improvements; and 
4. improve the social infrastructure or the environment. 
 
Individual outcomes have only been monitored since 1998. The latest available data, for 2001, 
shows that 44.6 per cent of ABM participants were no longer receiving unemployment benefits 
six months after the programme ended and 29.7 per cent were in a job that involved paying social 
insurance contributions (Konle-Seidl, 2003).  
 
In the 1980s surveys showed that 22.4 per cent of those leaving ABM entered employment on 
leaving, and the employment rate increased to 41.2 per cent 32 months later (Spitznagel, 1989, 
cited in Meager and Evans). In the 1990s econometric techniques were used to establish net 
employment impacts of ABM. Blien et al refer to the findings of ‘various research groups’ that 
reported a ‘negative’ impact, attributed to unemployed people ceasing job search when they enter 
the subsidised job (2002, p. 27). Other studies have assessed impacts on job creation, especially 
in the east, with widely varying findings. This is attributed both to differences in the methodology 
and data sources used (Blien et al, 2002, p. 28), and to the exceptional circumstances of the 
former East Germany where, at its high point, almost a third of the unemployed were employed in 
job creation schemes.  
 
One of the studies made use of ‘estimated propensity scores’ and ‘difference-in-differences’ 
techniques and found “at best insignificant long-term employment effects of active labour market 
policy”. The authors noted, however, that the results for job creation and training programmes 
improved over the 1990s as they became more effectively targeted, albeit this “did not result in 
positive employment effects” (Bergemann et al, 2000, p. 24).  
 
There is another level of municipal job creation provision ‘HvW’ (Hilfe zur Arbeit or ‘help 
through work and work experience’) that is aimed at those who are eligible for social assistance. 
These programmes have expanded recently, as more unemployed people have come to rely on 
social assistance payments, and in 2001 there were, on average, 210,000 social assistance 
recipients in job creation programmes. About half were in waged and insured jobs, about half 
were paid their benefit plus a small premium (Knuth and Krone, 2003). The ‘benefit plus’ 
programmes effectively act as a ‘work test’, whereas the wage-based programmes enable 
participants to requalify for insurance related benefits and, as a consequence, they then become 
the responsibility of the Federal system.  
 
Municipalities have discretion as to the content and delivery of their social assistance 
programmes. While some municipalities have little provision others, such as Leipzig, have a very 
extensive system and in that city young people who claim social assistance receive support only if 
they take up a ‘job offer’ (Feist and Schöb, 2000). There is little evaluation of the diverse 
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provision available across the country although the Association of Municipalities carries out a 
survey every two years to establish the scale and content of these job creation programmes (Fuchs 
and Troost, 2001). 
 
Both federal and municipal programmes are delivered through a broad array of public authorities 
and ‘labour companies’, largely in the not for profit and social economy sectors (Blien et al, 
2002). There have been British reviews that have assessed some of these German providers, and 
other social economy firms as ILMs, but as organisations they have far less focus on job 
placement and progression (see, for example, IER’s description of Atlantis, 1999; or the 
environmental projects described by Lorenz and Birkhölzer, 1997). There is no equivalent to the 
British ILM network or the US ‘transitional jobs network’ but there is a national association – 
‘bag arbeit’ – which brings together these social enterprises and other service providers delivering 
job creation and other labour market programmes (www.bagarbeit.de/de/english). 
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Introduction 
 
5.1 Wage paying public sector and community service employment programmes have been 
implemented in many areas of the USA. There also is experience of implementing large-
scale job creation programmes to tackle the impacts of recession. This experience extends 
from the public works programmes associated with the New Deal of the 1930s, through to 
the large-scale temporary jobs programmes funded through CETA during the 1970s. 
There is, in addition, a long US tradition of benefit claimants being required to engage in 
relief work or unpaid workfare (now often described as Community Work Experience).  
 
5.2 Radical reforms of the US welfare system have resulted in major variations in how 
individual states use work experience programmes with examples of both types of 
programmes co-existing within the same state. Policy debate about these work experience 
programmes has now intensified, stimulated by the fact that the first significant groups of 
welfare recipients are exhausting their ‘time limits’ and the next phase of welfare reform 
is likely to involve a Federal requirement that more welfare recipients engage in work and 
for longer periods each week. States will now have to create more work based 
opportunities in much less buoyant labour markets and recruit welfare recipients who are 
more likely to have significant employment barriers (one estimate, for example, suggests 
that over a quarter of eligible clients have had no work experience). 
 
5.3 It is in this context that the organisations most closely associated with experimental 
evaluations of US welfare to work programmes have begun to review evidence, assess 
options, and examine the potential offered by work programmes that pay wages, variously 
referred to as Community Service Employment programmes, Public Service Employment 
programmes, or ‘Transitional Jobs Programmes’. The ‘transitional jobs’ approach has 
captured most British interest and is of most direct relevance to British ILMs; a fact 
reflected in the close links and information exchange that already takes place between the 
US ‘transitional jobs’ and British ILM networks. 
 
5.4 The evidence review revealed that there are few random assignment experiments that have 
assessed the impact of public sector, community service or transitional jobs programmes. 
There are, however, three experimental evaluations of demonstration projects – of 
‘Supported Work’, ‘New Hope’ and the ‘Youth Corps’ - that are of direct interest and that 
are described below. These models have influenced the design of some contemporary 
transitional jobs programmes, but none of these more recent programmes has yet been 
subject to an experimental evaluation. There is, nevertheless, an abundance of other 
evaluations, case studies, and reports that can be drawn on to establish ‘what works’ and 
extract lessons that are of relevance to ILMs in Britain. 
 
US Public Service Employment Programmes 
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5.5 Until recently the perception of public sector employment programmes in the USA was 
negative, based largely on the perceived failings of the large-scale public works 
programmes of the 1970s. Johnson and Carrichi challenged this consensus in 1997. They 
reviewed the record of public job creation initiatives and found many examples from the 
1970s and 1980s, and even before, that reduced unemployment and increased the income 
of those who participated, both while they took part in the programme and subsequently. 
They also pointed to the earlier work of Barnow (1994, cited by Erhel, 1996, p. 293) that 
found that a significant proportion of the people who were provided with their first jobs in 
CETA public service employment went on to work regularly in other jobs. He also found 
fiscal substitution was low with net new employment creation estimated at between 40 
and 60 per cent. Another assessment by Nathan, who summarised the findings of a five 
year study of 40 locations in 32 states concluded that CETA public service jobs “worked 
pretty well” as an “anti-recession tool” (cited in LCAN, 2003, p. 11)  
 
5.6 In 2000 Ellwood and Welty published a comprehensive review of research evidence into 
the impacts of US ‘public service employment’ programmes. Ellwood and Welty looked 
in detail at the impacts of programmes from the 1930s New Deal through to the 
‘workfare’ demonstration projects of the 1980s and identified three different types – 
‘counter cyclical’ (as in the New Deal); ‘targeted’ (aimed at particular subgroups); and 
‘mandatory work programmes’ (as in workfare). The authors tracked down what they 
described as “a mind-numbing number of programmes” but concluded that “reliable 
evidence was sadly limited” (2000, p. 299). There was, however, enough data and reliable 
evidence about the impacts of Public Service Employment (PSE) jobs for Ellwood and 
Welty to identify some key findings (2000, p. 187):  
 
In some studies, participants with less prior work experience have greater post 
programme benefits from PSE programmes, but this finding is not universal. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Post programme earnings effects are generally higher in PSE programmes than in 
workfare or unpaid work experience programmes. 
Imposing a reasonable time limit of perhaps six months or so appears likely to 
increase the effects of PSE employment on employment in regular, unsubsidised 
jobs. 
The rollover into permanent jobs provided by the work sponsors of PSE, as well 
as the development efforts of programme staff, appears to be important in 
explaining effects on post programme earnings. 
PSE programmes tend to work better if programmes place participants with 
regular employers as host agencies rather than directly employing participants in 
special jobs. 
The quality of supervision matters to the long-run effects of PSE jobs, but quality 
can be difficult to define. 
The strength of the local labour market does not appear to have consistent effects 
on the post programme effects of PSE jobs. 
 
5.7 Ellwood and Welty then draw the following “sharp conclusions” (2000, p.300): 
 
PSE programmes done badly “can be wasteful, inefficient, displacing, and 
counterproductive”. 
When implemented carefully they seem “to be able to increase employment, keep 
displacement near 25 per cent, and produce genuinely valuable output”, and in 
some circumstances, they “may raise earnings of low-skilled workers more 
effectively than wage subsidies”. 
There are some critical ‘trade-offs’ in PSE programmes, in particular, “the jobs 
that are more likely to increase future earnings also tend to be more expensive and 
difficult to implement”, and jobs that are more like ‘real’ jobs seem to impart 
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greater value to the community but also carry a greater tendency to displace 
public sector workers. 
 
5.8 Ellwood and Welty, like many other assessments of transitional jobs programmes, draw 
particular attention to the results from three random assignment evaluations that assessed 
the impacts of programmes that most closely resemble the current ‘transitional jobs’ 
approach. One was the Ford Foundation sponsored National Supported Work 
Demonstration, operational between 1976 and 1979. Another was the New Hope 
Demonstration programme that operated in Milwaukee and was evaluated between 1994 
and 1998. Both these evaluations were undertaken by MDRC and the Supported Work 
(SW) assessment was the first random assignment, multi-site evaluation, undertaken by 
MDRC (Gueron, 1997). The final evaluation was that of the work experience based 
‘Youth Corps’. This evaluation was undertaken for Abt Associates (Jastrzarb et al, 1997). 
The evaluations are summarised in the relevant boxes that follow this section. 
 
5.9 There was another significant evidence base that has been drawn on in developing the 
transitional jobs approach, albeit the programmes have been mainly targeted at people 
with learning disabilities. Kirby et al in particular point to the importance of the model 
developed by ‘supported employment’ providers who in the 1970s started to replace 
segregated sheltered workshops for people with disabilities (an approach subsequently 
adopted in Britain and other countries). By 1995 there were some 3,690 supported 
employment agencies in the USA working with nearly 140,000 people (Pavetti and 
Strong, 2001). The essential idea is that a disabled person who wants to work receives 
help from a supported employment agency to find a job that matches their skills, abilities 
and interests. The agency then provides a staff member, called a job trainer or job coach, 
to go to the workplace with the new employee, and help the employee learn what is 
required. This includes the responsibilities and tasks of the job itself, and other important 
aspects such as the journey to work and social integration in the workplace. The job 
trainer aims to withdraw gradually as the employee learns the job (Corden, 1997). Pavetti 
and Strong cite six experimental studies of supported employment that found employment 
rates of 58 per cent for programme participants, compared to 21 per cent for controls 
(2001, p.7). The supported employment model is directly replicated in ‘Goodworks!’ the 
state-wide transitional jobs programme in Georgia that is described later in this chapter in 
case study 5. 
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Evaluation 1: The National Supported Work Evaluation 
 
The ‘Supported Work’ (SW) programme was designed to test the efficacy of paid work 
experience in improving the employability of a variety of sub groups within the ‘hard-core’ poor 
– long term welfare (AFDC) recipients, ex-addicts, ex-offenders, and young high school drop 
outs (Robinson et al, 1984). The objective of the programme was to develop work habits and 
general work-coping skills rather than specific technical skills. Individual SW programmes 
varied but were all expected to provide temporary jobs for up to a year that included a realistic 
work environment with close supervision, peer support and what was called ‘graduated stress’, 
involving the gradual reduction of supervision and increase of individual responsibilities. SW 
programmes also had to provide job search training and placement assistance. 
 
During the course of the programme over 6,610 participants were recruited at 13 SW sites, of 
which 1,620 were AFDC welfare recipients. Programme costs, at about $10,000 per person, 
were relatively high. Nearly 80 per cent of AFDC recipients worked in human and clerical 
services jobs, while 47 per cent of ex-addicts, 38 per cent of ex-offenders and 35 per cent of the 
young people worked in construction jobs.  
 
The programme generated significant improvements in the employment experiences of lone 
parent AFDC recipients and at “every period of observation” a significantly higher percentage of 
the experimental group was employed, worked more hours, and earned a higher income than did 
the control group. The experimental-control differential fell to its lowest point at the time that 
people first left SW, when it averaged 10 hours and $54 per month, but participants still earned 
more than the controls three years later. The programme did not have a significant impact on the 
employment and earnings of the other target groups, although a secondary analysis found that 
many of the participants had not actually received the kind of placements that the programme 
had been designed to deliver. Where the original design was delivered the results were much 
better (Long, 1987, cited by White, 1999). Overall, even when the post-programme effects were 
at their strongest, only 42 per cent of SW leavers were employed, and their average earnings 
exceeded the average for the controls by just $81 per month. 
 
SW also was the focus of a rigorous attempt to evaluate the value of the output produced by the 
programme. Ellwood and Welty cite two studies that estimated output value by assessing how 
much alternative suppliers would charge for the same goods or services (2000, p. 180). There 
are methodological limitations but the evaluators estimated that SW projects produced output 
valued, in 1998 dollars, at $13.12 per hour worked by a SW participant, suggesting the projects 
were quite productive. Wages plus fringe benefits for SW participants averaged $14.84 in 1998 
dollars. Project costs (supervision, materials) averaged $8.28 per hour worked by a SW 
participant. The overhead costs at local site level (management costs; costs of organising 
projects and recruiting and placing participants; and cost of supportive services) averaged $6.56 
per hour of work by a SW participant. Central administration costs were estimated at $0.80 per 
hour worked by a participant. Combining these results, the output produced by SW projects 
offset 43 per cent of the total cost or $13.12 per hour out of total hourly cost of $30.48.  
 
An overall cost benefit assessment concluded that although SW was quite expensive – it cost 
more than $20,000 per person in 1993 dollars – the “programme generated a net gain for 
taxpayers” (Kemper et al., 1991, cited in Bloom, 1996). 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation 2: New Hope 
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‘New Hope’ was an independent welfare reform demonstration project run by a community-
based organisation in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in the mid-1990s. The significance of the New 
Hope experience has been accentuated by its location in Wisconsin, where the State Government 
has implemented one of the toughest work-based regimes in the USA where cash support is 
“only given in return for demonstrated work effort” (Nightingale and Mikelson, 2000, p. 2). The 
approaches shared a ‘work first’ philosophy with Community Service Jobs (CSJs) for those who 
were not able to get regular jobs and they also employed case managers to work closely with 
participants. There were, however, major differences in philosophy and approach with paid CSJs 
in New Hope and unpaid CSJs in the State programme, at least until 2004 when the Governor 
announced the introduction of a broader wage-paying transitional jobs programme as part of 
W2.1  
 
New Hope operated in two poor neighbourhoods and tested a combination of financial 
incentives and CSJs. MDRC undertook an experimental evaluation between 1994 and 1997, 
with the final participants ending the programme at the end of 1998 (Bos et al, 1999). Just over 
1,300 people were randomly assigned to either a control group who were not directly assisted or 
a programme group who received services. 
 
The project was voluntary, and participants were made a simple offer that if they worked over 
30 hours a week they were guaranteed that their earnings would be ‘above poverty’ (150 per 
cent of the federal poverty level) and they would have access to child care and health insurance 
where necessary. Participants who could not get regular work could make up their hours or 
engage full time with a minimum wage paying CSJ. Participants could participate in up to two 
six-month CSJs over the three-year programme (Brock et al, 1997). As participants were paid 
they were entitled to claim tax credits unlike their then unpaid W2 CSJ equivalents.  
 
Over the life of the project about a third of participants made use of CSJs for variable periods. 
Most CSJ workers moved into unsubsidised employment and it seems that they were “important 
in bringing about the employment effect for participants who were not employed full time at 
random assignment” (Kaplan and Rothe, 1999, p. 49). 
 
MDRC reported an employment rate of 50 per cent two years into the programme, generating a 
13 per cent wage gain over two years, at a cost per participant of $7,200. Of those not employed 
at time of random assignment, 7 per cent more of the participants in New Hope were employed 
over the two years following the programme than members of the control group (Brock et al, 
1997). In their final report MDRC found what Kaplan and Rothe describe as a “chain of 
beneficial effects” where, on average, participants “were less stressed, had fewer worries, and 
experienced less material hardship” than the control group (1999, p. 49). Their children were 
also more likely to settle into and make progress in school.  
 
1 W2, the state-wide programme, has been the subject of a large number of studies, 53 at one count, but 
there has been no subsequent use of random assignment (Nightingale and Mikelson, 2002). Unpaid CSJs 
were targeted at “those who need to practice the work habits and skills necessary to be hired by a regular 
employer” and until 2004 W2 made extensive use of these ‘workfare’ job slots. In October 2002 about 60 
per cent of those receiving cash assistance in Milwaukee were employed in these unpaid assignments 
(Robles et al, 2003, p. 1). After a review in 2003 the Wisconsin Governor announced that in 2004 a paid 
transitional jobs programme would be introduced state-wide to provide ‘real work opportunities’ for those 
previously eligible for only unpaid positions (see http://www.dwd.state.wi.us/transjobs). 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation 3: Youth Corps: National Association of Service & Conservation Corps 
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The Youth Corps trace their roots to the Civilian Conservation Corps of the 1930s. Today Youth 
Corp programmes engage disadvantaged young people, generally 16 to 25 years old, in paid, 
productive, full-time work that is intended to benefit the young person and their communities. 
More than 100 youth corps operate in 38 states and each year about 26,000 young people enter 
programmes. Projects are generally run under the auspices of host agencies, usually not-for-
profit organisations. Some programmes are state-wide but the majority are locally based. 
Funding is drawn from a number of sources including state, county and municipal grants; 
charges for services; foundations and corporations; as well as federal training and community 
development grants. Overall Youth Corps raised over $338 million in 2002 (www.nascc.org). 
 
Participants usually work full time in crews or teams of eight to twelve with a paid adult 
supervisor who sets clear standards of behaviour. Most receive at least the minimum wage. 
Participants devote about a day a week to improving education skills and preparing for future 
employment. They are also offered life skills training, such as in budgeting, parenting, and 
personal health. Corps encourage civic involvement, such as voting. The jobs last for between 
six months and a year though the average duration is about four or five months. Cash awards or 
educational grants are usually available for those who complete their assignment. 
 
The work projects range from traditional forestry and parks projects, through to housing 
renovation and assistance with ‘human services’ agencies. In 2002 they delivered over 18 
million service hours, over half of which was in conservation, environmental restoration and 
recycling. 
 
A comprehensive national evaluation of the 1993/94 intake utilised experimental techniques. 
Applicants were allocated randomly to a control group that did not participate and a treatment 
group of those that did. The evaluation reported that Corps participants are typically both 
educationally and economically disadvantaged. Most participants were ‘people of color’; almost 
half were African American; slightly more than a quarter were white. More than half were high 
school dropouts and 80 per cent did not work at all in the year before participation. Most came 
from poor households with almost half of them receiving some form of public assistance. 
 
The study found the strongest impacts were on participants’ employment and earnings. Counting 
jobs both in and out of the programme, most participants reported being employed at some time 
during the follow-up period, in contrast with about three quarters of those who did not 
participate. They also worked more hours, 2,000 over 15 months compared to 1,500 for the 
control group. This difference was also apparent in post-programme employment, where the 
wages of the treatment group were slightly higher. The biggest impact was on African-American 
youth, with white participants doing less well than their control group. Participants were also 
less likely to be arrested and the research found that the corps provided net increases in the 
services available in communities, “in most cases accomplishing work that would not otherwise 
have been carried out”. 
 
The evaluation attributed the impact of the programme to integrated service provision; 
supportive and dedicated programme staff; the quality of the projects; the intensity of the full 
time experience; and the expansion of social networks that seems to have been critical in 
explaining the impacts on young African-Americans. 
Source: Jastrzab, 1997. 
 
Workfare: Community Work Experience and Community Service 
Employment 
 
5.10 After 1981 mandatory work for AFDC recipients usually meant ‘workfare’ (Bloom, 1997, 
p. 63). The aim is to reinforce the work ethic by requiring participants to work in unpaid 
Community Work Experience jobs. Participants do not have employment status but 
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typically work hours that are calculated by dividing benefit entitlement by the hourly 
minimum wage. Sanctions are imposed for non-compliance. 
 
5.11 Only a few states have implemented large-scale workfare programmes, but they have been 
a component in many welfare reform strategies. Constraints on expansion have included 
administrative complexity, cost, and political opposition. MDRC impact evaluations of 
the workfare programmes that were experimentally evaluated in the 1980s indicated that 
on its own unpaid work experience did not significantly improve the future employment 
or earnings of participants, though better results were secured when work experience was 
combined with training and other supports. The largest positive impact they found was 
secured by the San Diego ‘SWIM’ (Saturation Work Initiative Model) that combined 
mandatory unpaid work with job search assistance and limited training. This was in 
contrast to the lack of impact in West Virginia, which ran a relatively large programme 
reliant almost exclusively on work requirements (Gueron & Pauly, 1991). 
 
5.12 Workfare programmes expanded with welfare reform in the 1990s as states, such as 
Wisconsin, increased work requirements and imposed time limits on entitlement. Other 
states, however, took a different approach with Vermont, for example, introducing paid 
Community Service Jobs in 1995 for those individuals who were required to work but 
could not get a regular job. In Vermont the jobs were usually part time and participants 
were placed in closely supervised, temporary public positions at public and non-profit 
agencies for a maximum of ten months. Participants also were able to claim in-work tax 
credits, but there was little support for making the transition to regular work.  
 
5.13 In other states, with or without Community Jobs programmes, a diverse range of local 
agencies and partnerships, working with a variety of different client groups, continued to 
develop and implement smaller scale wage paying programmes offering higher levels of 
support that gradually became known as ‘transitional jobs’ programmes. There were two 
key differences with workfare. First, the programmes paid wages and were designed to 
directly focus on transitions into regular work and would often combine Community 
Service Employment with the principles of subsidised work or on-the-job training 
programmes that had been used to induce employers to hire and train disadvantaged 
workers. Second, the programmes often targeted groups other than TANF recipients, in 
particular at risk’ youth, ex-offenders and people with disabilities. 
 
5.14 Most individual states now have either paid or unpaid work experience programmes as an 
element in their provision, but generally both programmes are small scale. In 2002 only 
40,000 people receiving TANF (Temporary Assistance to Needy Families) were enrolled 
in work experience programmes in any given month, with two thirds of them in just four 
states – New York, New Jersey, Illinois and Ohio (Holier, 2002, p. 1). Transitional Jobs 
programmes involved fewer participants but by 2003 the Transitional Jobs Network 
estimated there were about 17,000 participants in 40 US transitional jobs programmes, 
including four state-wide programmes (http://www.transitionaljobs.net/).  
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Transitional Jobs Programmes 
 
5.15 The new generation of transitional jobs programmes have been targeted both at lone 
parents with children who are receiving TANF and at other disadvantaged groups, such as 
ex-offenders, ‘at risk’ youth and refugees. They typically combine a variety of public 
funds to provide wage-paying jobs with skill development activities and related support 
services. Brief descriptions of several transitional jobs projects are given later in case 
study 5, with more detailed assessments of transitional jobs programmes in Washington 
State and New York City at the end of this chapter. 
 
5.16 A key characteristic of transitional jobs programmes is that they are not counter-cyclical 
job creation schemes. The stress on case management and on tackling the employment 
barriers of some of the hardest-to-help represents a different, more targeted intervention. 
As Kirby and colleagues note if the point was job creation then “the increased level of 
support and supervision provided through transitional jobs programmes would be 
unnecessary and a poor use of resources” (2002, p. vii). 
 
5.17 The goals of the different types of transitional jobs programmes have been summarised by 
Saner and Richer as (2001): 
 
Move welfare recipients with little/no recent work experience and other 
employment barriers into unsubsidised jobs. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Enhance job readiness and work-related skills among those recipients who do not 
succeed in front-end job search while retaining a ‘work first’ approach. 
Respond to TANF community service requirements and time limits on welfare 
without large-scale workfare programmes. 
Provide temporary paid work after welfare limits (the closest to traditional job 
creation). 
Develop models that generate work opportunities for welfare recipients even in 
periods or areas of high unemployment. 
 
5.18 There is now a body of evaluation evidence about the impacts of transitional jobs and the 
factors involved in the design of high performance programmes. Most of the major 
evaluation organisations, from MDRC to the Brookings Institute, have produced 
assessments but the most systematic evaluations have been carried out by Mathematica. In 
2001 they gathered information from 65 programmes that had transitional jobs 
characteristics (Pavetti and Strong, 2001). They concluded that the programmes had 
lessons for those administrators wishing to expand their options for TANF recipients but 
warned that these were relatively expensive programmes “ranging in cost from $3,500 to 
as much as $10,000 per person” (Pavetti and Strong, 2001, p. 28).  
 
5.19 Mathematica followed this report with an in-depth assessment of six programmes across 
the US, two of which were in Washington State. None of the six programmes had been 
evaluated experimentally, but placement and retention data suggested that in these 
programmes about half to two thirds of participants obtained unsubsidised employment 
(Kirby et al, 2002). More detailed results of job entry and programme costs are given in 
Table 5.1 It is important to note that the gross wage costs involved would be at least partly 
offset by savings in TANF benefit payments. 
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Table 5.1 Outcomes and Costs of Six Transitional Jobs Programmes 
 
 
 PREP, 
Forrest 
City, 
Arizona 
Community 
Job 
Programme, 
San Francisco, 
California 
GoodWorks! 
Augusta, 
Georgia 
Transitional 
Work 
Corporation, 
Philadelphia 
Community 
Jobs, 
Aberdeen, 
Washington 
Community 
Jobs, 
Tacoma, 
Washington 
Number of 
Clients in 
Period 
110 165 161 1924 140 761 
Average 
Length of 
Participation 
(months) 
3.1 6.5 7.7 3.4 6.2 5.3 
Placement Rate 
of all 
Participants 
into 
Unsubsidised 
Jobs 
48.2 46.7 70.3 48.5 n/a n/a 
Median Hourly 
Wage 
$5.75 $9.00 $5.75 $6.75 n/a n/a 
Cost Per 
Participant Per 
Month: 
Wages 
(as % of total) 
Services 
Total  
 
 
 
$701 
(45.1%) 
$856 
$1,556 
 
 
 
$749 
(32.0%) 
$1,593 
$2,342 
 
 
 
$287 
(13.3%) 
$1,871 
$2,158 
 
 
 
$520 
(28.5%) 
$1,305 
$1,825 
 
 
 
$590 
(53.2%) 
$519 
$1,109 
 
 
 
$534 
(58.5%) 
$379 
$913 
Source: Tables V.1, V.5, VI.5: Kirby G., Hill H., Pavetti L., Jacobson J., Derr M. and Winston P. (2002) Transitional 
Jobs: Stepping Stones to Unsubsidized Employment. Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., Washington. 
 
 
5.20 The evaluations make clear that transitional jobs programmes are working with and 
helping to place disadvantaged individuals, many of whom have multiple barriers to 
employment and who may not have engaged with work for many years. The Georgia 
Goodwill model in particular was found to demonstrate “that clients with complex needs 
can work if they have the right amount and types of support” (Derr et al, 2002, p. xiii). 
Despite these impacts, however, there are hard to help groups that pose significant 
operational problems and who, without appropriate assistance, are unlikely to make a 
transition to a subsidised job. The Mathematica review of six programmes found several 
themes to this. Case managers did not always feel adequately trained to handle severe 
problems, and many stressed that there were numerous issues that needed to be tackled 
prior to referral to a transitional job. Programme staff also reported that there were 
shortages or long waiting times for key services, such as substance abuse treatment and 
mental health counselling. Even where they existed it “can be difficult for programme 
staff to build and maintain referral systems with multiple government and community 
agencies” (Kirby et al, 2002, p. 70). 
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Case Study 5: Examples of Transitional Jobs Programmes 
 
Georgia Goodworks!: A Supported Employment Transitional Jobs Model 
 
In 1999 the State Government allocated $18.6 million to design and implement an intensive 
supported employment programme for hard-to-employ welfare recipients approaching their 48-
month time limit for TANF benefits. 
The model is based on the supported employment provided by Goodwill Industries in the work 
they do with people who have disabilities. Goodwill delivers the programme through performance 
contracts with a variety of local agencies.  
Key components include “aggressive outreach, screening and assessment, paid work placements, 
enhanced supports, individualised job placement and long term follow up”. Participants work 
between 20 and 30 hours a week in a structured work placement in entry-level jobs for between 
six and nine months. Placements can be in for-profit community agencies as well as non-profit 
organisations. Participants are paid between $5.15 and $8.52 per hour. Most work in clerical, 
health care or service related jobs. 
Other features of the programme include case conferences and low client-to-staff ratios. Personal 
advisors and job coaches manage 15 to 30 cases allowing for more intensive work with individual 
clients. 
Estimated cost per person per month in 2002 was about $785, including wages. Job placement 
rates in six county study sites found placement rates into unsubsidised jobs of between 35 per cent 
to 70 per cent with median hourly wages of between $5.75 and $8. 
 
In 2002 a tougher performance-contracting regime was implemented. Instead of a monthly 
payment for case management, for example, providers now are paid monthly for the time the 
client is in work placement for up to nine months. The monthly payment amount decreases every 
three months to encourage providers to move the client into a job. The bulk of any payment is 
only received for an unsubsidised job placement, with staged payments released on evidence of 
retention. 
 
A Mathematica evaluation concluded that GoodWorks! was a “promising practice” and that 
delivering the package of services effectively had meant ”thinking outside the box”. The 
programme was “not for everyone” but “demonstrates that clients with complex needs can work if 
they have the right amount and types of supports”.  
 
Source: Derr et al, 2002. 
 
 
YouthBuild: A Transitional Jobs Programme Targeted at Disadvantaged Young 
People  
 
YouthBuild is a national non-profit agency providing support, finance and technical aid to 200 
programmes engaging 6,000 participants in 44 states. YouthBuild recruits ‘high risk’ unemployed 
young people aged between 16 and 24 who do not have a high school diploma or have other 
educational needs. They combine employment in rehabilitating run down housing with support to 
secure a high school diploma equivalent. Since 1994 more than 20,000 young people have 
participated creating more than 7,000 units of affordable housing 
 
Management data shows the programme engages “a highly disadvantaged segment of the young 
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adult population” Three quarters are male and three quarters are African-American or Latino. Two 
in five participants receive public assistance, one in three has a criminal record, and two in five 
are already parents. 
 
Outcome data for 40 ‘programme cycles’ in 1996 and 1997 showed that: 
 
• Nearly two thirds of all enrolees graduated from the programme; the average length of 
stay for all participants was 8.7 months. 
• 81 per cent of all graduates subsequently found jobs at an average wage of $7.53 per hour 
or went on to postsecondary education. 
• 40 per cent of those participants who had not secured a high school diploma pre entry 
achieved the equivalent qualification. 
 
Subsequent follow up surveys of more than 400 YouthBuild graduates from 14 sites six months 
after graduation showed that 84 per cent were still working at an average wage of $7.66 per hour 
or were enrolled in school. 
 
One assessment concluded that the effectiveness of the model was attributable to the combination 
of work, skills training, education and personal development that provided a “comprehensive 
response to the employment barriers faced by disadvantaged young people”. 
 
Source: Johnson and Lopez, 2002. 
 
 
The Transitional Work Corporation: A Citywide Transitional Jobs Programme for 
Welfare Recipients Who Have Exhausted Their Time Limits 
 
‘Philadelphia Works’ is delivered by the Transitional Work Corporations. The first transitional 
workers were recruited in 1998. The client group face ‘multiple obstacles’ and most have reached 
their welfare receipt time limit. Participation is optional. Participants work for 25 hours per week 
for up to six months in jobs in city government and non-profit agencies and are paid the state 
minimum wage.  
After a two-week work preparation orientation clients enter work experience, and after four 
months TWC staff start to assist clients locate and acquire full time unsubsidised employment. 
One feature is the use of ‘work partners’ who are regular employees at the work site. Work 
partners agree to provide additional support on-site and in return receive $50 per month. 
Programme staff offer case management and job retention services for up to 12 months after 
participants find competitive jobs. Clients may qualify for job retention bonuses at placement 
($200), at 60 days ($200), and at 120 days ($400) if they are working at least 30 hours per week. 
By 2002 TWC had recruited over 6,000 people to transitional jobs, and 1,750 had progressed to 
unsubsidised employment, where they earned on average $7.50 an hour and nearly two thirds 
were still in employment six to nine months after participation. Average cost was $6,994 per 
client  
 
Source: Greenwald, 2002. 
 
 
 
 
 
What Works in Transitional Jobs  
 
 85 
 
 
ILMs and Transitional Employment in Britain and Internationally  
5.21 The following factors appear to be most closely associated with high performance 
(Sherwood, 1999; Ellwood and Kelty, 2000; Kim, 2001; Kirby et al, 2002): 
 
Targeting: Transitional jobs should serve as a last resort for those recipients who 
face the greatest number of barriers and so have been unable to obtain private 
sector jobs. MDRC suggest the programme should be open only to those who 
already have participated in job search activities and who have failed to get 
regular work. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
 
Poor neighbourhoods: Most assessments emphasise the anti poverty impact of 
transitional jobs. MDRC highlights the spatial dimension and suggests that the 
impact of transitional jobs might be enhanced if they are targeted at small 
geographical areas and integrated into multifaceted anti poverty or economic 
development strategies targeted at poor neighbourhoods. 
 
Assessment: This is important to target those clients for whom a transitional job 
is appropriate. Once selected successful programmes emphasise rapid entry into 
transitional job placements with clients spending two weeks, at most, in pre-
placement activities before beginning their jobs. 
 
Placement diversity: This is vital for providers to develop an array of work 
placements that have a diversity of workplace expectations and flexibilities. 
Choice of placements and a good ‘match’ lead to improved motivation and 
results. Placements with ‘for profit’ organisations increase diversity and closeness 
to the regular labour market but increase the potential for displacement.  
 
Placements with ‘for profit’ firms: Many US intermediaries, such as the Wildcat 
Corporation and EarnFair in New York and America Works, employ welfare 
recipients and place them on a temporary basis with employers who might then 
offer them permanent jobs. These interventions provide pre-placement services 
and select the relatively employable. This practice also has been adapted by 
transitional jobs providers who in places such as Washington State now encourage 
placements with ‘for profit’ organisations. This partly reflects the reality of 
‘down-sized’ government in an era of privatisation where distinctions between 
non-profit, for-profit and public organisations are hazy (such as the distinction 
between different types of hospitals). On the limited scale that most transitional 
job programmes operate such placements are unlikely to lead to serious 
displacement or substitution. If implemented on a large scale, however, as in the 
Parks Programme in New York City, there is likely to be substitution and political 
opposition. 
 
Training: Most of the programmes provide participants with some pre-placement 
training on job search skills and work place norms. Some programmes also 
require participants to complete between 4 to 20 hours of other work related 
activities during the transitional placement. The aim is to help participants address 
employment barriers, such as limited use of English, substance abuse problems, or 
difficulty with workplace norms. 
 
Support and supervision: At work, transitional workers receive more 
supervision and support than regular employees. Work site supervisors help them 
learn basic skills, acquire appropriate workplace behaviour, and identify leads for 
unsubsidised jobs. The support from programme staff is more intensive because of 
low client-to-staff ratios (generally 25:1) and there is generally at least weekly 
contact. 
86 
 
 
 
 
Workfare? Evaluation Lessons from USA Public Service Employment and Transitional Jobs Programmes 
 
 
 
Supportive services: Transitional jobs programmes tend to draw on rather than 
provide a range of supportive cash and in-kind supports, ranging from childcare 
through to transportation. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
 
Job search, retention and job developers: All transitional workers receive help 
searching for unsubsidised employment, but this is not always provided on-site 
and is often delivered by another agency. This makes tracking more difficult. 
Some programmes have developed job retention services - which can include 
supportive services, job coaching and incentive payments - for as long as two 
years. The key lesson for providers has been the importance of retaining and 
rewarding ‘job developers’, the staff whose role it is to find and fill vacancies, 
build relationships with employers and assist participants to find and get a job. 
 
Case Managers and networking: Evaluations constantly stress the importance of 
skilled case managers who can provide support, assist with tackling barriers and 
help participants gain access to the supports, additional help and job leads that are 
accessed through both formal and informal networks. 
 
Flexible, performance-based administration under a public/private model. 
Wage-based jobs programmes are likely to be more effective if they are small 
scale, community based efforts tailored to meet local needs, whether public or 
private. In administering jobs programmes the advice to state governments is that 
they should aim to create partnerships with an array of private organisations, 
whether for-profit or not-for-profit, and to reduce bureaucratic demands. Such an 
arrangement can provide programmes with both the flexibility to meet the 
changing demands of local labour markets and to seek out a larger number of 
work sites to meet the interests and skills of participants. Funding arrangements 
should reward results and encourage effective, entrepreneurial solutions, and 
financial incentives should focus on job retention and advancement as much as on 
initial placement. 
 
Partnerships: Effective collaboration between a range of agencies is a 
characteristic of successful programmes and this needs effective management both 
to deliver programme goals and also to create a ‘joined up’ experience for 
participants. In particular, it seems critical to maintain strong relationships 
between programme staff, especially case managers, and supervisors in 
transitional work placements. 
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Case Study 6: Washington State Community Jobs  
 
Community Jobs are a part of Washington State’s ‘WorkFirst’ welfare system. They were 
introduced in 1998 for “individuals facing multiple employment barriers who would otherwise be 
left behind”. The programme went state-wide in July 1999 and eligibility now is open when a 
‘work trigger’ is activated at 24 months requiring benefit recipients to undertake paid work or 
community service or lose assistance. CJ has grown significantly, now engaging up to 3,000 
participants a year. It is the largest transitional jobs programme in the USA. 
 
When designing WorkFirst the State Government decided not to undertake radical bureaucratic 
change but to rely on new partnership arrangements to take advantage of the ‘window of 
opportunity’ created by relatively buoyant labour markets. Significantly, it was decided that CJ 
would be coordinated by the Office of Trade and Economic Development (OTED), rather than 
the mainstream welfare agencies. This directly links CJs with an economic development agenda, 
and with services targeted at employers. 
 
OTED contracts with a network of local community-based and some ‘for profit’ organizations to 
provide local service delivery. Contractors find work sites and providing intensive case 
management, personal goal development and support services. Work sites are developed in a 
range of placements and should fit both participant and local needs. CJ has a hybrid funding 
structure that combines pay-for performance with some consistent flow of funds to its contractors.
 
Participants are referred to CJ by TANF case managers, and interviewed and assessed by the 
contractor’s case manager. Each participant develops an Individual Development Plan to identify 
professional/employment and personal goals. A training plan describes job duties, occupational 
goals, and skill development objectives. Participants are employed at minimum wage for up to 
nine months (average duration 7 months) during which they work 20 hours a week. In their 
remaining 20 hours each week, participants receive case management support and mentoring to 
resolve barriers to work. They also  may access subsidized education, work readiness, and 
vocational training opportunities. In addition to entry-level jobs in public and non-profit agencies 
some participants are employed as translators, teachers’ aides and bus drivers. Case managers can 
access a discretionary fund to assist a participant get a job, whether such help involves purchasing 
work clothes, transport to work, and so on. This was reduced from a maximum of $600 to $300 
per participant in 2003. 
 
Since 2001 OTED has developed private sector job placements in a variant called ‘Career Jump’. 
The aim was to offer a greater range of work placements in sectors with better job prospects. The 
design of Career Jump includes shorter enrolment, built-in career ladder tracks, higher wages, 
benefits, and focused training. A private employer can recruit a CJ worker for only five months. 
 
Washington State has extensive evaluation literature largely generated from the data collected 
through an independent ‘WorkFirst Study’. A random selection of 3,000 families who were 
receiving welfare in March 1999 has been followed up annually, supplemented by a second 
cohort of families followed up since October 2000 
(www.workfirst.wa.gov/about/StudyDescript.html).  
 
An early regression analysis of personal characteristics showed that CJ participants were amongst 
the least employable and another study confirmed that CJ participants were dealing 
simultaneously with an average of eight employment barriers. The typical participant was “a 31-
year-old single mom with two children, no high school degree, less than one year of prior job 
experience, and many personal issues ranging from lack of transportation and debt to an unstable 
housing situation or domestic violence” (Burchfield, 2002).  
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By 2001 a multivariate analysis of the 3,000 panel data led the researchers to conclude that CJ, 
and other components of WorkFirst, had a “significant impact” on the subsequent earnings and 
employment of the 3 per cent of the sample who had participated (Klawitter and Evans, 2001). 
Only 14 per cent of a matched comparison group of those who did not participate were in work, 
compared with 47 per cent of those who had participated in CJ. 
 
Another evaluation captured fuller data. It tracked 1,100 CJ participants via Unemployment 
Insurance data. 72 per cent had found some employment since leaving CJ, with the others either 
failing to find jobs or leaving the programme for other reasons. Over 60 per cent of those in 
employment joined the workforce in the first quarter after finishing CJ, with about one in five 
taking longer than six months. 45 per cent worked continuously over the period that was tracked, 
with each person on average working 75 per cent of the time available. One in five, however, 
worked for less than half that time and this group showed less income gain. Overall, the average 
income of those who worked rose by 60 per cent during the first two years and was 148 per cent 
higher than their pre-CJ income. In the year before CJ half the CJ participants did not work at all, 
and one in five had worked less than three months. The evaluators concluded that CJ “can break 
the negative employment patterns.. of welfare participants with the most barriers to employment”. 
They suggested, however, that the model needed to “strengthen’ capacity to move participants 
quickly into the workforce and provide stronger retention services” (Burchfield, 2002, p. 7). 
 
By May 2003 there were signs that the recession was impacting on WorkFirst, with Washington 
experiencing a significant increase in unemployment, then standing at 7 per cent. CJ exit rates 
had also slowed. There was evidence too that the fiscal crisis of Washington State and associated 
public expenditure reductions was prompting some reform of CJ. 
 
Key Sources: Field Notes, May 2003; Burchfield, 2002; Klawitter and Evans, 2001). 
 
 
Case Study 7: Transitional Jobs Programmes in New York 
 
New York City has been at the forefront of work-based welfare reform and has witnessed rapid 
reductions in the numbers claiming welfare. It still accounts for one out of every 13 cases of those 
receiving Federal TANF and Federal time limits on entitlement started to impact at the end of 
2001. New York State is constitutionally required to provide ‘home relief’ assistance to the poor 
which means that there is assistance for some single or childless people and for those who come 
to the end of their ‘time limits’.  
Welfare reform was a major priority in the 1990s and the City reorganised its welfare offices into 
Job Centers, contracted out its employment-related services, and created a system that required 
job search and work over the payment of cash assistance. Initially, NYC developed one of the 
largest US workfare programmes and, by the end of 1996, over 30,000 people were in the unpaid 
Work Experience Programme (WEP). Three quarters of these were in ‘basic’ unpaid work 
placements in public agencies, especially the Parks Department. The others were in training or 
other activities. By 2001 the programme had changed. Only 12 per cent of the 17,000 in WEP at 
the end of 2001 were in workfare alone. The rest were either in other activities or combined their 
unpaid work placement with a variety of programmes for those with special needs, such as those 
with substance abuse, mental health, or literacy problems (Nightingale et al, 2002). 
The City has gradually introduced wage paying work experience programmes, partly in response 
to political opposition to workfare but also to cater for those who are ending their Federal time 
limits at a time when the jobs market has tightened following 9/11 and the recession. At the same 
time NYC has been the site for the development of many community and Foundation led 
initiatives and there is a rich network of practice and demonstration projects that deliver wage-
based employment programmes to a variety of groups in the City. This case study briefly assesses 
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three of the wage-based programmes currently available - the wage-based transitional jobs 
programmes offered by the Parks Department; the Neighbourhood Work Project targeted at ex-
offenders, and the new EarnFair Alliance that operates like an employment agency (similar to the 
Wildcat Service Corporation that has been widely covered in Britain). 
Parks Career Training 
Since 1995 the New York City Parks Department has relied significantly on the unpaid labour of 
Work Experience Programme participants who at one point made up some 20 per cent of the 
agency’s maintenance staff. The traditional WEP programme offers placements for between six 
months and a year and participants work 20 hours a week, with their additional ‘simulated’ 
workweek being made up of other activities. This unpaid labour has contributed to a marked 
increase in park cleanliness, security and other performance standards 
(www.nycgovparks.org/sub_opportunities/opportunities.html).  
Since 1994 the programme has been supplemented by a transitional jobs programme, ‘Parks 
Careers Training’ (PACT). It is credited with training over 5,000 participants and placing nearly 
2,000 in full-time and seasonal jobs. Initially the programme was targeted at ‘home relief’ 
recipients, predominantly male, single and without children. Sherwood (1999) cites a non-
experimental evaluation from 1996 that found that some 40 per cent of participants obtained 
regular full time jobs, with 77 per cent retaining employment for at least 90 days. This contrasted 
well with the 10 to 15 per cent of WEP participants moving into jobs. 
Participation in PACT was voluntary. The programme offered 35 hours employment a week for 
up to twelve months in jobs that ranged from office work and horticulture through to park and 
vehicle maintenance and security positions. The jobs offered training, help with basic skills and 
other services and paid $8.40 an hour. During their time on the programme most participants 
worked either in small crews supervised by a regular employee, or in individually assigned 
positions. Most participants viewed the experience as real, challenging work and thought it a 
valuable experience. More than 60 per cent of participants stayed in PACT for about ten months, 
or left because they found a job; only 15 per cent left voluntarily. 
The combination of voluntary participation and Parks selection screened out many of the hardest 
to help, including those who had virtually no work experience or who had been on welfare for 
over five years. Although they were a more motivated group the evaluation pointed out that they 
were still disadvantaged relative to the working population. They were predominantly middle 
aged, 84 per cent minority, 40 per cent without a high school diploma or equivalent, 20 per cent 
with a criminal record and 40 per cent with less than five years experience. 
Subsequently the Parks Department redesigned its programmes and since 2001 provision is made 
up of conventional WEP and a wage-based ‘Park Opportunities Programme’ (POP) that was 
modelled on PACT but to increase work incentives pays lower wages and offers a maximum of 
six months employment. Both groups of participants are assisted by specialised mandatory job 
placement and preparation services that increase in intensity during participation in the 
programme. Between 1998 and 2002 this placement agency placed 2,700 people into regular 
jobs, over 85 per cent of whom retained the job for at least 90 days. It adopts an 'aggressive’ 
approach to job development and markets itself as a ‘no fees’ employment service, that will pre 
screen candidates and provide post placement support. It  markets also a range of employer tax 
credits for recruiting welfare recipients. 
The changing face of workfare in New York is evident in the fact that in May 2003 there were 
1,000 unpaid WEP and 1,800 paid POP participants, with the wage-based programme planned to 
increase to 2,500. 
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The Neighbourhood Work Project: Center for Employment Opportunities 
(www.ceoworks.org) 
CEO provides job preparation and placement services for ex-offenders and others under 
community supervision in NYC. It has been an independent non-profit organisation since 1996. 
With approximately 100 staff members and a budget of $9 million, CEO enrols about 1,500 ex-
offenders annually, the majority having just been released from New York State’s ‘boot camp’ 
programme. CEO only accepts non-violent offenders, of which 95 per cent have drug-related 
offences. 90 per cent of its clients are young men in their mid-20s, many with children that they 
have to support. 
The organization has developed a distinctive transitional jobs approach. First, the Neighbourhood 
Work Project (NWP) offers immediate, short-term paid employment opportunities through a day-
labor program providing maintenance and repair services to public agencies. Participants are 
organized in work crews of five to seven members with a full-time field supervisor, and they 
provide general building maintenance, grounds keeping and painting services to a range of 
organisations across New York City. Participants are paid the federal minimum wage on a daily 
basis, providing a clear incentive and much needed cash for recently released offenders to 
continue to seek regular jobs. Participants typically remain in NWP for two to three months. 
When ex-offenders arrive at CEO, they attend a weeklong life skills and pre-employment 
workshop to learn how to prepare a resume, how to discuss their conviction with a potential 
employer, and other basic interview skills. On the last day, participants work with their individual 
employment specialists to develop an employment plan and assess their vocational skills and 
interests. While employed in NWP, participants meet their employment specialists weekly to 
continue work on interviewing skills, follow up on job leads developed by employment 
specialists, and address needs that might impede their employment success, like obtaining 
housing, medical services, child care or work-related documents. 
CEO is unusual in the non-profit world in its staff evaluation. For job developers, CEO operates a 
commission-based environment, where they earn a base salary and bonuses based on their 
performance. For other staff, whose work is not so easily quantifiable, CEO developed additional 
standards around judgment, communication and self-management to generate scores used to 
calculate bonuses. 
This dual strategy has proved very effective. The contracts obtained for building services 
generate enough revenue for NWP to be self-sustaining, while providing real work for 
participants. NWP has helped place participants with over 300 companies in manufacturing, food 
industries, customer service and office support, while maintaining a 65 per cent placement rate 
and an average starting wage of $6.30 an hour. 
EarnFair (New York City) (www.earnfair.com) 
 
EarnFair is a demonstration project, funded by Foundations, that began operating in NYC in 
2000. The project is testing new ideas to improve job prospects for disadvantaged workers. 
EarnFair employs welfare recipients and others from job placement programmes in the city. 
Those it recruits are employed for up to two years subject to their performance. EarnFair operates 
in approximately the same way as a for-profit staffing agency, and workers compete in the labour 
market for placements in various businesses and non-profit organizations. The organization both 
provides recruitment screening for entry-level employers and allows them time to test whether 
they want to employ a participant directly.  
 
EarnFair provides an array of employment assistance and retention services and the aim is to 
equip participants to be able to retain employment and increase their earnings. During the two 
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years in which a worker may participate in the programme, participants have access to such 
services as ‘job readiness’ training, remedial education, personal financial education, and job 
coaching. Workers also get help in obtaining childcare assistance and healthcare. Uniquely, 
EarnFair also offers its participants a chance to open ‘individual development accounts’ (similar 
to British Individual Learning Accounts). The programme is administered through ten 
neighbourhood organisations, which act as ‘home bases’ for services and are being transformed 
into ‘local worker support centres’. 
 
By June 2003 the Programme Manager reported that together EarnFair Alliance organizations had 
placed almost 4,000 low-income individuals with multiple barriers to employment into jobs and 
achieved retention rates “among the highest of all the employment services providers in the City”. 
Placements secured an average wage of $9 an hour, 75 per cent above the minimum wage 
(Shapiro, 2003). 
 
Key Sources: Nightingale et al, 2002; Field Notes, May 1993.  
92 
 
 
 
 
  
 
6.   What Works  
 
 
 
 
6.1 Distinguishing ILMs from former job creation and temporary employment schemes is 
important in advancing the debate on the effectiveness of ILMs as a labour market 
intervention. 
 
6.2 ILMs have some features which distinguishes them from former national programmes: 
 
they are a local response to local conditions; • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
ILMs usually are focused on the most disadvantaged unemployed people; 
they attempt to offer a range of measures to increase employability, and are not 
exclusively orientated to the provision of temporary work; 
the majority of ILMs are focused on labour market outcomes; and  
ILMs act as a mechanism for local partners to ‘join-up’ national initiatives and 
programmes. 
 
6.3 The weakness of many national temporary employment schemes has long been recognised 
in the UK, and increasingly in other countries. The policy response has tended to 
concentrate on activities that will increase the effectiveness of job search and/or focus on 
one specific aspect of employability, such as training. The consistent problem with such 
responses is that they have tended not to work well for the most disadvantaged in the 
labour market. 
 
6.4 Low employability usually stems from a range of different factors, or multiple barriers. A 
low level of educational attainment may be a significant factor in stopping a person 
finding work, but training isolated from the experience of work may not be the solution. 
The successful ILMs appear to be distinctively focused on provision that can tackle 
multiple barriers.  
 
6.5 The basic design of New Deal 18-24 and 25+ recognises the need to concentrate first on 
job placement and increasing job search effectiveness, and for the majority of people that 
join New Deal this is sufficient to find employment. However, for those initially 
unsuccessful the New Deal 18-24 Options and New Deal 25+ Intensive Activity Period 
are designed to give more intensive support. One of the key policy questions is whether 
this support is as effective as it could be, and whether the design of New Deal provision 
has anything to learn from the ILM approach? 
 
6.6 Even if ILMs can be distinguished from temporary employment schemes, there remains a 
substantial body of thought that maintains that their labour market effect remains the 
same. Table 6.1 sets out, in summary, the main criticisms of ILMs, the ILM response, and 
evidence from this report. 
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Table 6.1 Summary of Criticisms of ILMs and Evidence from the Survey 
 
Criticism ILM response Evidence from Review and 
Survey 
High cost May cost more but returns to 
individual and community are 
worth it 
ILMs are more expensive, but not 
as much as previously thought 
Recruit the more 
employable 
Voluntary participation is 
important, but ILMs still target 
the least employable 
Some evidence that non-New 
Deal ILMs do recruit the more 
employable, but these only 
represent one-third of all ILMs 
Detach people from 
active job search 
Most recruits have ceased active 
job search, ILMs provide the 
transition back to job search 
ILMs are more focused on labour 
market outcomes than other 
temporary employment schemes 
Multiple objectives 
confuse the labour 
market objective 
True, and this is beneficial There are multiple objectives, but 
labour market outcomes appear to 
have primacy 
High levels of 
displacement 
Only if ILM is of a significant 
scale, and that work activity is 
inappropriate 
Large, national temporary 
employment schemes do have 
high displacement but ILMs’ 
small size and local control 
minimises this. 
Job outcome rates are no 
better 
ILMs claim to double New Deal 
job outcome rates  
There is some evidence from the 
survey that New Deal 
employment rates are 
considerably improved, possibly 
more than doubled. 
Internationally this also appears 
to be the case. 
 
 
6.7 The international review and survey suggests that there are some features common to 
successful ILMs and related Transitional Employment Programmes: 
 
targeting of the most disadvantaged • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
targeting of geographical areas 
devised and controlled at the local level 
managing the transition from benefits to a waged employee 
support services for the individual employee 
access to training 
work which is close to conventional labour market conditions 
local partnership 
integration of national initiatives; and   
investment in staff capacity. 
 
6.8 Whilst the survey has shown that many ILMs have successfully worked with the New 
Deal, it is our view that there is also a persistent tension between the design, structure and 
rules of a national programme and locally devised ILMs. The extent of flexibility 
permitted at the local level to ‘bend’ national programmes is therefore critical to the 
ability of local partners to operate ILMs and other local labour market initiatives. 
 
 
6.9 As we have pointed out before, there is essentially a neutral approach to ILMs by 
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Government. If this policy were to encourage ILMs, then we suggest that the following 
factors will be critical: 
 
1. stimulating local labour market initiatives, to complement national programmes 
for priority areas and groups 
2. greater flexibility for local partners to devise effective local processes 
3. continued focusing of ILMs on the hardest to help in the labour market, which 
could include lone parents and people on Incapacity Benefit 
4. encouraging the contribution ILMs can make in neighbourhood regeneration 
where national funding streams are co-ordinated by Local Strategic Partnerships 
5. requiring local partners to identify the added value of bringing funding together 
for ILMs 
6. continuing to seek to reduce the administrative requirements of different funding 
streams 
7. there should be a mechanism so that ILMs can be more easily identified and their 
impact measured over time. 
 
6.10 In summary, the extent to which ILMs are able to complement and ‘join up’ national 
programmes will depend on the extent to which policies can build on their essentially 
local character, and bring added value to deprived areas and hard to help groups. 
 
6.11 There also appears to be certain pre-conditions for the emergence of local ILMs, both in 
the UK and internationally. These are: 
 
a concentration of long-term unemployed people, and/or those with multiple 
barriers 
• 
• 
• 
• 
various funding streams targeted at the area or client group 
under-performing national interventions, and where local partners are committed 
to and empowered to improve performance; and  
national rules that are sufficiently flexible to enable ‘joining-up’. 
 
6.12 These pre-conditions do not explain all the ILM-type interventions that we examined, for 
example, the State-wide Transitional Jobs Programme in Washington State, Worktrack in 
Northern Ireland, or indeed the StepUP pilot. These are examples of transitional 
employment programmes where Government has sought to improve national programmes 
by incorporating elements into their design that draw on the factors associated with 
successful ILMs. As yet the effectiveness of these interventions are to be proven, but they 
are evidence of Governments seeking to adapt the ILM approach to increase the job 
outcome rates for the most disadvantaged. 
 
6.13 There appear to be three key questions for policy makers. 
 
6.14 First, if it is true that ILMs (or indeed other forms of local labour market initiative) will 
emerge under certain conditions then should Government encourage or inhibit these 
initiatives? 
 
6.15 Second, can British ILMs and international experience help inform the development of 
existing New Deals to increase the job outcome rates for the most disadvantaged? 
 
6.16 Third, should there be new and separate initiatives that learn from ILMs and transitional 
employment programmes that are targeted on specific groups of people and/or areas? 
 
Encouraging or Inhibiting ILMs? 
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6.17 The policy context for this question is a general shift to greater local discretion across 
Government. Local Strategic Partnerships now cover the majority of areas where ILMs 
operate. As Partnerships who have a responsibility to consider how Government 
initiatives can work together at the local level, it is likely that there will be a demand for 
more local labour market initiatives.  
 
6.18 Local Public Service Agreements already specifically encourage the emergence of local 
initiatives through Local Authorities, and the 2003 Beacon Council Awards for 
‘Removing Barriers to Work’ has demonstrated the actions that Local Authorities are 
taking, and are encouraged to take. 
 
6.19 In addition, there is now a move within Jobcentre Plus to devolve more discretion in 
design and delivery to the District level. It is likely this will mean that the implementation 
of national programmes into local labour markets will vary according to local conditions.  
 
6.20 In the present context it appears that local labour market initiatives are more likely to 
emerge than not. This implies that the structure and design of national programmes will be 
critical.  
 
 
Developing Mainstream New Deals 
 
6.21 As the survey has shown, around 10 per cent of New Deal 18-24 ETF and Voluntary 
Sector options and New Deal 25+ Work Experience Placements are delivered by ILMs. 
The job outcome rates for these New Deal-based ILMs appear to have improved the 
national job outcome rates for the Options.  
 
6.22 If this is true then what are the key design lessons from ILMs that could help improve job 
outcome rates in general? The survey did not find any strong correlation between any 
single characteristic and successful ILMs. This could imply that it is the combination of 
wage+training+support which is significant for improved performance. However, the 
survey also did identify that New Deal-based ILMs seemed to be significantly more 
successful when contracts were extended beyond 26 weeks.  
 
6.23 Considering the review and the survey evidence together we also believe that giving 
people a job and a wage is important. Helping disadvantaged individuals make the 
transition from benefits to wages whilst on a ‘programme’ that is providing support could 
be the main advantage of the ILM approach. The implication for New Deal design is that, 
for disadvantaged groups, the transition from benefits to a wage should be made possible 
whilst on New Deal. Furthermore this is best delivered through enabling a mix of 
wage+training+support, all of which could be tailored for areas and specific groups of 
people. 
 
 
Separate Targeted Initiatives 
 
6.24 Some of the international examples cited in this report are interventions that have been 
designed for specific groups of people, such as ex-offenders and lone parents with 
multiple barriers and little, if any, work experience. StepUP also has been specifically 
designed as separate to New Deal to increase the motivation of those who become eligible 
for New Deal again. 
 
6.25 Further exploration is needed into how priority groups and areas may benefit from distinct 
wage-based initiatives. This may become more pressing as employment requirements are 
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extended. In particular, there may be scope to develop programmes that bring together the 
best features of ILMs and those of Supported Employment as seems to have happened in 
Georgia Goodworks!  
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Appendix A: The Evidence Review 
 
The review of evidence and ‘what works’ was carried out between October 2002 and May 2003. 
Initially, it involved a search of six specialist databases and the use of one meta search engine, 
Copernic Professional. The key search phrases used were: Intermediate Labour Market; 
Transitional Employment; Transitional Jobs; Community Jobs; Community Employment; 
Workfare; Supported Employment; Work Experience Programme (Program); Job Creation 
Programme (Program); and Community Service Employment. 
 
The searches generated a large number of matches – over 1,500 through the specialist databases 
and nearly 3,000 through Copernic (the results of the data base searches are given below). Peer 
reviewed articles were assessed and, in the case of Copernic, a sample of the literature was 
checked. The search failed to reveal the three experimental random assignment evaluations of 
relevant programmes in the USA, that were later located through supplementary approaches 
described below. The search did reveal relevant quasi-experimental studies, both from the USA 
and especially from Northern Europe.  
 
In addition there were descriptive performance and monitoring statistics presented in a broad 
range of programme assessments, case studies and implementation guides that had evidential 
value and were found in the reports, books and journals that make up part of what is described as 
‘grey’ literature. This pattern reflected the highly fragmented nature of the relevant labour market 
and programme literature in contrast with the limited number of large, high quality bibliographic 
databases that exist in disciplines such as medicine for which the systematic review methodology 
was developed (Young et al, 2002).  
 
If we had adhered to the text book methodological criteria for systematic reviews we would have 
severely restricted the studies to be assessed and missed much of the evidence available in project 
related and qualitative studies. We also would have missed three relevant experimental US 
studies. In order to capture the relevant literature the formal searches were supplemented in four 
ways:  
 
1. Utilising the existing extensive collections of evaluations and ILM project reports 
available at the University of Portsmouth and the Centre for Economic & Social 
Inclusion. 
2. Reviewing the sections on tackling long term unemployment contained in the individual 
country assessments produced for the 2002 ‘Impact Evaluation’ on the first five years of 
the European Employment Strategy 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_strategy/impact_en.htm). 
3. Contacting an existing network of national experts in a number of countries – Germany, 
France, Italy, Denmark, Holland, Ireland, the USA, and Australia – to obtain information 
about relevant evaluations, projects and policy developments. 
4. An additional search of the websites of key policy and evaluation organisations in the 
USA. This included the Department of Health and Human Services; Department of Labor; 
Abt Associates; Mathematica; the Manpower Development Research Corporation; the 
Urban Institute; the Brookings Institute; the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities; and 
the Center on Law and Social Policy.  
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 These combined research methods led to the accumulation of over 200 evaluations, reports, 
articles, case studies and books that contained evidence that was of relevance for assessing the 
impact of ILMs and transitional employment programmes. 
To facilitate the early choice of comparator countries we first reviewed edited collections, recent 
evaluations and evidence and policy overviews. We then consulted with national experts. This 
was followed by a more detailed assessment of the evaluation evidence and policy developments 
from several countries that the literature searches indicated had relevant programme experience, 
and for which there was evidence that they were good comparators with the potential for policy 
transfer (CMPS, 2002). 
 
The richest source of evaluation evidence was from the USA, especially that concerned with 
‘transitional jobs’ programmes. There were no experimental evaluations of these programmes but 
there were many independent assessments. Much of this literature has been published by the 
leading research organisations in the USA that have done so much to create high quality 
evaluations and to stimulate effective inter-State policy transfer.  
 
We looked too in more detail at two countries that had reshaped their subsidised employment and 
ILM type programmes within the context of implementing employment first benefit systems – 
Holland and Australia. This was supplemented by examining developments in a major European 
country, Germany, which continues to implement large-scale temporary job creation programmes. 
 
Finally, the research was supplemented by case study visits to three of the countries that seemed, 
on the basis of the evidence, to represent relevant comparators that could inform British 
operational practice. The countries involved were the Netherlands, the USA and the Republic of 
Ireland. 
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Number of matches from each Systematic Review Source (using GB and USA 
spelling) 
 
Source SSCI IBSS ASSIA EBSCO RePEC SPECTR Copernic 
Professional
Intermediate Labour 
Market 
0 1 0 1 0 0 184        67 
Job Creation 
Programme 
2 2 1 35 2 0 258        72 
Transitional 
Employment 
12 0 1 27 0 0 292      128 
Transitional Jobs 0 0 0 6 1 0 178        68 
Community Jobs 6 1 1 9 0 0 374        66 
Community 
Employment 
23 5 10 41 0 0 534      145 
Workfare 131 97 35 356 44 1 653      157 
Supported 
Employment 
392 9 53 250 0 0 534      165 
Work Experience 
Programme 
8 1 5 21 5 5 346      122 
Secondary Labour 
Market 
25 8 6 24 3 0 197        70 
Community Service 
Employment 
7 5 1 3 0 0 344        91 
 
SSCI  Social Science Citation Index from Institute for Scientific Information ‘Web of Science’ (covers 
3,300 ‘leading scientific and technical journals’) 
IBSS  International Bibliography of the Social Sciences covers Ingenta Journals with 1.2 million articles 
from over 2,700 journals 
ASSIA  Applied Social Science Index and Abstracts 
EBSCO Electronic Journals Service, which covered Business Source Elite (1,100 scholarly business 
journals); EconLit (American Economic Association’s electronic database with 825,000 records); 
and TOC Premier (Covers over 18 million citation records and 23,000 of the ‘most recently 
published journals) 
RePEC  Research Papers in Economics (177,000 articles, working papers, etc.) 
SPECTR  The Campbell Collaboration’s Social, Psychological, Educational and  
Criminological Trials Register 
Copernic  An advanced search tool which can search over 1,200 search engines.  
Professional  Within Copernic the categories of search engine we selected were those which related to ‘science 
publications’ and those for a dozen individual countries thought most relevant to the research. This 
gave 220 search engines. Copernic deleted broken links and excludes duplicate pages and to ensure 
relevancy the search was restricted to a maximum of 10 results from each search engine. We also 
limited results to those in English language. 
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Survey of ILMs and Transitional Employment 
 
Please complete this survey if you can tick all of the boxes in Question 1 and at least one box in Question 
1.1. 
  
1. Do you operate ILMs or transitional employment? 
 
 Please tick 
Do you offer temporary jobs on short-term contracts to unemployed or 
economically inactive people? 
 
Do you receive state and/or private funding to support costs?  
Do you offer a wage at some point in the participants stay?  
 
Additional features: 
 
Do you offer access to training at some point?  
Do you offer access to personal support and/ or job search?  
Is some or all of the work done of benefit to the community (i.e. not in the 
private sector)?  
 
 
If you have ticked all the boxes in Question 1 and at least one box in Question 1.1 please proceed to 
answer the rest of the survey and return to Centre for Economic & Social Inclusion (CESI) by Monday 10th 
February 2003. 
 
2. Organisation Details 
 
Name of organisation:  
Contact (person completing the 
survey): 
 
Address:  
  
  
  
Tel no:  
Email:  
Legal status of organisation:  
Number of employees 
(excluding transitional 
employees): 
 
Geographical area covered by 
ILM/ transitional employment 
activity. Please give Local 
Authority areas only. 
 
 
 
3. Funding and volumes 
 
3.1 For the following years please give total turnover of transitional employment activity11. If not operating 
in any year please mark ‘N/A’ 
 
 £ 
                                                     
11 Defined as all direct and indirect costs of supporting the temporary jobs, including management costs, 
and any capital expenditure. 
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2000/ 2001 total turnover of transitional employment activity  
2001/ 2002 total turnover of transitional employment activity  
2002/ 2003 estimated total turnover of transitional employment 
activity 
 
 
3.2 Please provide an estimated percentage breakdown for 2002/2003: 
 
 % 
Wages  
Support costs to the transitional employee  
Work activity costs (e.g. materials)  
Training costs  
Managements costs (incl. overheads)  
Other costs (please specify)  
  
  
Total 100% 
 
3.3 Where does your funding come from for transitional employment? Please estimate the percentage from 
each funding source for the current financial year. NB. this question was varied for surveys going to 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
 
Funding Source % 
New Deal 18-24  
New Deal 25+  
StepUP  
European funds (include all types e.g. ESF, ERDF, Equal)  
Single Regeneration Budget  
Neighbourhood Regeneration Fund  
New Deal for Communities  
Employment Zone  
Education Action Zone  
Health Action Zone  
Action Team  
Learning & Skills Council funds  
Contributions from employers  
Regional Development Agency  
Trust funds  
Lottery funds  
Local Authority grant  
Trading income  
Other (please detail):  
  
  
  
  
Total 100% 
 
 
3.4 For any of the above funds are you a sub-contractor to another organisation? This question is to help us 
avoid double counting of transitional employment jobs. If you are, please give details: 
 
Funding Source Name of main contractor 
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 3.5 Number of participants in transitional employment on 31
st October 2002   
 
3.6 Number of transitional jobs and participants for: 
 
 2000/ 2001 2001/ 2002 
 
2002/ 2003 
(to 31st October) 
a) Total number of jobs available for 
recruitment 
   
b) Number of participants starting    
c) Number of participants who left for 
any reason 
   
 
Unit costs 
 
 £ for 2000/ 2001 £ for 2001/ 2002 £ for 2002/ 2003 
(to 31st October) 
For each available job    
For each participant starting    
 
NB. If these figures do not equal Q3.1 divided by Q3.5 a) and b) please provide an explanation for how you 
calculate and express your unit costs. 
 
 
4. Activity 
 
Under the following headings can you classify the work of your transitional employees?   
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Total number
of jobs in 
2002/ 2003 
Number 
employed in
the voluntary
sector 
Number 
employed in 
the public 
sector 
Number 
employed in
the private
sector 
 Protective Service Occupations     
 Culture, Media and Sports Occupations     
 Administrative Occupations 
 
 
  
 Secretarial and Related Occupations     
 Skilled Agricultural Trades     
 Skilled Metal and Electronic Trades     
 Skilled Construction and Building Trades     
 Textiles, Printing and Other Skilled Trades     
 Caring Personal Service Occupations     
 Leisure and Other Personal Service      
 Occupations 
    
 Sales Occupations     
 Customer Service Occupations     
 Process, Plant and Machine Operatives     
 Transport and Mobile Machine Drivers and   
 Operatives 
    
 Elementary Trades, Plant and Storage     
 Related Occupations 
    
 Elementary Administration and Service  
 Occupations 
    
 
If you feel you cannot use one of the headings above, please briefly describe the activity of the 
transitional employees. 
 
Description Total 
number of 
jobs in 
2002/ 2003 
in the 
voluntary 
sector 
in the public 
sector 
in the 
private 
sector 
     
     
     
     
 
Benefit to the community. Please briefly describe any activities which are of direct benefit to the 
community e.g. environmental improvement, crime prevention, etc. Please also indicate the number of 
transitional jobs for each activity. 
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Activity Number of transitional jobs 
  
 
 
5. The transitional job offer 
 
Please describe how wage levels are determined: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wage level 
 
 
 £ per hour 
What is the average wage across all jobs?  
What is the range of wages paid? from £              to £ 
 
Duration of transitional jobs and hours per week 
 
What is the length of the standard temporary contract offered?                 weeks 
What are the contracted hours per week, including all activities?                 hours 
For all leavers in 2002/3 what is the average length of stay?                 weeks 
 
Do you have any variations to the standard temporary contract and hours per week, as given above?  
YES/NO 
If YES, please give details: 
 
 
 
Please tick the personal support offered: 
 
 tick 
Benefits and money advice  
Childcare advice  
Support with childcare costs  
Support with travel costs  
Mentor  
Support with back to work costs (e.g. clothing)  
Drug misuse advice/ referral  
Advice/ referral on alcohol abuse   
Housing advice  
Job search  
Career advice  
Support in early months in new job  
Other – please specify: 
 
 
 
Please briefly describe how you deliver personal support. For example, are there dedicated staff or do 
supervisors provide the support, and do you use specialist agencies? If possible, could you estimate the 
average amount of time spent with a transitional employee over a year? 
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Average time spent on personal support for each employee over a year = 
 
 
 
  
The training you offer: 
 
 Tick Average Hours 
per week 
If you offer accredited 
training please tick 
On the job    
Off the job    
ESOL    
Basic/ life skills    
 
Please describe briefly how you deliver job search support, especially at what point you deliver it 
during a person’s temporary contract: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you deliver support (formal or informal) to the employee and employer in the early months of 
someone getting a job in the open labour market? 
 
To the employee YES/NO 
To the employer YES/NO 
 
If YES to either please describe the nature of the support and how it is delivered: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Characteristics of employees 
 
For all starters in this financial year up to 31st October please give the percentage breakdown of 
employees for the following characteristics. We recognise that not all organisations collect this data – 
where it is not available please mark with ‘N/A’. 
 
6.1 Age profile % 
16-17  
18-24  
25-49  
50+  
 
 
6.2 Gender % 
Male  
Female  
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 6.3 Ethnicity %  % 
British  Bangladeshi  
Irish  Other Asian  
Other White  Black Caribbean  
White and Black Caribbean  Black African  
White and Black African  Other Black  
White and Asian  Chinese  
Other Mixed  Other Ethnic Group  
Indian  Prefer not to say  
Pakistani  TOTAL  100% 
 
6.4 Disability % 
People with a disability or health problem  
 
6.5 Previous employment record % 
Those who have not had paid employment before  
Those who have only had casual employment before  
 
6.6 Qualification levels – percentage whose highest qualification is: % 
Those with no academic or vocational qualifications on joining  
NVQ level 1 (1- 5 GCSEs grade D – G)  
NVQ level 2 (1- 5 GCSEs grades A – C)  
NVQ level 3 (A Level)  
NVQ level 4 (Higher level qualifications)  
 
For starters in 2002/3 how significant are the following list of barriers? Please use your best 
assessment to tick the appropriate column: 
 
 Very 
Significant 
Significant Not Very 
Significant 
Not a 
Problem 
Inadequate housing     
Lack of previous work experience     
Child care or care of dependent     
Literacy and numeracy     
De-motivated in working or seeking 
employment 
    
Living in social rented accommodation     
Lack of public transport     
Problems with the law or previous record     
No permanent place to live     
Illness of another member of the family     
Employer discrimination     
Lack of personal transport     
Problems with drugs or alcohol     
Access to a phone      
No jobs nearby where they live     
Lack of references from previous 
employer 
    
Debt or money problems     
Partner out of work     
Insufficient English language skills     
Health problems     
Other (please specify): 
What have been your main problems in managing transitional employees? 
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 Very 
Significant 
Significant Not Very 
Significant 
Not a 
Problem 
Timekeeping         
Discipline problems         
Lack of motivation         
Lack of basic/ life skills         
Lack of skills needed for the job         
Personal problems at home         
Suspected or actual drug abuse         
Suspected or actual alcohol abuse         
Homelessness         
Learning difficulties         
 Other (please specify): 
          
 
7. Recruitment 
 
Target groups for recruitment – please specify any target groups for recruitment that you may have 
beyond the eligibility requirements of your funders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please give details of recruitment methods (including outreach) other than referrals from Jobcentre 
Plus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you take mandatory referrals from Jobcentre Plus?   YES/NO 
 
If YES please describe any special arrangements in working with this group: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Outcomes 
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What targets do you have for positive outcomes this financial year (2002/03)? Please indicate if these 
are contractual or your own targets. 
 
 % Contractual 
(tick) 
Own 
(tick) 
Leavers into jobs    
Leavers going into full-time further or higher education    
Securing a qualification    
Volunteering    
Other positive outcomes measures you may use (specify 
below): 
   
    
    
    
 
Do you set any targets for the length of time a job leaver to the open labour market stays in their new 
job? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of all your transitional employees who have left this year up to 31st October, at any stage in their 
contract, how many… 
 
 Leavers in 2001/ 
2002 
(numbers) 
Leavers in 2002/ 
2003 
(numbers) 
Went to another job   
  For all leavers to jobs: 
what numbers are known to have stayed in their new job 
for longer than 13 weeks? 
what numbers got a job with the same employer for whom 
they worked as a transitional employee? 
  
Went into full-time further or higher education   
Were dismissed   
Resigned for health reasons   
Resigned for domestic reasons   
Dropped out with no reason given   
Returned to receiving benefits   
Left into volunteering   
Secured a qualification   
Destination is unknown  
Left for another reason (specify below)  
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8.4 Do you have any local evaluation evidence of sustained job outcomes lasting longer than 13 weeks, or 
any other evaluation of your outcomes?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.6 Please give details of any methods you might use to measure the ‘distance travelled’ by transitional 
employees.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Reasons for establishing Transitional Employment and progress to date 
 
How important were the following reasons when deciding to establish transitional employment in your 
area: 
 
 Very 
important 
Importan
t 
Not that 
important 
Not at all 
important 
    
To increase employability of unemployed people     
To enhance the New Deal     
To provide services of benefit to the community     
    
   
   
To meet needs of voluntary and community sector 
employers 
    
To help unemployed people get back into the 
labour market 
To create or support social enterprises 
To meet needs of private sector employers   
To meet needs of public sector employers  
 
Is transitional employment part of any formal local strategies in your area?   YES/NO 
If YES, please give details: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please describe in your words the main reasons for establishing transitional employment in your local 
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area: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
London SE1 7TP 
or email to: survey@cesi.org.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
Have you had any study or evaluation done (either by yourselves or a funder) which you can share 
with us? Please give details below and attach or email any reports you may have: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What changes, and/or resources, would you like to see which would help you run your transitional 
employment more effectively? This is a deliberately open-ended question given the wide range of 
circumstances that ILMs operate within.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for taking the time to complete this survey.  
Please return by Monday 10th February 2003 to: 
 
CESI 
3rd Floor 
89 Albert Embankment  
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